Lik - Lindr

 

Liliental, Witold K. "The Truth about Enigma Finally Surfaces." Everyone's War 2 (2000): 40-42.

From Royal Historical Society Database: "The Poles' pioneering role in breaking the German code."

[OtherCountries/Poland/Enigma; UK/WWII/Ultra]

Lillbacka, Ralf. "Was Olof Palme Killed by an Intelligence Agency?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 119-147.

The author's "findings are consistent with previous inquiries using a similar research design, suggesting a random opportunistic killing."

[OtherCountries/Sweden]

Lilley, James, with Jeffrey Lilley. China Hands: Nine Decades of Adventure, Espionage, and Diplomacy in Asia. New York: Public Affairs, 2004.

James R. Lilley died at the age of 81 on 12 November 2009. See John Pomfret, " U.S. Ambassador to China Served during Crackdown at Tiananmen Square," Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2009.

Nathan, Washington Post, 25 Apr. 2004, notes that "James Lilley served on the operations side of the CIA, working on China, from 1951-74. He then switched to analysis and diplomacy, serving as U.S. representative in Taipei in 1982-84 and ambassador in Beijing in 1989-91, among other posts."

To Peake, Studies 48.4 (2004), James Lilley's life is "a moving, exciting, and informative adventure." The book "is a pleasure to read and a valuable contribution to the literature of intelligence." For Pye, FA 83.3 (May-Jun. 2004), the author provides "the inside story of U.S. policymaking in a keen, clear-eyed manner." Rawnsley, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), comments that the author provides "a gripping description of American covert operations in Asia" and "a fascinating vista from which to view the evolution of America's China policy."

Halloran, Parameters 34.4 (Winter 2004-2005), finds that the author "strolls down memory lane in an account of his childhood in China.... He ranges over his education at Yale and his intelligence work in Japan, Hong Kong, Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, although without telling much about operations there." And he "recounts his close affiliation with George Bush the Elder." However, "[t]he cohesive thread woven through this well-written memoir ... is Lilley's association with China."

[CIA/Memoirs; China/Gen]

Lim, Benjamin Kang. "China Executes Two for Spying for Taiwan." Washington Post, 14 Sep. 1999, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"China has executed an army general and a colonel after they were found guilty of selling state secrets to Taiwan for at least $1.6 million, military sources said, describing the case as the biggest spying scandal in Communist China's 50-year history."

[China/Gen]

Lind, Lew. The Battle of the Wine Dark Sea: The Aegean Sea Campaign, 1940-45. [Australia]: Kangaroo Press, 1993.

Surveillant 3.6: This is a "concise and analytical account of the unusual war fought in the eastern Mediterranean in WWII to secure the Aegean Sea." It is "exciting and highly readable."

[UK/WWII/Med]

Linder, James C. "The War in Laos: The Fall of Lima Site 85." Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995): 79-88. Reprinted as "The War in Laos: The Fall of Lima Site 85 in March 1968." Studies in Intelligence 59, no. 1 (Mar. 2015): 11-20.

Lima Site (Landing Site) 85 was built on Phou Phathi, a mountain sacred to the Hmong and Yao tribes, about 25 miles from the Pathet Lao capital of Samneua. A Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) station was built there by the U.S. Air Force in August 1966. The station was staffed by Air Force personnel in civilian clothing, and was guarded by 300 Thai mercenaries reinforced by 1,000 Hmong troops led by two CIA paramilitary officers.

The North Vietnamese and Pathet Lao began an offensive against the mountain in December 1967. The plan was to keep the Air Force technicians at the site until just prior to its fall; Ambassador Sullivan had sole authority for ordering the evacuation. The final push against the site began on March 10; evacuation was ordered the next morning. Seven Americans were evacuated alive; eleven died. The failure is at least partially attributable to lack of command and control on the ground and the decision not to arm and train the Air Force personnel in defense and evacuation under fire.

See Timothy N. Castle, One Day Too Long: Top Secret Site 85 and the Bombing of North Vietnam (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999); and Richard V. Secord, "Tragedy Strikes Laos Site 85," Air Commando Journal, 1, no. 3 (Spring 2012): 9-11.

[CIA/Laos]

Lindgren, David T. Trust But Verify: Imagery Analysis in the Cold War. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2000.

For Seamon, Proceedings 126.11 (Nov. 2000), "[t]he steady development and improvement of aerial intelligence gathering is spelled out here in admirable detail.... Lindgren ... also recalls U.S. politics and diplomacy of the Cold War years and the impact made on policy by imagery analysis. In the absence of most of the parochial bickering among the military services that marred intelligence gathering in World War II, analysts working under civilian control 'provided a series of American presidents with the strategic intelligence they required.'"

Peake, Studies 48.1, notes that author "makes clear he does not agree with th[e] decision," made under DCI John Deutch, to remove CIA from its role in the U.S. satellite programs.

[Analysis/Soviet; Recon/Imagery]

 

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