Kaj - Kaq

 

Kajdasz, James E. "A Demonstration of the Benefits of Aggregation in an Analytic Task." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 4 (Winter 2014): 752-763.

[Analysis/Gen/10s]

Käkönen, Jyrki, ed. Green Security or Militarized Environment? Brookfield, MA: Dartmouth Publishing Co., 1994.

[NatSec/Env]

Kalaris, George, and Leonard McCoy. "Counterintelligence for the 1990s." Studies in Intelligence 32 (Spring 1988); International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 2 (Summer 1988): 179-187; and in Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s: Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence and Covert Action, ed. Roy Godson (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989).

Kalb, Madeleine G. The Congo Cables: The Cold War in Africa -- From Eisenhower to Kennedy. New York: Macmillan, 1982.

Whitaker, NYT, 27 Jun. 1982, says the author "tells the story well. Carefully placing the three-year struggle in the international context..., Mrs. Kalb both educates and stuns the reader with a flood of detail that is sometimes as dizzying as the Congo's complexities were to a series of Western diplomats."

[CA/Africa/Congo]

Kaledin, Victor K. K.14-O.M.66: Adventures of a Double Spy. London: Hurst & Blackett, 1934. London: Paternoster, 1937. [Chambers]

[Russia/Interwar]

Kalitka, Peter F.

Kalugin, Oleg.

Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.

Johnson, I&NS 5.3, notes that the author's argument that "nations will continue to suffer military surprise-attacks even with good intelligence-collection capabilities" is firmly in line with Richard K. Betts' perspective. Nevertheless, Kam does propose "a number of thoughtful ideas about the analytic process and organizational procedures that at least might help to reduce ... the possibility of intelligence failure."

For Wirtz, I&NS 4.4, this work is "a masterful integration of current thinking about what causes nations to fall victim to intelligence failure." However, in making his generalizations about intelligence failures, "he treats instances of surprise attack occurring at the outset of war and during war itself as the same phenomenon."

Kamen, Al (Washington Post)..

Kamps, Charles Tustin. "Operation Eagle Claw: The Iran Hostage Rescue Mission (English Version)." Air & Space Power Journal en Español 18, no. 3 (2006), at: http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/apjinternational/apj-s/2006/3tri06/kampseng.html.

"The brave men who attempted to rescue American hostages in Iran in April of 1980 unfortunately became a disastrous reminder of the need for unity of command, joint training, and good communications, and the dangers of overly complex and needlessly compartmented planning. The failure of their mission, Operation Eagle Claw, would be a prime motivator in the subsequent formation of US Special Operations Command."

[GenPostwar/80s/IranRescue]

Kamps, Charles Tustin. "The Son Tay Raid: A 35-Year Retrospective." Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]

Although no POWs were rescued "(the enemy had moved them to other facilities), the [Son Tay] raid serves as a model of a well-planned and -executed joint special operation." Indeed, Operation Kingpin was "[m]arked by outstanding organization, training, and unity of effort."

[Vietnam/SonTay]

Kamps, Charles Tustin. "US Air Force Special Operations." Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]

"Headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Florida, AFSOC [Air Force Special Operations Command] includes one colocated wing with combat, training, and foreign internal defense squadrons; a special-tactics group; and a Reserve group. Operational groups in Europe and the Far East include fixed- and rotary-wing squadrons as well as special-tactics squadrons. A National Guard unit in Pennsylvania operates the EC-130E Commando Solo psychological-operations platform."

[MI/AF/00s; MI/SpecOps]

Kan, Paul Rexton. "Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 586-599.

"Intelligence efforts against drug trafficking must adapt to anti-insurgency factors."

[MI/SpecOps/Counterinsurgency]

Kan, Shirley A. China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 Feb. 2006. 

This report reviews the many factors that went into the huge dispute over Chinese spying.

[GenPostCW/China/90s/00s]

Kane, Harnett T. Spies for the Blue and Gray. Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1954.

[CivWar/Overviews]

Kane, Paul. "GAO Seeks Review of Spy Agencies: The Outgoing Chief Auditor Makes a Pitch on Capitol Hill." Washington Post, 7 Mar. 2008, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Comptroller General David M. Walker, whose 10-year term concludes on 12 March 2008, "is again asking Congress to give the Government Accountability Office [GAO] the power to review the finances of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.... [T]he Justice Department issued a ruling in the early 1990s that restricted oversight of the CIA to House and Senate select committees on intelligence." Lawmakers and others question "whether the GAO is too closely aligned with the congressional majority and whether its investigators have the proper clearances to handle classified intelligence matters."

Writing to IAFIE members, Mark M. Lowenthal commented: "GAO has been sucking around the IC for years, trying to get in. Bad case of oversight envy. They could never articulate what they would bring, they just wanted in. I never understood the value add proposition." To which, J. Ransom Clark added: "I always figured that GAO's hots for the IC role was connected with bureaucratic politics -- expand your responsibilities, get more staff for the new responsibilities, get more dollars to pay staff and handle the new responsibilities, grow your empire. Sounds like a normal bureaucratic imperative to me." And Bart Bechtel noted: "GAO needs to examine itself. There is no oversight of this office anywhere near what already exists in the IC. GAO was a pass the buck exercise by Congress wanting to avoid its duty."

[Oversight/00s]

Kane, Paul. "House Intelligence Chairman Reyes Says CIA Lied to Committee." Washington Post, 9 Jul. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 7 July 2009, HPSCI chairman Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) sent a letter to the House leadership accusing "the CIA of lying to the panel in a classified matter." This is "the second time in less than two months that a top House Democrat has charged the spy agency of intentionally misleading Congress."

[CIA/00s/09; Oversight/00s]

Kane, Paul, and Joby Warrick. "House Panel to Investigate Canceled CIA Program." Washington Post, 18 Jul. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The House intelligence committee announced [on 13 July 2009] it will investigate the CIA's handling of its secret al-Qaeda assassination program, including whether Vice President Richard B. Cheney improperly intervened to stop the agency from telling Congress about the initiative."

[CIA/00s/09; Oversight/00s]

Kapera, Zdzislaw J.

Kaplan, David E.

Kaplan, Fred. "The End of the Age of Petraeus: The Rise and Fall of Counterinsurgency." Foreign Affairs 92, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 2013): 75-90.

"The revival of COIN in the Age of Petraeus ... was in part the product of generational politics.... The 2007 turnaround in Iraq was remarkable, but it was also oversold. It was not due entirely to the surge or to COIN or to Petraeus personally.... Afghanistan was not susceptible to COIN. Eventually, Obama recognized this.... The hubbub over Petraeus and his COIN field manual was always overblown. Counterinsurgency is a technique, not a grand strategy."

[MI/SpecOps/Counterinsurgency]

Kaplan, Fred. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2013.

Freedman, FA 92.3 (May-Jun. 2013), finds that the author "has a gift for bringing to life what might otherwise seem like arcane strategic debates by linking them to the personalities and biographies of the main participants." This is "a tale of hubris. Buoyed by their relative success in Iraq, Petraeus and his allies believed that the surge there offered a model for Afghanistan, despite being well aware that the two situations were very different."

[MI/Ops/Afghan/Books & SpecOps/Counterinsurgency]

Kaplan, Robert D. "Special Intelligence." Atlantic Monthly, Feb. 1998, 61- 62. [http://www.theatlantic.com]

"For an army that will have to act secretly, unconventionally, and in advance of crises rather than during them, intelligence is critical. Indeed, the growth of Special Forces might be a crude indication of the collapse of any distinction between our military and intelligence services. Yes, the CIA itself might be done away with. What the CIA does, however, will not only grow in importance but also have the support of armed troops within the same bureaucratic framework."

[MI/SpecOps]

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