MacEachin, Douglas J. CIA Assessments of the Soviet Union: The Record Versus the Charges -- An Intelligence Monograph. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996.
"[C]harges that CIA did not see and report the economic decline, societal deterioration, and political destabilization that ultimately resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union are contradicted by the record." The monograph includes excerpts from various CIA presentations from June 1977 to May 1991 to make the point.
MacEachin, Douglas J. The Final Months of the War with Japan: Signals Intelligence, U.S. Invasion Planning, and the A-Bomb Decision. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998.
From the "Foreword": This monograph's "basic objective is not to pass judgment on the decisions that were made, but rather to examine the intelligence that was available at the time and to weigh the role the intelligence played or might have played in the deliberations on an invasion."
Zelikow, FA 80.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2001), calls this "the most important work on the atomic bomb controversy in a decade." For Jonkers, AFIO WIN 6-99 (10 Feb. 1999), MacEachin's work is a "fascinating and authoritative view of the elements that went into the decision to use the A-bomb." It is "[e]ssential reading for scholars and students of history."
Although of the opinion that it is "marred by some obvious errors" (such as, calling MacArthur CINCPAC), Bates, NIPQ 15.3, still finds the work to be "a fine document" and "an important historical document." Goulden, Intelligencer 10.2, calls the work "a solid documentary compilation." Skates, JMH, Oct. 1999, believes that the author "has put his finger precisely on the salient issues in the controversies surrounding the invasion of Japan and the use of the bomb." The appendices to MacEachin's narratives are "[m]ost important," especially the 118 pages of "critical archival documents."
MacEachin, Douglas J. The Tradecraft of Analysis: Challenge and Change in the CIA. Working Group on Intelligence Reform Series, No. 13. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1994.
Surveillant 3.6 and 4.2: The Deputy Director for Intelligence "outlines a blueprint for CIA analysis which departs substantially from past CIA doctrine and analytic practice." MacEachin places "new emphasis on the specific needs and goals of policymakers.... [Analysis] should be timely, relevant, readable, and hinged on facts and evidence." Commenting on MacEachin's ideas are Paul Wolfowitz, John Despres, and Abram Shulsky, with additional discussion from other participants.
MacEachin, Douglas J. US Intelligence and the Polish Crisis, 1980 - 1981. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. U.S. Intelligence and the Confrontation in Poland, 1980 - 1981. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002.
Table of Contents:
Copyright and Attribution Statement
Chapter 1: The Burgeoning Confrontation
Chapter 2: The Confrontation Escalates
Chapter 3: US Launches Public Policy and Diplomatic Offensive
Chapter 4: Filling Out the Picture
Chapter 5: Intelligence and Policy
Chapter 6: Escalating Challenges to the Polish Regime
Chapter 7: Jaruzelski Takes the Government Reins
Chapter 8: A Setup for Military Crackdown
Chapter 9: A Close Call?
Chapter 10: Liberalization Infects the Party
Chapter 11: Solidarity Charges Ahead, and the Regime Digs In
Chapter 12: Bringing Down the Curtain
Chapter 13: Caught Off Guard
Chapter 14: Would It Have Made a Difference
Clark comment: This will not be the last word on how the United States interacted with the Polish Crisis of 1980-1981, but it serves as an excellent starting point. For Zelikow, FA 80.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2001), this is "one of the best published analyses of the Polish crisis." MacEachin's critique of the intelligence community is "ruthless but fair."
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