Kaiser, Frederick. Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 25 Aug. 2010. [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL32525.pdf]
"This report first describes the Select Committees on Intelligence and then the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, often cited as a model for a counterpart on intelligence. The study also sets forth proposed characteristics for a joint committee on intelligence, differences among these, and their pros and cons. The report ... examines other actions and alternatives affecting congressional oversight in the field."
Kaiser, Frederick M. "Congress and the Intelligence Community: Taking the Road Less Traveled." In The Postreform Congress, ed. Roger H. Davidson, 279-300. New York: St. Martin's, 1992.
Kaiser, Frederick M. "GAO Versus the CIA: Uphill Battles against an Overpowering Force." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 330-389.
"From the CIA's perspective, GAO lacks independent statutory power to perform audits, evaluations, examinations, or reviews of the Agency, its personnel, operations, or activities.... In contrast, the GAO maintains that it possesses sufficient authority to conduct such audits and reviews but lacks the necessary enforcement powers to carry them out.... [T]he competition between GAO and the CIA has been one-sided and generally won by the Central Intelligence Agency."
Kaiser, Frederick M. "Impact and Implications of the Iran-Contra Affair on Congressional Oversight of Covert Action." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 205-234.
Kaiser, Frederick M. "The Watchers' Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 55-75.
For a critique of the factual basis and conclusions of this article, see: Scott Breckinridge, "CIA's Inspector General...," IJI&C 3.3:419-424.
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