Ler - Leu

 

Lerner, Daniel. Sykewar: Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany, D-Day to VE-Day. New York: Geo. W. Stewart, 1949. Psychological Warfare against Nazi Germany: The Sykewar Campaign, D-Day to VE-Day. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1971. [pb]

From MIT Press: "This first full analysis and description of psychological warfare conducted by the United States and British armies against Germany" has "become a standard reference on World War II propaganda....There are chapters on policy, personnel, media, methods of operation, and effectiveness, as well as reproductions of typical propaganda leaflets, charts, and newspapers used against the Germans."

[WWII/PsyWar]

Lerner, K. Lee, and Brenda Wilmoth Lerner, eds. Encyclopedia of Espionage, Intelligence and Security. 3 vols. Farmington Hills, MI: Thomson Gale, 2003

Appears to be strong on science and technology related topics.

[RefMats/Encyclo/Gen]

Lerner, Mitchell B. "A Failure of Perception: Lyndon Johnson, North Korean Ideology, and the Pueblo Incident." Diplomatic History 25, no. 4 (Fall 2001): 647-675.

A distilled version of the author's more broadly developed book, The Pueblo Incident (2002).

[GenPostwar/60s/Pueblo]

Lerner, Mitchell B. The Pueblo Incident: A Spy Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002.

Brennock, NWCR, Autumn 2002, notes that the author's "hard-hitting analysis ... does not exonerate the commanding officer of the Pueblo.... However, of all those who may have been culpable, Commander [Lloyd M.] Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer the scapegoat his superiors made him out to be. Exhaustive research ... leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the shoulders of the Navy chain of command, the intelligence community, and [President Lyndon] Johnson's foreign policy advisors, due to their misunderstanding and underestimation of the North Korean-Soviet Union relationship."

For Mobley, Proceedings 128.7 (Jul. 2002), the author "provides two major services.... First, his comprehensive account ... instructs on so many levels. Second, there is much new information." Similarly, Van Nederveen, Air & Space Power Journal, Summer 2003, believes that "Lerner ... breaks new ground in this book. His conclusions, although harsh, may be true -- certainly, the facts as recounted in the book support them.... The Pueblo Incident, which has become required reading in new Cold War courses at major academic institutions around the country, makes for spellbinding, provocative reading."

Luoma, I&NS 18.1, views this as "a remarkable work of scholarship" that "is imaginatively conceived" and "easy to read." The author's "failure to provide a scholarly discussion for the US Navy's case against Commander Bucher and the other members of his crew following their release from captivity and return is a curious omission." To Freedman, FA 82.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2003), "[t]his lively account, backed by extensive research, demonstrates the multiple flaws in the mission's planning that put the crew in such a parlous position." But the author "also credits Lyndon Johnson with the patient diplomacy that brought about the eventual resolution."

Lerner's case that "the basic failure of the whole operation was the U.S. government's inability to realize that all communist countries were not totally under Soviet control and that North Korea had the ability to act ... independently of Moscow" is accepted by Bath, NIPQ 18.4. Nevertheless, the reviewer finds that Lerner has engaged in some "unnecessary and unwarranted Navy-bashing" and is somewhat short in military knowledge.

[GenPostwar/60s/Pueblo]

Leroy, Christophe. "Mexican Intelligence at a Crossroad." SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 107-130.

[LA/Mexico]

Lert, Frederic. Wings of the CIA. Paris: Histoire et Collections, 1998.

According to Hauver, CIRA Newsletter 23.2, "[c]overage begins with the B-26s of the Bay of Pigs and proceeds through the U-2, the SR-71 and drone aircraft. A unique portrait of Agency air ops from 1948." Leary, JMH 64.1, finds little of value to this work, calling it "poorly written..., episodic, disjointed, filled with invented conversations, and -- worst of all -- frequently inaccurate." The book has "no footnotes and only a sketchy bibliography"; it "should be treated with great suspicion."

[CA/90s; CIA/90s/Gen; Recon/Planes]

Lesberg, Sandy. The "Q" Factor: The True Story of Charles Fraser-Smith, The "Q" of the James Bond Novels. Phoenixville, PA: Peebles, 1980.

[UK/Biogs]

Lescaze, Lee. "Sorenson Bows to Opposition, Withdraws as Nominee for CIA." Washington Post, 18 Jan. 1977, A1.

President Carter's initial nominee for DCI withdraws in the face of controversy over his nomination.

[CIA/70s; GenPostwar/70s/Gen]

Lesce, Tony. Espionage: Down and Dirty. Townsend, WA: Loompanics Unlimited, 1991. [pb]

Surveillant 1.6 calls this a "breezy, informal book which touches on the famous, unusual, or dangerous aspects of intelligence work and cases.... This may be the title to suggest to those who have read little in the field looking for a quick review of a few fascinating cases and bits of tradecraft."

[Overviews/Gen]

Leshuk, Leonard. US Intelligence Perceptions of Soviet Power, 1921-1946. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Hanyok, I&NS 18.3, notes that the author concentrates on U.S. perceptions of "the development of the Soviet military power" from the end of World War I to the beginning of the Cold War. The story presented "is one of almost constant and large-scale failure."

[Interwar/U.S.; WWII/Gen]

Leslau, Ohad. "The Effect of Intelligence on the Decisionmaking Process." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 3 (Fall 2010): 426-448.

The author seeks to examine "the role and position of the intelligence services in the decisionmaking process at the highest level of the national security arena."

[GenPostCW/10s/Gen]

Leslau, Ohad. "Intelligence and Economics: Two Disciplines with a Common Dilemma." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 106-121.

The dilemma faced by both professional intelligence and economic advisors in their work for the government is: "should they be loyal to their employers -- the highest echelon of decisionmakers -- or to their professional ethics?" The author suggests that "[t]he CIA and other governmental organizations that function as professional advisory bodies should adopt" the practices of the Council of Economic Advisors and appoint "outside professionals who are not from the political arena."

[GenPostCW/00s/Gen]

Leslau, Ohad. "Israeli Intelligence and the Czech-Egyptian Arms Deal." Intelligence and National Security 27 no. 3 (Jun. 2012): 327-348.

"This article presents the decelopment of intelligence estimations during the year between the announcement of the arms deal and the beginning of the October 1956 Suez War and the difficulties intelligence had in giving a full and substantiated description and analysis of the arms deal."

[Israel/Overviews]

Leslie, Peter. The Liberation of the Riviera: Resistance to the Nazis in the South of France and the Story of Its Heroic Leader Ange-Marie Miniconi. New York: Wyndham, 1980.

[WWII/Eur/Fr/Resistance]

Lesser, Ian, et al. Countering the New Terrorism. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1999. [http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR989.pdf]

From "Preface": "This book brings together three complementary papers that address trends in international terrorism, the special problem of terrorism in the information age, and how to meet the terrorist challenge to U.S. interests."

[Terrorism/90s/Gen]

Lester, Normand. Enquêtes sur les services secrets. Montreal: Les Éditions de l'Homme, 1998.

[Canada/Gen]

Lester, Richard I. Confederate Finance and Purchasing in Great Britain. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1975.

Constantinides: The author "describes Confederate uses of cover and go-betweens to purchase or lease ships and the methods that side employed to evade Union surveillance and British laws of neutrality.... Lester [also] shows the Union had created a well-organized and -developed system of espionage and surveillance against the Confederates."

[CivWar/Conf/CA]

Lett, Brian. Ian Fleming and SOE's Operation Postmaster: The Untold Top Secret Story Behind 007. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2012.

For Peake, Studies 57.2 (Jun. 2013), [t]he successful Operation Postmaster is a small but significant part of SOE history, and Lett tells that story well. The frequent allusions to James Bond are only distractions."

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE]

Lett, Brian. SAS in Tuscany 1943-45. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2011.

From publisher: This work describes three SAS "operations in enemy-occupied Italy during the latter half " of World War II. The ill-supported SPEEDWELL 2 (September 1943) ended in disaster. GALIA (winter 1944-1945) "tied up many thousands of enemy troops for nearly two months under extreme winter conditions," working in coordination with "an SOE mission led by Major Gordon Lett, the author's father." BLIMEY (April 1945) was overtaken by the Allied advance.

[UK/WWII/Services/SAS & SOE; WWII/Eur/Italy]

Lett, Gordon. Rossano: An Adventure of the Italian Resistance. London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1955. Rossano: Valley in Flames -- An Adventure of the Italian Resistance. Barnsley, UK: Frontline, 2011.

From publisher: "In July 1942, Major Gordon Lett was taken prisoner at the fall of Tobruk." He escaped from an Italian prison "at the Armistice of September 1943 ... and took to the mountains" where "he founded and led" a "band of highly-successful partisans, the Battaglione Internazionale. The group fought and harassed ... the Germans along the Magra valley from North of Pontremoli to La Spezia.... They were so influential to the success of the Allied advance that permanent lines of communication with the Allies were established, supplies dropped by air and, later, SAS troops sent in to assist the Brigade."

[UK/WWII/Services/SAS & SOE; WWII/Eur/Italy]

 

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