1. "The Birth of a Police State: The Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior, 1945-48." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 78-88.
The author argues two points: "First, Czechoslovak Communists did much of the work typically ascribed to the Kremlin by themselves"; and, second, "the West played a confusing role in the post-war Czechoslovak crisis."
2. "The Czechoslovak Intelligence Service and Western Reactions to the Communist Coup d'Etat of February 1948." Intelligence and National Security 8, no. 4 (Oct. 1993): 73-85.
This article focuses primarily on the French and is keyed to a specific document: "[R]eport from the Ministry of the Interior's intelligence service to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs."
3. "The GPU and GRU in Pre-World War II Czechoslovakia." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 91-104.
The author presents some 1923 Soviet documents dealing with the organization of the GPU and the GRU. The documents were collected by the Third Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was "active and successful in gathering offensive intelligence abroad" and which was headed by Jan Hajek.
Lukes, Igor. "The Czechoslovak Special Services and Their American Adversary during the Cold War." Journal of Cold War Studies 9, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 3-28. [http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/abs/10.1162/jcws.2007.9.1.3]
From abstract: "This article discusses the activities of four Czechoslovak security and intelligence agencies to demonstrate that the scale of the U.S. failure in Prague in 1945-1948 was far greater than often assumed, especially if one considers the substandard size and quality of Czechoslovakia's Communist-dominated special services after the war."
Bridges, H-Diplo, 27 Jun. 2007 [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/journalforum.htm], notes that the author "makes clear the ineptitude of the American military intelligence officers in the Prague embassy.... One wonders whether the failure of the military intelligence people may have been due to their lack of training in clandestine work." The reviewer also expresses his "doubt that any other American has done as much research as Lukes has in both prewar and postwar Czechoslovak archives."
For Smula, H-Diplo, 27 Jun. 2007 [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~hpcws/journalforum.htm], Lukes' overview "is especially useful to those unable to read Czech, who are getting for the first time a comprehensive, and at times colourful, look inside the intelligence services during the immediate postwar years." However, "a more systematic examination of the reasons behind the American failure would have benefited the article."
Lukes, Igor. "Great Expectations and Lost Illusions: Soviet Use of Eastern European Proxies in the Third World." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 1-13.
Lukes, Igor. "KAMEN: A Cold War Dangle Operation with an American Dimension, 1948-1952." Studies in Intellihence 55, no. 1 (Mar. 2011): 1-12.
The Czechoslovak StB "created fictitious resistance organizations, dangled them as bait," and drew in opponents of the communist regime.
Lukes, Igor. On the Edge of the Cold War: American Diplomats and Spies in Postwar Prague. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Peake, Studies 56.4 (Dec. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.3 (Winter-Spring 2013), sees this as "a superbly documented, well-written story of US intelligence operations in early postwar Czechoslovakia." For Fischer, IJI&C 26.2 (Summer 2013), this is a "thoroughly researched and gracefully written account." It "reveals how woefully unprepared American military and civilian intelligence officers were for the challenge that faced them in Czechoslovakia."
Return to Lp-Lum