Kalaris,
George, and Leonard McCoy. "Counterintelligence for the 1990s."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2,
no. 2 (Summer 1988): 179-187.
Kalaris,
George, and Leonard McCoy. "Counterintelligence for the 1990s."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2,
no. 2 (Summer 1988): 179-187.
A version of this article appears in Godson, ed., Intelligence Requirements for the 1990s.
[CI/To90s; Reform/80s][c]
Kaledin, Victor
K. K.14-O.M.66: Adventures of a Double Spy. London: Hurst & Blackett,
1934. London: Paternoster, 1937. [Chambers]
[Russia/Interwar]
Kalitka,
Peter F. "Centralize Control of Department of Defense Counterintelligence
Activities: We Try Again." American Intelligence Journal 11,
no. 3 (1990): 27-28.
[MI/CI]
Kalitka, Peter
F. "The Equalizer Versus Competitive Intelligence." American
Intelligence Journal 17, no. 1/2 (1996): 43-45.
The "equalizer" in this article is industrial counterintelligence activities that are both reactive and, at times, proactive in nature.
[GenPostwar/Issues/EconIntel/CI][c]
Kalitka,
Peter F. [COL/USA (Ret.)] "HUMINT for Hire." American Intelligence
Journal 14, no 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993): 29-31.
"To balance future military demands, DoD needs to be involved in economic information collection." Argues for making use of "a reservoir of professionally trained United States intelligence officers -- retired and otherwise -- engaged in second careers from which to draw."
[Reform/Mil/Gen][c]
Kam, Ephraim.
Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988.
Johnson, I&NS 5.3, notes that the author's argument that "nations will continue to suffer military surprise-attacks even with good intelligence-collection capabilities" is firmly in line with Richard K. Betts' perspective. Nevertheless, Kam does propose "a number of thoughtful ideas about the analytic process and organizational procedures that at least might help to reduce ... the possibility of intelligence failure."
For Wirtz, I&NS 4.4, this work is "a masterful integration of current thinking about what causes nations to fall victim to intelligence failure." However, in making his generalizations about intelligence failures, "he treats instances of surprise attack occurring at the outset of war and during war itself as the same phenomenon."
[Analysis/Surprise]
Kamen, Al. "Alexander Named to Run NSA." Washington Post, 6 Jul. 2005, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Army Lt. Gen. Keith B. Alexander has been nominated by President Bush for assignment as Director, National Security Agency, and Chief, Central Security Service, Fort Meade.
[NSA/05]
Kamen, Al. "The DNI and the DNIplos." Washington Post, 6 Jul. 2005, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DNI John D. Negroponte is giving the post of "director of the National Counterproliferation Center, an Executive Level II job (it outranks undersecretaries)" to Kenneth C. Brill, former ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency and currently international affairs adviser to the commandant of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
[Reform/00s/05/DNI]
Kamen, Al. "The Lie Detector that Didn't." Washington
Post, 17 Sep. 1999, A23. [http:// www.washingtonpost.com]
On 14 September 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson took a polygraph test to set an example for department scientists unhappy about the prospect of being polygraphed themselves "on espionage matters."
[GenPostwar/90s/China/99]
Kamps, Charles Tustin. "The Son Tay Raid: A 35-Year Retrospective." Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]
Although no POWs were rescued "(the enemy had moved them to other facilities), the [Son Tay] raid serves as a model of a well-planned and -executed joint special operation." Indeed, Operation Kingpin was "[m]arked by outstanding organization, training, and unity of effort."
[Vietnam/SonTay]
Kamps, Charles Tustin. "US Air Force Special Operations." Air & Space Power Journal 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005). [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil]
"Headquartered at Hurlburt Field, Florida, AFSOC [Air Force Special Operations Command] includes one colocated wing with combat, training, and foreign internal defense squadrons; a special-tactics group; and a Reserve group. Operational groups in Europe and the Far East include fixed- and rotary-wing squadrons as well as special-tactics squadrons. A National Guard unit in Pennsylvania operates the EC-130E Commando Solo psychological-operations platform."
[MI/AF/00s; MI/SpecOps]
Kan, Paul Rexton. "Counternarcotics Operations within Counterinsurgency: The Pivotal Role of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 586-599.
"Intelligence efforts against drug trafficking must adapt to anti-insurgency factors."
[MI/SpecOps]
Kan, Shirley A. China: Suspected Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Secrets. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1 Feb. 2006.
This report reviews the many factors that went into the huge dispute over Chinese spying.
[GenPostCW/China/90s/00s]
Kane, Harnett
T. Spies for the Blue and Gray. Garden City, NY: Hanover House, 1954.
[CivWar/Overviews]
Kane, Paul. "GAO Seeks Review of Spy Agencies: The Outgoing Chief Auditor Makes a Pitch on Capitol Hill." Washington Post, 7 Mar. 2008, A15. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Comptroller General David M. Walker, whose 10-year term concludes on 12 March 2008, "is again asking Congress to give the Government Accountability Office [GAO] the power to review the finances of the CIA and other intelligence agencies.... [T]he Justice Department issued a ruling in the early 1990s that restricted oversight of the CIA to House and Senate select committees on intelligence." Lawmakers and others question "whether the GAO is too closely aligned with the congressional majority and whether its investigators have the proper clearances to handle classified intelligence matters."
Writing to IAFIE members, Mark M. Lowenthal commented: "GAO has been sucking around the IC for years, trying to get in. Bad case of oversight envy. They could never articulate what they would bring, they just wanted in. I never understood the value add proposition." To which, J. Ransom Clark added: "I always figured that GAO's hots for the IC role was connected with bureaucratic politics -- expand your responsibilities, get more staff for the new responsibilities, get more dollars to pay staff and handle the new responsibilities, grow your empire. Sounds like a normal bureaucratic imperative to me." And Bart Bechtel noted: "GAO needs to examine itself. There is no oversight of this office anywhere near what already exists in the IC. GAO was a pass the buck exercise by Congress wanting to avoid its duty."
[Oversight/00s]
Kapera, Zdzislaw J., ed. Before Ultra There Was Gale: Some Contributions to the History of the Polish Enigma, 1939-1942. The Enigma Bulletin, No. 6. Mogilany, Poland: The Enigma Press, 2002.
Kruh, Cryptologia 27.4, notes that these essays come out of a conference on "The Contribution of Polish Intelligence to the Allied Victory in the Second World War," and mark the 70th anniversary (2002) of the breaking of the military Enigma by the Polish mathematician Marian Rejewski. This work provides "interesting reading about the vital role of the Polish Cipher Bureau in the Enigma battle."
[OtherCountries/Poland/Enigma; UK/WWII/Ultra]
Kaplan,
Robert D. "Special Intelligence." Atlantic Monthly, Feb.
1998, 61- 62. [http://www.theatlantic.com]
"For an army that will have to act secretly, unconventionally, and in advance of crises rather than during them, intelligence is critical. Indeed, the growth of Special Forces might be a crude indication of the collapse of any distinction between our military and intelligence services. Yes, the CIA itself might be done away with. What the CIA does, however, will not only grow in importance but also have the support of armed troops within the same bureaucratic framework."
[MI/SpecOps]
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