Kerbel, Josh. "Lost for Words: The Intelligence Community's Struggle to Find Its Voice." Parameters 38, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 102-112.
The author argues the absence of "a cohesive analytic identity" within the U.S. Intelligence Community, as he explores "the question of whether intelligence analysis is art or science."
Kerbel, Josh. "Thinking Straight: Cognitive Bias in the US Debate about China." Studies in Intelligence 48, no. 3 (2004): 27-35.
The U.S. debate over China "has long been conducted as if single-outcome predictions of China's long-term future are possible and that the United States is capable of promoting or altering a predicted outcome." This article argues that "these two assumptions are largely the result of an unrecognized, deeply ingrained, and enduring cognitive bias that results in the misapplication of a linear behavioral template to China, which, like all nation-states, in reality behaves 'nonlinearly.'" [footnote omitted]
Kerbel, Josh, and Anthony Olcott. "The Intelligence-Policy Nexus: Synthesizing with Clients, Not Analyzing for Customers." Studies in Intelligence 54, no. 4 (Dec. 2010): 1-13.
"What if the Intelligence Community were to reimagine itself as a serice-provider geared to engaging in goal-focused conversation as a well-defined regular activity? What, in other words, would happen if the IC were to become a provider of knowledge services, rather than a producer of information?"
Kerbey, Joseph O.
1. The Boy Spy: A Substantially True Record of Secret Service During the War of the Rebellion. Chicago: American Mutual Library Association, 1889. Chicago: Donahue, Henneberry, 1892.
Fishel notes that the phrase "substantially true" in the subtitle "makes this book of fictions and occasional facts unique among Civil War espionage memoirs in its admission that some of its stories might be slightly embellished." (p. 603, fn. 15)
2. Further Adventures of the Boy Spy in Dixie. Washington, DC: National Tribune, 1898.
Kerlin, Julie O. "Military-Economic Estimating: A Positive View." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 4 (Fall 1966): 35-44.
The author argues that economic-military research on the Soviet Union is done using "an intelligent methodology [that] provides a logical ordering for data which are indeed sparse but which can be used to advantage in place of an otherwise unknown, intuitive input into military judgments."
Kern, Gary. A Death in Washington: Walter G. Krivitsky and the Stalin Terror. New York: Enigma, 2003.
Goulden, Washington Times, 10 Aug. 2003, and Intelligencer 14.1, says that this work "offers a multi-faceted examination of a case that intrigued intelligence officers and buffs for more than half a century.... Kern's book is of enormous value in seeking the answer" to the question of whether Krivitsky's death was a suicide or the work of Stalin's hitmen.
To Peake, Studies 49.4/103/fn.13 (2005), "[t]his is the most complete and well-written case study on a Soviet defector ever to be published in English. If reading only one counterintelligence case study, this is the one to chose." For Hyde, IJI&C 17.2, it is clear that the author "dug deep and discovered much that was unknown about Krivitsky's eighteen years of spying, sabotage, and subversion."
Batvinis, I&NS 19.2, comments that the author "is a solid writer and a skilled professional historian" who "has pierced together an intriguing story that introduces us to an array of fascinating characters." However, at times, he lapses into "breezy language and questionable word usage." He also indulges in "unnecessary fiction-like speculation surrounding the circumstances of Krivitsky's death."
Kern, Gary. The Kravchenko Case: One Man's War on Stalin. New York: Enigma Press, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 52.2 (Jun. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), the author "adds depth and detail to each period and principal event of Kravchenko's life." Kravchenko defected from the Soviet Union in 1944, published two books (one a worldwide best seller), and died in 1965 in circumstances officially classified as suicide.
Kern, Gary. "The Lessons of History: How 'Uncle Joe' Bugged FDR." Studies in Intelligence 47, no. 1 (2003): 19-31.
At the conference in Teheran in November 1943 and at the conference at Yalta in February 1945, President Roosevelt "stayed in Soviet quarters and was bugged like no other American president in history."
Kern, Gary, ed. Walter G. Krivitsky: MI5 Debriefing & Other Documents on Soviet Intelligence. Riverside, CA: Xenos, 2004.
According to Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), the British debriefed Krivitsky in 1940. This book reproduces the report of that "debriefing, done by MI5 officer Jane Archer." It also provides Krivitsky's "congressional testimony and some material related to Krivitsky's stay in France after his initial defection." (footnote omitted)
Kernan, Alvin B. The Unknown Battle of Midway: The Destruction of the American Torpedo Squadrons. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.
Wildenberg, NWCR 59.3 (Summer 2006), finds that there is nothing new here. Although the book's subject, "the destruction of U.S. torpedo planes at Midway, is a worthy project," the author's "execution leaves much to be desired.... [T]he book is so full of errors and misconstructions of fact that it only further distorts the reasons behind the tragic slaughter of the U.S. torpedo planes and their aircrews."
Kerr, Richard. "CIA's Record Stands Up to Scrutiny." New York Times, 24 Oct. 1991, A4.
Kerr was Acting DCI at this time.
Kerr, Richard J., and Peter Dixon Davis. "Ronald Reagan and the President's Daily Brief." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999): 51-56.
The CIA Office of Current Intelligence was able to establish a pattern of daily briefings early in the transition period after Reagan's election.
Responding to a comment in the Kerr-Davis article that the Reagan-Bush transition team had no contact with the PDB briefers, Samuel J. Watson, "Commenary," Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000), 105-107, does not find that situation unusual. "Transition teams serve a different purpose [than PDB briefers].... The work of the transition team [is] aimed at preparing the incoming president on the form, function, and activities of an agency."
Kerr, Richard, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas. "Intelligence Analysis: A Holistic Vision for the Analytic Unit." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 47-55.
"This paper argues that what is needed is a vision, from the bottom up, of intelligence analysis that focuses on the working of the basic analytic unit. We examine the analytic process, note problems and issues, and make recommendations to enhance the Intelligence Community's analytic capabilities and products."
Kerrihard, Bowen. "Bitter Bushwhackers and Jayhawkers." America's Civil War (Mar. 1999). [http://www.historynet.com/acw/blbittercivilwar/]
"For half a decade before the Civil War, residents of the neighboring states of Missouri and Kansas waged their own civil war." The conflict continued through and after the war years, and produced numerous legendary/infamous participants.
Kersaudy, François. L'Affaire Cicéron. Paris: Perrin, 2005.
Kahn, Intelligencer 17.1 (Winter-Spring 2009), characterizes this work as "[w]ell written, fast-paced, but little new."
Kershaw, Ian. Intro., Mark Seaman. Operation Foxley: The British Plan to Kill Hitler. Kew: PRO, 1998. London: Diane, 1998. [pb]
From publisher: "This book reproduces the feasibility study produced by Section X (German) of the British Special Operations Executive. It includes a historical introduction which places the file in context & explains why it never happened. It also covers the various 'little Foxleys', which looked at killing other leading Nazis."
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