Douglas Jehl

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Jehl, Douglas. "Administration Considers a Post for National Intelligence Director." New York Times, 16 Apr. 2004. []

On 15 April 2004, administration officials said that "[t]he White House is weighing whether to pre-empt the Sept. 11 commission's final report this summer by embracing a proposal to create a powerful new post of director of national intelligence.... Also being discussed within the White House, the officials said, were possible changes within the F.B.I., including the creation of a new directorate within the bureau responsible for domestic intelligence-gathering and analysis. The alternative of creating a new domestic intelligence agency was also being discussed but was seen as less likely to be embraced, the officials said."


Jehl, Douglas. "An Abundance of Caution and Years of Budget Cuts Are Seen to Limit C.I.A." New York Times, 11 May 2004. []

According to government officials, "America's clandestine intelligence service has fewer than 1,100 case officers posted overseas, fewer than the number of F.B.I. agents assigned to the New York City field office alone." Since George J. Tenet took charge of the CIA seven years ago, "rebuilding that service has been his top priority." But according to Tenet and others, "it will be an additional five years ... before the rebuilding is complete and the United States has the network it needs to adequately confront a global threat posed by terrorist groups and hostile foreign governments." In an interview on 30 April 2004, CIA Deputy Director for Operations James L. Pavitt "said he still needed 30 to 35 percent more people."


Jehl, Douglas. "Bleak Prognosis by C.I.A. Nominee." New York Times, 15 Sep. 2004. []

Testifying before the SSCI on 14 September 2004, DCI-Nominee Porter J. Goss said that rebuilding the CIA "would take more than five years and that American spies needed to be encouraged to take more risks." Goss "offered what he called a candid view of the intelligence agencies. He said that if confirmed as director, he would practice 'tough love' in leading agencies that he portrayed as standing at 3 on a scale of 10 in terms of capabilities." See also, Dana Priest, "At Hearing, Goss Vows Nonpartisan CIA Leadership: Nominee Calls for More Risk Taking By Agents Abroad," Washington Post, 15 Sep. 2004, A4.


Jehl, Douglas. "Bush Selects Admiral for No. 2 Post at C.I.A." New York Times, 1 Jul. 2005. []

The Pentagon announced on 30 June 2005 that President Bush has nominated Vice Admiral Albert M. Calland III to become CIA deputy director, the number two position at the agency. As associate director for military support, Calland has been the top military liaison at the agency and has been serving as acting deputy director for several months. Calland served from 2002 to 2004 as commander of the Navy Special Warfare Command, the senior officer in charge of Navy Seals.


Jehl, Douglas. "Campaign Is Begun To Protect Money for Intelligence." New York Times, 14 Mar. 1993, A1, A28.


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Chief Seeks Change in Inspector's 9/11 Report." New York Times, 2 Nov. 2004. []

According to Congressional and intelligence officials on 1 November 2004, a 27 October 2004 memorandum from DCI Porter J. Goss to Inspector General John Helgerson requests that "the C.I.A.'s inspector general ... modify a draft report on the Sept. 11 attacks to avoid drawing conclusions about whether individual C.I.A. officers should be held accountable for any failures."


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Churning Continues as 2 Top Officials Resign." New York Times, 16 Nov. 2004. []

On 15 November 2004, Deputy Director of Operations (DDO) Stephen R. Kappes and Associate Deputy Director of Operations Michael Sulick resigned from the CIA. According to "intelligence officials," the resignations came "after days of clashes with advisers" to DCI Porter J. Goss. "[A] covert officer who runs the agency's Counterterrorism Center" has been selected by Goss to become the new DDO. Officials "declined to name the officer, a former chief of American espionage operations in Latin America, because he is still under cover."


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Disputes Accusations that Its Prewar Conclusions on Iraq Arms Were Flawed." New York Times, 25 Oct. 2003. []

The CIA "responded angrily" on 24 October 2003 "to new Congressional criticism of its handling of prewar intelligence about Iraq's suspected illicit weapons program. At a briefing at C.I.A. headquarters, four senior intelligence officials said that a top-secret internal review now underway had found no evidence of faulty work."


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Is Reviewing Its Security Policy for Recruiting Translators." New York Times, 8 Jun. 2005. []

According to Congressional and intelligence officials, the CIA "is reviewing security procedures that have led the agency to turn away large numbers of Arabic-language linguists and other potential recruits with skills avidly sought by the agency since the attacks of 2001."


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Nominee Wary of Budget Cuts." New York Times, 3 Feb. 1993, A18.


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Report Finds Its Officials Failed in Pre-9/11 Efforts." New York Times, 7 Jan. 2005. []

According to current and former intelligence officials, "a near-final version of a report" by CIA Inspector General John Helgerson concludes that "officials who served at the highest levels of the agency should be held accountable for failing to allocate adequate resources to combating terrorism before the Sept. 11 attacks.... Among those most sharply criticized in the report, the officials said, are George J. Tenet, the former intelligence chief, and James L. Pavitt, the former deputy director of operations." See also, Dana Priest, "CIA Leaders Criticized on Pre-9/11 Actions," Washington Post, 8 Jan. 2005, A2.


Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. Review Is Critical of Prewar Iraq Analysis." New York Times, 22 Sep. 2004. []

A "C.I.A. document, dated August 2004..., summarizes conclusions reached by a panel called the Iraq W.M.D. Review Group, which completed a 10-month review in May but has not made its findings public. Among the analytical flaws identified in the group's report were what was described as 'imprecise language' and 'insufficient follow-up' as well as 'sourcing problems' in the prewar intelligence on Iraq.... [T]he now-discredited National Intelligence Estimate of October 2002, which found that Iraq possessed chemical and biological weapons and was reconstituting its nuclear program, was not double-checked to be sure that its assertions were properly backed up."

[CIA/00s/04/Gen; GenPostCW/00s/04/WMD]

Jehl, Douglas. "C.I.A. to Have Role in Inquiry on Jerusalem Bombings." New York Times, 13 Aug. 1997. []

According to senior American officials, "Israeli and Palestinian authorities have agreed to report all they have learned about the suicide bombing at a Jerusalem market [on 30 July 1997] to a three-way panel whose American representative will be the CIA station chief in Tel Aviv."


Jehl, Douglas. "Clinton Revamps Policy on Secrecy of U.S. Documents." New York Times, 18 Apr. 1995, A1, A9 (N).

On 17 April 1995, President Clinton signed Executive Order 12958 "overhauling Government secrecy rules and requiring, with certain exceptions, that even the most highly classified documents be made public after 25 years."


Jehl, Douglas. "Critics Fault Bush's C.I.A. Nominee as Championing Budgets Over Watchdog Role." New York Times, 13 Sep. 2004. []

As HPSCI chairman, Porter J. Goss (R-FL) "watched over American intelligence agencies.... But ... Goss cast himself more as a rebuilder than as a watchdog." Now, he "is facing questions about those years of oversight." According to current and former Congressional officials, "Goss was a consistent champion of bigger budgets but much less persistent when it came to scrutinizing mistakes."


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