Kotani, Ken. "Could the Japanese Read Allied Signal Traffic? Japanese Codebreaking and the Advance into French Indo-China, September 1940." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 2 (Jun. 2005): 304-320.
"[I]t is clear that Japan had negotiated with Indo-China on the basis of intelligence about US and British intentions obtained beforehand. Signal intelligence was one of the reasons Japanese troops could move into French Indo-China without fear of provoking serious Western reaction." However, "the Japanese Navy and Army solved only low grade British ciphers." In 1940, the Japanese Navy's "11th Section is comparable to the [British] GC&CS in their ability to read ciphers." This "situation gradually changed in 1941," with the increasing ability of U.S. and British codebreakers to read and process significant high-grade Japanese ciphers.
See Philip H. Jacobsen's letter, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2005): 318-319, for a critique of this article.
1. Nihongun no Interijensu: Naze Joho ga Ikasarenai no ka [Japanese Military Intelligence: Why Is Intelligence Not Used?] Tokyo: Kondansha, 2007.
2. Japanese Intelligence in World War II. Tr., Kotani Chiharu. Oxford: Osprey, 2009.
Mercado, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010), notes that this "translation" does not include the references in the author's earlier work to Tokyo's contemporary intelligence issues. Nonetheless, this work provides the reader with "a better appreciation for Japanese military intelligence, in particular for SIGINT." There are some "mistranslations of standard military intelligence terms and awkward English," but Western readers "should find value" here. The endnotes "warrant a close reading."
Although he finds the book "both frustrating and disappointing in several ways, Beard, I&NS 26.2&3 (Apr.-Jun. 2011), it is still "a useful addition to the literature. The translation, though awkward in places, is completely clear, and the footnoting is comprehensive."
Kotek, Joël. Tr., Ralph Blumenau. Students and the Cold War. London: Macmillan, 1996. New York: St. Martin's, 1996.
Aldrich, I&NS 18.2/131/fn.2, calls this a "path-breaking work." Paget, I&NS 18.2/159/fn.10, notes that Kotek "describes the ISC [International Student Conference] in 1952 as 'close to bankruptcy', and argues that action by a CIA conduit saved the ISC and COSEC."
Kotek, Joël. "Youth Organizations as a Battlefield in the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 168-191.
"[F]rom 1952 onwards large sums of [CIA] money went to organizations that were for the most part progressive and were actually independent, so much so that towards the end of the 1960s they did not hesitate to criticize [U.S.] foreign policy.... The situation was not, however, as paradoxical as it seems; we must remember that the chief objective of the intervention was not to control or intervene in the internal affairs of these organizations, but to break the communist monopoly."
Koudelka, Edward R. Counter Intelligence: The Conflict and the Conquest: Recollections of a World War II Agent in Europe. Guilderland, NY: Ranger, 1986.
Frazier, I&NS 2.4, identifies this work as the "reminiscence of a war-time CIC Special Agent of his recruitment, training, and service in Iceland, Britain, France, and Germany.... [T]he detailed description of missions and methods are of historical importance.... This is an accurate account of many of the early activities of the organization."
Kourou. "Elint Mission Eyed." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 3 Jan. 2005.
"A follow-on electromagnetic intelligence demonstration mission planned by France could be a final prelude to launch of a global operational system. The elint mission would build on experience from Essaim, a cluster of four signals intelligence satellites launched on Dec. 18  with the Helios 2A reconnaissance satellite."
Kouzminov, Alexander. Biological Espionage: Special Operations of the Soviet and Russian Foreign Intelligence Services in the West. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 2005.
According to Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), the author spent 10 years in the KGB (1982-1992), and emigrated to the West in 1994. Kouzminov "is concerned that Russia is pursuing a biological warfare capability and perhaps even testing agents on unsuspecting nations." The book "provides a detailed description of Directorate S -- the KGB action element for these programs.... Kouzminov is sincere in his warnings about the dangers of biological warfare.... His arguments should not be dismissed out of hand, but without documentation of any kind they cannot be accepted as fact."
1. "The Nonuse of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 4 (Winter 1997-1998): 383-417.
Kovacs suggests that while there are numerous reasons why intelligence may not be "used" in the decisionmaking process, the most important change that could be made would be to "close the gap between the two communities [intelligence and decisionmakers], and to effect a change in the basic mentality of intelligence agencies -- away from the theoretical and toward a more service-oriented approach."
2. "Using Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 145-164.
The author offers as a tentative conclusion that "[a]ll forms of intelligence are most successful at the level at which they are collected. In particular this means that much centrally-collected intelligence is difficult to utilize at the tactical level."
Kovar, Richard. "Mr. Current Intelligence: An Interview with Richard Lehman." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 51-63.
In an interview conducted 28 February 1998, Lehman, former D/OCI and C/NIC, among other positions, "recalls the challenges associated with briefing DCI Allen Dulles, recounts how the PICL [later PDB] was born, summarizes how the Agency got to know Presidents-elect Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan, and gives his candid assessment of the famous A Team/B Team exercise."
[Analysis/Soviet/Teams; CIA/Components/ DI]
Kovner, Milton. "Pricing Soviet Military Exports." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 37-42.
The author reviews the various approaches to establishing the dollar value and components of Soviet military exports, "the ambiguities that the figures embody, and their residual significance and usefulness."
Kozaczuk, Wladyslaw. Ed. and tr., Christopher Kasparek. Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher Was Broken, and How It Was Read by the Allies in World War II. Frederick, MD: University Publications of America, 1984.
According to Pforzheimer, the author focuses on "the role of Polish cryptologists in breaking the early German (pre-World War II) Enigma ciphers." Kozachuk may "give his Polish compatriots more credit than perhaps they should receive, major though their early work was." This volume belongs "on the shelf of important books on the Ultra secret." Sexton finds the book to be a "valuable corrective to Bertrand and Winterbotham" and an "essential source." For brief excerpts from this work, see Wladyslaw Kozaczuk, "Enigma Solved," Cryptologia 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1982): 32-33.
Kozaczuk, Wladyslaw, and Jerzy Straszak. Enigma: How the Poles Broke the Nazi Code. New York: Hippocrene, 2004.
Foot, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), notes that the authors "make it clear how successful the Poles were in breaking the machine cipher the Germans thought impregnable.... This short book ... is eminently readable, and deserves study."
Kozak, Robert. "Peru's Prime Minister Ana Jara Fires Senior Intelligence Officials." Wall Street Journal, 20 Mar. 2015. [http://www.wsj.com]
"Peru's Prime Minister Ana Jara has removed the head of the National Intelligence Service and other high-level officials, as allegations widened that the spy agency had for years gathered information on a broad range of well-known people in the country."
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