Johnson

H - Z

 

Johnson, Haynes, with Manuel Artime, José Peréz San Román, Erneido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. The Bay of Pigs: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. New York: Norton, 1964. London: Hutchinson, 1965.

Constantinides: "Along with other Cuban exiles, the four commanders of the brigade ... told their portion of the story to Johnson.... [He] devoted much less attention to the story of the operation from inside the U.S. government and especially CIA.... Johnson put more faith in the reliability and objectivity of the Castro government's published versions than experience with such regimes would seem to warrant."

In a contemporaneous review, Kirkpatrick, Studies 8.4 (Fall 1964), says that this book "is well done, and a reasonable book about a disaster.... [It] is especially good, and probably quite accurate, about the efforts made to free the prisoners and their eventual release. It is weak and sketchy, for obvious reasons, about the planning and execution of the operation from the U.S. viewpoint."

[CIA/60s/BoP]

Johnson, Ian. A Mosque in Munich: Nazis, CIA, and the Rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West. Boston & New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010.

Fischer, IJI&C 24, no. 2 (Summer 2011), opines that the author's "thesis that the blowback from Afghanistan began in Munich thirty years earlier is interesting but undocumented."

[CIA/50s/Gen]

Johnson, Jeannie L., and Matthew T. Berrett. "Cultural Topography: A New Research Tool for Intelligence Analysis." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 2 (Jun. 2011): 1-22. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-55-no.-2/cultural-topography-a-new-research-tool-for-intelligence-analysis.html]

The authors introduce a process they call "Cultural Mapping." This "process, or methodology, is designed to isolate and assess cultural factors at play on issues of intelligence interest and to distinguish the degree to which those factors influence decisionmaking and outcomes."

[Analysis/Gen]

Johnson, J.M., R.W. Austin, and D.A. Quinlan. "Individual Heroism Overcame Awkward Command Relationship, Confusion, and Bad Information Off the Cambodian Coast." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1977, 24-34. [Petersen]

[GenPostwar/70s/Mayaguez]

Johnson, Kate, ed. The Special Operations Executive: Sound Archive, Oral History Recordings. London: Imperial War Museum, 1998. [From Capet]

[UK/WWII/SOE]

Johnson, Kerry, and John Gallehawk. Figuring It Out at Bletchley Park 1939-1945. [UK]: BookTower, 2007.

[UK/WWII/Ultra]

Johnson, Loch K.

Johnson, L. Scott. "Toward a Functional Model of Information Warfare: A Major Intelligence Challenge." Studies in Intelligence (Semiannual ed. no. 1, 1997): 49-56.

"The overall concept of IW can thus be considered as having three parts: a set of IW elements (techniques and capabilities), a comprehensive strategy that applies and orchestrates them, and a target and objective."

[GenPostwar/InfoWar]

Johnson, Mark, and Paul Tolchinsky. “A Redesign in the Central Intelligence Agency.” Journal for Quality & Participation 22, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 1999): 31-35.

The authors write about the CIA's collaborative effort in 1996-1997 with "Dannemiller Tyson Associates (DTA), a small organizational development firm that specializes in assisting large-scale changes in an organization," to transform a 100-person-plus department in the CIA.

[CIA/C&C/Gen]

Johnson, N.L. "Soviet Satellite Reconnaissance Activities and Trends." Air Force, Mar. 1981, 90-94.

[Russia/To89]

Johnson, Richard D.

1. PSYOP, the Gulf Paper War: Psychological Warfare Operations against the Iraqi Military and Civilian Establishments between November 1990 and February 1991. Titusville, FL: R.D. Johnson, 1992. [Gibish]

2. Seeds of Victory: Psychological Warfare and Propaganda. Atglen, PA: Schiffer, 2004.

This is primarily a reference work. According to the publisher, it documents, "Psychological Warfare campaign methodologies and strategies used in Iraq." It has been "officially adapted" by the U.S. Army's Psychological Warfare Group Command "as an instructional and reference work for use within their company-level units."

[MI/Ops/90s/DesertStorm]

Johnson, Richard W. Shootdown: Flight 007 and the American Connection. New York: Viking, 1986. New York: Penguin Books, 1987. [pb]

Maertens, IJI&C 1.2: "Johnson thinks the aircraft was on an intelligence mission for the U.S. government ... [and is] determined not to let facts or logic get in the way of his theory." The reviewer "counted 105 factual or technical errors ... in the first chapter alone." The book is "based on misinformation and unsupported assertion" and shows "ideological biases." The author has "manipulated and distorted the evidence beyond recognition."

[GenPostwa/80s/KAL-007]

Johnson, Robert. Spying for Empire: The Great Game in Central and South Asia, 1757-1947. London: Greenhill, 2006. St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2006.

Kelly, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), notes the author's "impressive research in the pertinent archives." Johnson shows "how British India built up its intelligence network ... beyond the frontiers" with "listening posts." For Peake, Studies 51.2 (2007), the author demonstrates that "by the end of the 19th century, British military intelligence in India had become a professional service that did more than monitor the northern frontier. It also maintained India's domestic security through collaboration with the local Indian police."

[UK/Historical/GreatGame; UK/Overviews/00s]

Johnson, Scott C. The Wolf and the Watchman: A Father, A Son, and the CIA. New York: Norton, 2013.

Peake, Studies 57.4 (Dec. 2013),finds that this "is the story of an extraordinarily close relationship between a CIA father and his son, one that is dominated by the son's continuing struggle to understand the clandestine world and its morality. It is probably not a typical story, but it will be of interest to families whose members have chosen or are contemplating careers in intelligence."

[CIA/Memoirs]

Johnson, Stowers. Agents Extraordinary. London: Hale, 1975.

Wilcox identifies this book as an "account of British special agents, spies, [and] saboteurs,... during World War II." Peter J Conradi, Iris: The Life of Iris Murdoch (New York: Norton, 2001), 624/fn. 50, avers that Agents Extraordinary "is notoriously ill-documented."

[UK/WWII/Overviews]

Johnson, Thomas M. Our Secret War: True American Spy Stories, 1917-1919. Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1929.

[WWI/U.S.]

Johnson, Thomas R. American Cryptology during the Cold War, 1945-1989. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, c. 1995-1998. Redacted version of vols. 1-3 available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB260/index.htm.

The National Security Archive site listed above includes a commentary by Matthew M. Aid, "The National Security Agency during the Cold War." Aid calls this work "a unique and invaluable study for readers interested in the history of U.S. intelligence during the Cold War." Johnson's history has a "refreshing openness and honesty"; he acknowledges "both the NSA's impressive successes ... and abject failures."

Burke, Cryptologia 33.2 (Apr. 2009), says that this work's "comprehensive coverage of the subject, the skill and devotion of its author, and the research and writing that took close to ten years ... have yielded a foundational work." Johnson's "volumes stand as a resource for independent scholars and a fascinating reading for the general public." The reviewer notes that redactions from the volumes "increased as the subjects seemingly became relevant to more recent time periods, events, and operations."

[NSA/Overviews]

Johnson, Thomas R., and David A. Hatch. NSA and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 1998. [http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/cuban_missile_crisis.pdf]

"[S]ignals intelligence did not provide any direct information about the Soviet introduction of offensive ballistic missiles into Cuba. However, in the more than two years before that fact was known, SIGINT analysts thoroughly studied the Cuban military buildup. Once the offensive missiles were discovered, SIGINT provided direct support for day-to-day management of the crisis."

[GenPostwar/60s/Missile Crisis]

Johnson, William R.

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