Leebaert, Derek. To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda. Boston: Little, Brown, 2006.
Leebaert, Derek. To Dare and to Conquer: Special Operations and the Destiny of Nations, from Achilles to Al Qaeda. Boston: Little, Brown, 2006.
A Publishers Weekly (via Amazon.com) reviewer says that "[f]rom Gideon's terrifying assault on the Midianites in ancient Israel to the American Delta Force's special ops in the mountains of Afghanistan," the author analyzes special "operations in lively, if sometimes over-the-top, prose.... The last chapters of this mammoth book [688 pages], however, are drier, as Leebaert focuses on the relationship between politics and the use of special forces."
For DKR, AFIO WIN 11-06 (13 Mar. 2006), this is a "timely contribution to our knowledge of special operations." The author "shows that from the days of Alexander the Great onwards, ingenious, bold, and unexpected operations have been decisive in military conflicts. At the heart of such successes is a willingness to think outside the box and take high risks with small forces."
Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006), call this work "a vast undertaking. For those concerned with military history it offers much ... on a subject not dealt with in this magnitude elsewhere. And ... the role of intelligence is a major factor throughout.... Superbly documented and well written, this book deserves studied attention."
[MI/SpecOps/00s]
Leebaert, Derek. The Fifty-Year Wound: The True Price of America's Cold War Victory. New York: Little, Brown, 2002.
Zelikow, FA 81.3, finds that this book "is often slapdash in its treatment of particular episodes, and it suffers from critical omissions.... But Leebaert is often perceptive and well informed. His arguments are intriguing and provocative even when they are wrong."
[GenPostwar/CW]
Leeman, Sue.
"British Intelligence Was Never Able to Uncover Mata Hari's Secrets."
Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 1-7 Feb. 1999, 18.
Formerly classified British documents show that the British intelligence interrogated Mata Hari twice (once in December 1915 and again in November 1916), but were unable to get her to admit to spying for the Germans.
[France/WWI]
Leer,
Rensselaer, and Raphael Perl. Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign
Policy. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2002.
Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/IB95112.pdf.
[Terrorism/00s/Gen]
Lees, Lorraine
M. "DeWitt Clinton Poole, the Foreign Nationalities Branch and Political
Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 4
(Winter 2000): 81-103.
"The approach taken by Poole and FNB with the Yugoslavs provides an excellent example of the kind of political intelligence the FNB provided under Poole's tutelage, while previewing the Soviet-American antagonism that would mark the Cold War."
[WWII/OSS/Indivs]
Lees, Michael.
The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990.
Surveillant 1.3: Lees was a "British liaison officer who, in 1943, was dropped into Yugoslavia to help resistance fighters led by General Draza Mihailovic. He witnessed the abandonment of Allied support for Mihailovic."
[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/OSS/Yugo]
Lefever, Ernest W. "Can Covert Action Be Just?" Policy Review 12 (Spring 1980): 115-122.
[CA/Gen]
Lefever, Ernest
W., and Roy Godson. The CIA and the American Ethic: An Unfinished Debate.
Washington, DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, Georgetown University,
1979.
[Overviews/Ethics]
Leffler, Melvyn
P.
1. "The American Conception of National Security and the Beginning of the Cold War, 1945-1948." American Historical Review 89, no. 2 (Apr. 1984): 346-381.
John Lewis Gaddis, "Comments," American Historical Review 89.2 (Apr. 1984): 382-385, argues that Leffler has given too much importance to the influence of George Kennan and the Policy Planning Staff in this timeframe.
The author's response is at Leffler, "Reply," American Historical Review 89.2 (Apr. 1984): 391-400.
2. "Inside Enemy Archives: The Cold War Reopened." Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (Jul./Aug. 1996): 120-135.
Materials coming out of the former Soviet Union, its former Warsaw Pact allies, and even China "reveal a Soviet system as revolting as its worst critics charged long ago. Some scholars go further, asserting that the archives confirm not only the genocidal actions and fundamental brutality of the regime but also its ideological underpinnings and hegemonic aspirations." It is with the latter interpretations that Leffler takes issue, arguing that Soviet policy was grounded in "realpolitik" in its dealings with the West and China.
3. A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992. [pb] 1993.
Surveillant 2.2 notes that "[m]any previously classified documents support this work."
A reviewer in APSR 87.1 says that this work "will be of immense value to scholars interested in the Grand Strategy of the Truman administration.... [It] clarifies the crucial role of global economic objectives in U.S. grand strategy.... [T]he key theoretical concepts Leffler uses are not up to the subtlety of the story he tells.... The conclusion is ... direct, clear, and effective."
4. The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-1953. New York: Hill and Wang, 1994.
5. For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War. New York: Hill and Wang, 2007.
Ikenberry, FA 86.6 (Nov.-Dec. 2007), calls this "a masterful account of the Cold War.... Leffler focuses on critical turning points ... [and] draws vivid portraits of U.S. and Soviet leaders." His interpretation "moves beyond the old revisionist and traditionalist debates.... This important work will enlighten and sophisticate the debate on the ColdWar."
[GenPostwar/CW]
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