Jehl, Douglas. "Report Blames Agencies Over Prewar Intelligence." New York Times, 4 Jun. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"George J. Tenet's resignation may have been hastened" by the SSCI's "critical, 400-page report" presented to the CIA for comment last month. "Government officials and people close to Mr. Tenet said the classified report was a detailed account of mistakes and miscalculations by American intelligence agencies on whether Iraq possessed illicit weapons before the United States invaded last year. An unclassified version of the report is to be made public this month."
Jehl, Douglas. "Review Leads to Upheaval in Spy Satellite Programs." New York Times, 30 Sep. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
A review by DNI John D. Negroponte "is stirring a major upheaval within the country's spy satellite programs." In an announcement last week, the NRO said "that a Boeing Company contract to provide the next generation of reconnaissance satellites, known as the Future Imagery Architecture, was being 'restructured.'" However, according to officials and experts, Negroponte has "ordered that Boeing stop work on a significant part of the project ... under a plan to shift the mission to Lockheed Martin." The part of the program that involves radar-surveillance satellites "would remain with Boeing.... [I]t is not clear whether the proposal goes far enough to answer Congressional demands for deep cuts in spending on reconnaissance satellite programs."
Jehl, Douglas. "Spy Agencies Told to 'Bolster the Growth of Democracy.'" New York Times, 27 Oct. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"A new strategy document issued [on 26 October 2005] by the Bush administration ranks efforts to 'bolster the growth of democracy' among the three top missions for American intelligence agencies.... The top two 'mission objectives' are efforts to counter terrorism and weapons proliferation.... The strategy ... is unclassified, and the officials said it was not intended to apply in any way to any covert action that might be undertaken by the United States." See ODNI, "National Intelligence Strategy," at http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20051025_release.htm.
Jehl, Douglas. "Spy Agencies Vindicated After String of Setbacks." New York Times, 15 Dec. 2003. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Although it was American soldiers who unearthed [Saddam] Hussein, it was the intelligence community, including the Central Intelligence Agency and its military counterparts, that set them on the right path.... C.I.A. officers have played a major part in the supersecret military Special Operations teams, including Task Force 121, that were given the leading role in tracking down Iraqi leaders. In recent weeks, the information gathered by the C.I.A., the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence arms of the military services has been closely shared among the agencies through a new cooperative arrangement in Baghdad."
Jehl, Douglas. "The Spymaster Question." New York Times, 8 Dec. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"The question is whether the changes [restructuring the U.S. intelligence community] will make much of a difference in combating terrorism and weapons proliferation.... [E]ven some supporters of the legislation ... acknowledge their own agnosticism.... [T]here is much that remains uncertain about the plan, with the legislation itself leaving much to be worked out by the agencies affected. Among these is the precise division of authority between the intelligence chief and the Pentagon, which until now has controlled 80 percent of the overall intelligence budget, and how much authority the intelligence chief will exert on operational matters."
See also, Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, "Director's Control Is a Concern," Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2004, A1.
Jehl, Douglas. "Tenet Concedes Gaps in C.I.A. Data on Iraq Weapons." New York Times, 6 Feb. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Speaking at Georgetown University on 5 February 2004, DCI George J. Tenet "acknowledged ... that American spy agencies may have overestimated Iraq's illicit weapons capacities, in part because of a failure to penetrate the inner workings of the Iraqi government." However, he steadfastly defended U.S. "spy agencies and their integrity.... He insisted that intelligence agencies had acted independently of policy makers, and noted that intelligence analysts had never portrayed Iraq as presenting an imminent threat to the United States before the American invasion last March." See also, Dana Priest and Walter Pincus, "Tenet Defends CIA's Analysis of Iraq as Objective, if Flawed," Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2004, A1.
Jehl, Douglas. "2 Top Officials Are Reported to Quit C.I.A." New York Times, 25 Nov. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Intelligence officials said on 24 November 2004 that two more senior officials of the Central Intelligence Agency's Directorate of Operations, the chiefs of the Europe and Far East divisions, are retiring.
Jehl, Douglas. "White House to Ask C.I.A. to Manage Human Spying." New York Times, 28 Jun. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to senior government officials on 27 June 2005, the White House has decided to reject classified recommendations by the Silberman-Robb commission "that would have given the Pentagon greater authority to conduct covert action.... The decision is a victory for the Central Intelligence Agency." The officials also said that "[t]he White House will also designate the C.I.A. as the main manager of the government's human spying operations, even those conducted by the Pentagon and the F.B.I....
"The plan for covert action was the only major recommendation explicitly rejected" by the White House. The commission's "recommendations about covert action were deleted from the public version of the ... report, but senior government officials said they would have allowed the Pentagon a larger role in carrying out intelligence, reconnaissance or sabotage missions more secretive than the operations already carried out by American Special Operations forces, which are defined as clandestine -- a shade less secret than covert."
Return to Jeh-Jer