Jeremiah Panel. "Defining the Future of the NRO for the 21st Century: Report to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Final Report: Executive Summary, 26 August 1996." [http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/jeremiah.htm]
Jeremiah Panel. "Defining the Future of the NRO for the 21st Century: Report to the Director, National Reconnaissance Office. Final Report: Executive Summary, 26 August 1996." [http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/jeremiah.htm]
This is text of the Executive Summary of the report prepared by the panel chaired by David E. Jeremiah [ADM/USN (Ret.)]. The panel was appointed following the difficulties encountered by the NRO in 1994 (building flap) and 1995 (unspent funds), which had led to dismissal of the organization's director and deputy director in February 1996.
The Panel concluded that "the NRO continues to be the right organizational answer to the nation's space reconnaissance needs in the future because it serves the national and military equities represented by the SECDEF and DCI." In addition, the Executive Summary presents 12 issues and makes recommendations on each.
[NRO/90s/96]
Jernigan, Patricia H. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] "Army Intelligence Production: Challenge and Commitment." American Intelligence Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer
1992): 79-83.
[MI/Army/90s][c]
Jerusalem
Post. "PM Rejects Claim by Mossad
Agents that Gov't Abandoned Them." 6 Jul. 2000. [http://www.jpost.com]
On 5 July 2000, the Prime Minister's Office "said it gave 'full support' to the Mossad and its director, rejecting criticism by Mossad agents that the government had turned its back on the service by sending an agent to stand trial in Switzerland for a bungled wire-tap attempt on a Hizbullah member."
[Israel/00s]
Jervis, Robert. "Intelligence and Foreign Policy." International Security 11, no. 3 (Winter 1986-1987): 141-161.
[GenPostwar/80s/Gen]
Jervis, Robert. "The Politics and Psychology of Intelligence and Intelligence Reform." Forum 4, no. 1 (2006): 1-9. [http://www.bepress.com/forum/vol4/iss1/art1]
Abstract: "Policy-makers always say they want the best intelligence, but in fact they do not because good intelligence often raises doubts and challenges policy. They also always claim to be working to improve intelligence, but in fact do not understand the problems, and many 'reforms,' such as the recent establishment of a Director of National Intelligence, are useless if not harmful."
Clark comment: This is an excellent article that makes its argument succinctly and pointedly. It deserves to be widely read and discussed.
[Reform/00s/06]
Jervis, Robert. "Reports, Politics, and Intelligence Failures: The Case of Iraq." Journal of Strategic Studies 29, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 3-52.
[GenPosCW/00s/Gen]
Jervis,
Robert. "What's Wrong With the Intelligence Process?" International
Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986):
28-41.
[Reform][c]
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