Lev

 

Levchenko, Stanislav. "The KGB." New Counterpoint 7, no. 2 (Winter 1992): 2-7.

Levchenko, Stanislav. On the Wrong Side: My Life in the KGB. Washington, DC: Permagon-Brassey's, 1988.

Levenstein, Aaron. Escape to Freedom: The Story of the International Rescue Committee. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1983.

Although Namebase dismisses this book as "an in-house puff piece written for the International Rescue Committee's fiftieth anniversary," it is a useful counterpoint to Chester's Covert Network: Progressives, the International Rescue Committee, and the CIA.

[CA]

Lever, Paul. "If it's Broke, Fix it: The Reform of Two Intelligence Services." RUSI Journal, Feb. 2005. [www.rusi.org/intelligence]

"Last summer it was a tale of two reports. The Senate Intelligence Committee produced a scathing condemnation of the US intelligence community's assessment of Iraq's capability ... to deliver weapons of mass destruction. Lord Butler and his team published a more measured, but no less critical, review of the parallel failures in Britain. In both cases reforms were promised.... [T]hese reforms are [now] in place or at any rate in early prospect. As with the reports which provided the impetus for them their styles are very different."

[Reform/00s/05/Gen; UK/PostCW/05]

Levering, Ralph B. The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History. Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1994.

Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, says that "this compact, highly readable book provides a balanced diplomatic history of the Cold War."

[GenPostwar/CW]

Leverkuehn, Paul. German Military Intelligence. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954. New York: Praeger, 1954.

According to Pforzheimer, Leverkuehn is a former member of the Abwehr and, thus, provides an insider's look at Admiral Canaris.

Constantinides points out that, while the author headed the Abwehr station in Istanbul from 1941 to 1944, he "has left out or missed" much, and "his loyalty to his old service and ... Canaris is undiminished."

See also Burkhard Jähnicke, "Lawyer, Politician, Intelligence Officer: Paul Leverkuehn in Turkey, 1915-1916 and 1941-1944," Journal of Intelligence History 2, no 2 (Winter 2002). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

[WWII/Eur/Ger/Abwehr & Gen]

Levin, Bob, et al. "A Grim Pentagon Critique."  Newsweek, 1 Sep. 1980, 20-21.

On Holloway Report.

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran]

Levin, Carl. "Press Release: Levin Releases Newly Declassified Pentagon Inspector General Report on Intelligence Assessment Activities of the Office of Under Secretary of Defense Doug Feith." 5 Apr. 2007. [http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2007/04/levin040507.html]

In releasing the report, Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said: "It is important for the public to see why the Pentagon's Inspector General [IG] concluded that [Under] Secretary [of Defense for Policy Doug] Feith's office 'developed, produced and then disseminated alternative intelligence assessments on the Iraq and al-Qaeda relationship,' which included 'conclusions that were inconsistent with the consensus of the Intelligence Community,' and why the Inspector General concluded that these actions were 'inappropriate.'"

The declassified report by the Pentagon Inspector General, dated 9 February 2007, is available at: http://www.fas/org/irp/agency/dod/ig020907-decl.pdf. A rebuttal from Feith's Office, dated 16 January 2007, to a draft version of the IG report, is available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/ousd011707.pdf. The arguments in the latter amount to a lengthy "we didn't do anything wrong."

[GenPostCW/00s/07; MI/00s/07; MI/Ops/Iraq/07]

Levine, Alan J. The Pacific War: Japan versus the Allies. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995.

Auer and Halloran, Parameters, Spring 1996, portray Levine's argument thusly: "Had the A-bomb never existed,... Japan would still have quit before the planned invasion. But conventional bombing and blockade would probably have killed more Japanese than those lost at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 'It is thus reasonably certain,' Levine concludes, 'that the use of the bomb saved Japanese as well as American lives.' He also argues: 'In hindsight, the dropping of the second bomb, so soon after the first, must be considered a horrible mistake. Nagasaki's destruction seems to have contributed nothing to the decision to surrender.' Other writers would point to continued Japanese resistance up to and beyond the Emperor's proclamation on 15 August that Japan must make peace by 'enduring the unendurable and suffering the insufferable.'"

[WWII/FE/Pac/Bomb]

Levine, Michael. Deep Cover: The Inside Story of How DEA Infighting, Incompetence, and Subterfuge Lost Us the Biggest Battle of the Drug War. New York: Delacorte, 1990.

Petersen says that this book is an "[e]xpose with intelligence aspects, by [a] former DEA official."

[CIA/Accusations/Drugs; OtherAgencies/Other/DEA]

Levine, Michael, and Laura Kavanau-Levine. The Big White Lie: The CIA and the Cocaine/Crack Epidemic -- An Undercover Odyssey. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993.

Surveillant 3.4/5 comments that the authors write in "a 'you are there' style." The book purports to expose "the U.S. government's questionable actions in its unsuccessful 'war on drugs,'" and "suggests that the CIA-created La Corporacion became a 'General Motors of cocaine' trafficking.... Levine is the Drug Bureau Director for Cape Cod, MA."

[CIA/Accusations/Drugs]

Levit, Kenneth J. "The CIA and the Torture Controversy: Interrogation Authorities and Practices in the War on Terror." Journal of National Security Law & Policy 1, no. 2 (2005): 341-356.

"It is important to distinguish ... between coercive measures used for interrogation and abusive practices in a detention facility that have no bearing on intelligence gathering efforts.... Interrogation tactics and gratuitous abuse of detainees raise different issues.... [I]t would be reckless for CIA leadership not to seek legal advice from the Department of Justice in determining how to carry out its responsibilities for interrogation under a covert action finding without breaking the law. As the interrogation controversy has taken shape, it is becoming increasingly clear that the Agency did in fact take significant steps to ensure that it had met its legal responsibilities.... [W]here mistreatment is not likely and there is a well articulated legal basis for a rendition of a particular detainee to a particular destination country, a rendition should be considered legal."

[Overviews/Legal/Topics]

Levite, Ariel. Intelligence and Strategic Surprise. New York: Columbia University Press, 1987.

Clark comment: Levite, a former Israeli defense analyst, looks at the intelligence-strategic surprise nexus through the cases of Pearl Harbor and Midway.

Kovacs, IJI&C 10.4, says that Levite has a "good bibliography on strategic surprise."

In a lengthy analysis, Uri Bar-Joseph, "Review Article: Methodological Magic," Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 4 (Oct. 1988), 134-155, argues that "this study suffers from fundamental methodological mistakes that undermine its theoretical value. Obviously, the most problematical issue here is the comparison made between two types of strategic surprise: one that starts a war (Pearl Harbor) and the other which takes place while war is in progress (Midway).... [In addition,] [t]he way Levite treats threat indicators before Pearl Harbor leads one to suspect that his judgement might have been biased, at least partially, toward minimizing the quality and accuracy of these indicators."

[Analysis/Surprise; WWII/PearlHarbor]

LeVitre, Rose [RADM/USN] Part 1 of 2. "'J2!' -- More than a Letter and a Number." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, no. 4 (Dec. 2003): 7-9. Part 2 of 2. Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 20, no. 1 (Feb. 2004): 16-19.

The author discusses her assignment as Pacific Command J2.

[MI/Navy/00s]

Levitsky, Melvyn. "Fighting Terrorism: A New Kind of Enemy and a New Kind of War." Defense Intelligence Journal 11, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 11-15.

"[W]e must view our embassies as forward deployed assets and protect their ability to function effectively as a key objective in our overall campaign."

[Terrorism/02/Gen]

Levy, Steven. Crypto: How the Code Rebels Beat the Government -- Saving Privacy in the Digital Age. New York Viking, 2001.

Powers, NYRB, 21 Jun. 2001, and Intelligence Wars (2004), 243-255, finds that this work recounts "in lively detail" NSA's "clandestine campaign" against public encryption. "How these [public key] systems actually work is complicated but not dauntingly so," and Powers "urge[s] interested readers to consult Levy's book."

[Cryptography/Encryption; NSA/Overviews]

Levytsky, Boris. Uses of Terror: The Soviet Secret Police, 1917-1970. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1971. New York: Coward, McCann & Geoghegen, 1972.

Rocca and Dziak: "Should be used with caution."

[Russia]

 

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