K - Kai

 

Kadane, Kathy. "Ex-Agents Say CIA Compiled Death Lists for Indonesians." San Francisco Examiner, 20 May 1990. [http://www.pir.org/kadane.html]

"The U.S. government played a significant role in one of the worst massacres of the century by supplying the names of thousands of Communist Party leaders to the Indonesian army, which hunted down the leftists and killed them, former U.S. diplomats say.... Approval for the release of the names came from the top U.S. Embassy officials, including former Ambassador Marshall Green, deputy chief of mission Jack Lydman and political section chief Edward Masters, the three acknowledged in interviews."

In "A Letter to the Editor," New York Review of Books, 10 Apr. 1997, Kadane adds that the above-mentioned "on-the-record, taped interviews..., my notes, and a small collection of documents, including a few declassified cables..., [have been transferred] to the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C.."

[CA/Indonesia]

Kagan, Donald. "Why America Dropped the Bomb." Commentary, 100 (Sep. 1995), 17-23.

Auer and Halloran, Parameters, Spring 1996, say that the author "is masterful in refuting the 'new revisionist consensus' that the bomb was neither necessary nor a morally acceptable means to end the war."

[WWII/FE/Pac/Bomb]

Kagan, Mark H. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Relays Pictures to Airborne Radar System." Signal, May 1999, 61 ff. [http://www.us.net/signal]

[Recon/UAVs]

Kagan, Robert. A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua, 1977-1990. New York: Free Press, 1996.

Hendrickson, FA 75.4, calls this book a "brilliant and encyclopedic history of the American intervention in Nicaragua." Kagan, a midlevel State Department official during the Reagan administration, approaches the subject "from the more detached and objective station of the historian, and his literary gifts make the work appealing despite its oppressive length."

[CIA/80s/Nicaragua]

Kahan, Jerome H., and Anne K. Long. "The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Study of Its Strategic Context." Political Science Quarterly 87 (Dec, 1972): 564-590.

[GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis]

Kahan, Stuart. The Wolf of the Kremlin. London: Robert Hale, 1989.

This biography of Kaganovich offers insights into the Terror and the relationship between Stalin and the OGPU/NKVD.

[Russia/Interwar]

Kahana, Ephraim. "Analyzing Israel's Intelligence Failures." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 2 (Summer 2005): 262-279.

The author lists a substantial number of "failures," dividing them into strategic failures and covert action failures. He concludes that Israel's "leaders must find a balance between exaggerating threats to the country and accurately assessing opportunities for peace."

[Isarel/Surprise]

Kahana, Ephraim. "Early Warning versus Concept: The Case of the Yom Kippur War 1973." Intelligence and National Security 17, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 81-104.

"A close examination of the case of the Yom Kippur War reveals how difficult it is to abandon a firm concept, even though it is wrong. The result in this case was that the decision-makers were not provided with early warning in due time, despite an abundance of good and relevant information."

[Israel/YomKippur]

Kahana, Ephraim. Historical Dictionary of Israeli Intelligence. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow, 2006.

From publisher: This work "provides detailed information on the various agencies, operations, important leaders and operatives, and special aspects of tradecraft through a chronology, an introduction, a dictionary full of cross-referenced entries, and a bibliography suggesting further reading."

Aftergood, Secrecy News (from the FAS Project on Government Secrecy), 18 May 2006 [http://www.fas.org], notes that "[a]ll of the obvious topics are covered, from the capture of fugitive Nazi Adolf Eichmann to the Jonathan Pollard case, as are other relatively obscure subjects, such as the defense security organization Malmab, and its querulous director Yehiel Horev. The individual subject entries are mostly brief, and do not include sources or references. But the book includes a fine bibliography ... featuring hardcopy and online resources on Israeli intelligence."

For Peake, Studies 50.4 (2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), this work "has useful case summaries, but it is incomplete in surprising areas.... On the other hand, there is new information on some cases.... The introduction is a valuable summary of how Israeli intelligence operates, citing missions, failures, oversight, the importance of HUMINT, and a look to the future. Overall this is a valuable reference book."

[Israel/Ref]

Kahana, Ephraim. "Mossad-CIA Cooperation." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 409-420.

As the author admits, there is little open-source information on his subject. Hence, the article is filled out with instances where there was a lack of "cooperation": such as, Israel's use of NUMEC to obtain enriched uranium, the attack on the Liberty, and the Pollard fiasco.

[Israel/U.S.Rels/Gen]

Kahana, Ephraim. "Reorganizing Israel's Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 15, no. 3 (Fall 2002): 415-428.

Israeli national intelligence estimates are prepared by Aman. However, "Aman is a military unit, and national intelligence estimates, which cover political and economic issues, should not be left to the military alone." Additionally, Aman does not have access to the intelligence estimates drawn up by other groups.

[Israel/Overviews]

Kahaner, Larry. Competitive Intelligence. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1997.

Kahin, Audrey R., and George McT. Kahin. Subversion as Foreign Policy: The Secret Eisenhower and Dulles Debacle in Indonesia. New York: New Press, 1995.

Warren, Surveillant 4.3, comments that "[t]he writing is awkward, the thesis untenable, and the evidence missing. If one can separate the tendentious chaff from the straightforward wheat, however, it's not a bad description of the Indonesian rebellion in the late 1950s." Nevertheless, the Kahins are stretching when they try "to implicate the Eisenhower administration in the massacre of hundreds of thousands of Indonesians in 1965 as an outgrowth of American support for the rebellion."

As a counterpoint, Hess, JAH 83.1, appears to swallow the Kahin line whole, terming this a "singularly important book." This view is shared, at least in part, by Lucas, I&NS 12.3, who sees the Kahins "skilfully" uncovering the Eisenhower administration's "heavy-handed resort to secret operations" and providing "a fascinating account of a policy gone wrong."

Two former CIA officers who served in Indonesia, Collins and Tovar, IJI&C 9.3, note that George Kahin "is regarded by many as America's leading apologist for former Indonesian President Sukarno." Therefore, it is not unexpeced that they find "serious flaws in this book, not the least of which is a stridency militating against any pretension to objectivity.... [T]here is no credible evidence to support [the authors'] thesis that the U.S. 'provoked' the 1958 rebellion." In addition, "the Kahins greatly inflate the size and scope of the U.S. covert and military forces involved in Indonesia." The reviewers conclude that this book is an "essentially failed exercise of allegation and innuendo."

IJI&C 10.2 carries the Kahins' response, "CIA's Men Disingenuous," to the Collins-Tovar review, and separate counter-responses by Tovar and Collins. In their discussion, the Kahins reiterate that "we have not been reticent in averring that American officials were supportive of the Suharto forces' physical elimination of those they charged with communism." And therein lies the rub.

In another context, Tovar, IJI&C 14.4, comments that "[t]he Kahins and their partisans have done their best to show U.S. involvement with the army in the Gestapu coup attempt, this being the alleged culmination of relations with the army dating back to 1958. That is nonsense, as is the contention that the coup attempt was 'an internal army affair.'"

[CA/Asia/Indonesia]

Kahn, David.

Kaiser, David. "Review Article: Conspiracy or Cock-up? Pearl Harbor Revisited." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 354-372.

Clausen and Lee's Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement is a "highly readable book." Much of what Clausen "uncovered late in the war ... has been ignored." Nevertheless, "[l]awyers ... acquire the habit of working to prove a particular point.... Readers must therefore approach his account with caution." Neither Rusbridger and Nave nor Layton "have been able to prove that anyone had real information warning of a Pearl Harbor attack.... [T]he behavior of the Washington authorities suggests that they believed that they had given field commanders enough warning of impending hostilities, and for the most part, the record backs them up.... Th[e] evidence ... suggests that General Short simply did not regard an attack upon Hawaii as a serious possibility.... To the unbiased, reflective historian, five decades after the event, the Pearl Harbor attack exemplifies the difficult of anticipating surprise, the mistakes which individuals inevitably make, the ease with which governments fail to make use of available information, and the relative unimportance, in the long run, of winning the opening battle of a war."

[WWII/PearlHarbor][c]

Kaiser, Frederick.

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