Jones

A - H

Jones, Alfred Haworth. "The Making of an Interventionist on the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News." Pacific Historical Review 43 (1973): 74-93.

[WWII/PsyWar]

Jones, Bruce E. War Without Windows: A True Account of a Young Army Officer Trapped in an Intelligence Cover-Up in Vietnam. New York: Vanguard, 1987.

Jones, Calvert. "Intelligence Reform: The Logic of Information Sharing." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 3 (Jun. 2007): 384-401.

This is an interesting critique of the "Information Sharing Environment," which draws on both information and communications theory. The author argues that the reforms that flowed from the influential report of the 9/11 Commission "may privilege the flow of information and its sheer volume at the expence of the context and analytic tradecaft that render it meaningful actionable intelligence." [Italics in original]

[Reform/00s/Gen]

Jones, Christopher M. "The CIA Under Clinton: Continuity and Change." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 4 (Winter 2001-2002): 503-528.

This article by a political science professor, working solely from publicly available materials, focuses on the CIA's mission, structure, and personnel in an effort "to uncover how the CIA has responded organizationally to its internal problems and new external environment" during the Clinton years. While some of the supporting analysis can be nit-picked, the result is a commendable look at what is understood of the organizational dynamic at work in the CIA in the 1990s.

Although the CIA saw certain of its responsibilities "either challenged or lost completely" (e.g., by the creation of the Defense HUMINT Service and the move of the functions of the National Photographic Interpretation Center to the Defense Department's new National Imagery and Mapping Agency), its work also has "become broader and more complicated." The author concludes that "[w]hile the CIA did not experience sweeping change during the Clinton era, a process of bureaucratic adapation generated by forces within and outside the Agency altered several important aspects of its mission, structure, and personnel."

[CIA/90s/SummingUp]

Jones, Clive.

1. Britain and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-1965: Ministers, Mercenaries and Mandarins: Foreign Policy and the Limits of Covert Action. Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press, 2004.

Mawby, I&NS 20.3 (Sep. 2005), finds that this work "contains much new and significant material about the Yemen Civil War." However, it also has "glaring deficiencies both in its major thesis and on points of detail." The reviewer notes, for example, that the Maria Theresa thaler/dollar "is rendered throughout as the Mother Theresa Dollar." This book must be read "with considerable care." Jones, I&NS 21.2 (Apr. 2006), 316-317, takes grave exception with the tone and conclusions of Mawby's review.

2. "'Where the State Feared to Tread': Britain, Britons, Covert Action and the Yemen Civil War, 1962-64." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 717-737.

Official British covert actions associated with the Yemen civil war were restricted to defensive activities along the border. Unofficially, a group of Conservation MPs worked with key Middle Eastern leaders in supporting a private mercenary organization.

[OtherCountries/Yemen; UK/Postwar/Gen]

Jones, Clive. "'A Reach Greater than the Grasp': Israeli Intelligence and the Conflict in South Lebanon, 1990-2000." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 1-26.

Israel's overall intelligence effort in South Lebanon was "conceptually flawed. The inability to regard Hizb'allah as anything more than terrorists, or to look beyond the more extreme rhetoric at their emergence into the mainstream of Lebanese politics produced erroneous intelligence assessments."

[Israel/OtherOps/Misc]

Jones, Dorothy B. "The Hollywood War Film: 1942-1944." Hollywood Quarterly 1 (1945-1946): 1-19. [Winkler]

[WWII/PsyWar]

Jones, Edgar L. "Fighting with Words: Psychological Warfare in the Pacific." Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1945, 47-51. [Winkler]

[WWII/PsyWar]

Jones, Frank L. "Army SOF in Afghanistan: Learning the Right Lessons." Joint Forces Quarterly 33 (Winter 2002-2003): 16-22.

"The successes of military operations in Afghanistan are being jeopardized by misreading them. Although Special Operations Forces are credited with defeating Taliban and al Qaeda foces, too much emphasis can be put on coordinating ground and air attacks while recruiting anti-Taliban fighters is underestimated. The latter capacity resulted from employing SOF assets in unconventional warfare.... The rise of insurgent and irredentist movements..., coupled with asymmetric threats, demands a strategic vision for unconventional warfare."

[MI/Ops/Afgh & Spec/Ops]

Jones, Frank Leith. Blowtorch: Robert Komer, Vietnam, and American Cold War Strategy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013.

Freedman, FA 92.3 (May-Jun. 2013), notes that this is a "sympathetic biography." The author "makes a convincing argument that Komer was, in fact, a master strategist, able to put short-term issues in their wider context and think through the likely consequences of action." For Wirtz, IJI&C 27.4 (Winter 2014), this is a "finely crafted monograph." It "makes a convincing case that Komer was a gifted strategist who was able to devise politically sensitive policies that matched ends to means to achieve realistic objectives that furthered U.S. interests."

Peake, Studies 59.2 (Jun. 2015), says the author "adds particulars to a colorful though relatively unknown CIA analyst who became an advisor to four presidents." Komer's "passion for and contribution to strategic issues and national policy have received insufficient attention. Blowtorch adjusts the balance."

[CIA/Biogs; GenPostwar/NatSec/To90s; Vietnam/Gen]

Jones, Garrett. "Working with the CIA." Parameters, Winter 2001-2002: 28-39.

The former CIA Chief in Mogadishu and U.S. Army War College graduate offers some basic-but-useful thoughts for military commanders and their senior staffs on the CIA-military relationship within the context of field operations.

[CIA/00s/02]

Jones, George. "Curbs on MI5 after Spy Case 'Farce.'" Telegraph (London), 14 Sep. 1999. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

"Tighter controls over the security service were ordered" by Home Secretary Jack Straw on 13 September 1999 "after MI5 admitted it did not consult ministers over a decision not to prosecute Melita Norwood ... despite having confirmation of her treachery."

[UK/SpyCases/99/Fever]

Jones, George. "Shayler Names Spies in Plot to Kill Gaddafi." Telegraph (London), 28 Feb. 2000. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

Shayler "said he was furious that the Government was pursuing him through the civil courts, declaring: 'If the Government want to do battle, then I'll have a battle.'"

[UK/PostCW/Shayler]

Jones, George, and Michael Smith. "Straw Calls Emergency Meeting Over the Spy of 87." Telegraph (London), 13 Sep. 1999. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

Home Secretary Jack Straw "has summoned Stephen Lander, head of MI5, to an emergency meeting" on 13 September 1999 "to explain why ministers were kept in the dark for almost seven years about the extent of Soviet espionage in Britain." The KGB files "were brought out of Russia by Richard Tomlinson, the renegade MI6 officer [who] ... was serving in Moscow under diplomatic cover in 1992 when Vasili Mitrokhin ... defected to the West. It was considered too dangerous for ... Mitrokhin to bring the 300,000 documents with him so Tomlinson was sent to Mitrokhin's dacha where they were hidden under the floor in empty milk cartons."

[UK/PostCW/90s/Tomlinson; UK/SpyCases/99/Fever]

Jones, Harry E., Jr. "Closing the Intelligence Gap in the OMFTS Concept." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1999, 52-54.

OMFTS = operational maneuver from the sea.

[MI/Marines]

Jones, Howard. The Bay of Pigs. New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. 2010. [pb]

DeBenedictis, Cold War Times 8.4 (Nov. 2008), believes the author breaks "new ground both with documentation and interpretation." He also paints with "a broader Cold War brush in showing the foreign relations legacy of both the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis. The legacy touched future presidents during the Vietnam War and beyond." Schwab, IJI&C 22.1 (Spring 2009), sees the criticism of the operation in this "incisive and comprehensive study" as "even-handed." For Fischer, I&NS 25.2 (Apr.2010), the "book is succinct but comprehensive.... [I]t is fair and judicious in explaining what happened and why and apportioning blame for the outcome."

[CIA/60s/B0P]

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