Christopher J. Lamb


Lamb, Christopher J., and Martin Cinnamond. "Unified Effort: Key to Special Operations and Irregular Warfare in Afghanistan." Joint Forces Quarterly 56 (1st Quarter 2010): 40-53.

The Obama administration "has taken important steps to improve unified effort among the diverse actors working to promote stability and defeat the Taliban insurgency. Even so, more needs to be done.... [T]he record to date demonstrates that special operations serve conflicting objectives in Afghanistan. We offer an explanation for this incongruity to underscore just how difficult unity of effort is to achieve, and to establish some baseline requirements for remedial action. We then make recommendations designed to improve unity of effort in military operations, civil-military cooperation, and among international and Afghan partners."

[MI/Ops/Afgh/2010 & SpecOps/2010]

Lamb, Christopher J., and Evan Munsing. Secret Weapon: High-value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation. Strategic Perspectives, No. 4. Washington, DC: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University Press, Mar. 2011.

"[T]hree innovations -- net-worked-based targeting, fusion of intelligence and operations, and counterterrorist-counterinsurgency integration -- required unprecedented collaboration between diverse departments and agencies and between SOF and conventional forces. Together, these innovations set the stage for the dramatic reversal of the security situation in Iraq in 2007.... Both the interagency high-value target teams and the interagency approach eventually embraced by conventional forces demonstrate that how the national security system is organized for complex missions matters greatly.... When the high-value target teams and integrated conventional force commands collaborated tactically, they produced quick and powerful results."


Lamb, Christopher J., and David Tucker. United States Special Operations Forces. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

According to Johnson, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), the authors argue that SOCOM should be "reorganized into two separate commands: one specializing in unconventional warfare and one specializing in direct action and commando skills.... The authors' expertise enables them to boil down complex history, theories, and debates into succinct chapters.... Occasionally, the arguments of the book are made too strongly or supported with insufficient evidence but overall the book is excellent,"


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