J - Jal

 

Jablonski, David. "The Paradox of Duality: Adolf Hitler and the Concept of Military Surprise." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 3 (Jul. 1988): 55-117.

The author concludes that "[i]n the end, Blitzkrieg failed because Hitler failed as a strategist.... Although Blitzkrieg was initially closely meshed with Hitler's political goals, his very success led him beyond strategic aims that could be met by the limited opportunistic aggression of that doctrine."

[WWII/Eur/Ger][c]

Jackall, Robert, ed. Propaganda. New York: New York University Press, 1995. London: Macmillan, 1995.

[CA/Propaganda]

Jackamo, Thomas J., III. "From the Cold War to the New Multilateral World Order: The Evolution of Covert Operations and the Customary International Law of Non-Intervention." Virginia Journal of International Law 32, no. 4 (Summer 1992): 929-977.

Calder: "Addresses uncertainty in status of traditional law of non-intervention and potential problems raised by any uniform rule on intervention that might be enacted by the United Nations."

[Overviews/Legal/Internatl]

Jackson.

Jacob, Gary. "MI5 Laptop Is Stolen on Tube." Times (London), 24 Mar. 2000. [http:// www.the-times.co.uk]

A government source has confirmed that on 4 March 2000 a laptop computer carrying coded information on Northern Ireland was stolen from an MI5 intelligence agent at Paddington Underground station in London. The source stated that the "information in the computer does not constitute a threat to national security or individuals."

[UK/PostCW]

Jacobs, Andrew. "U.S. Indicts 2 More Men in Bombing of Embassies." New York Times, 17 Jun. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 16 June 1999, a Federal grand jury indicted two men, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Khalid al-Fawwaz, who prosecutors say are close associates of Osama bin Laden. They are charged with involvement in the bombing of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

[Terrorism/U.S.Embs]

Jacobsen, Alf R. "Scandinavia, Sigint and the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 16, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 209-242.

Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden were all "deeply engaged in signals intelligence collection against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, albeit in great secrecy.... Available evidence suggests that Sweden, despite its neutrality, maintained a substantial clandestine Sigint sharing relationship with the US and Great Britain, particularly during the early stages of the Cold War."

[OtherCountries/Denmark; Finland; Norway; Sweden]

Jacobsen, Philip H.

Jacobsen, Walter L. [LTCDR/USN] "A Juridical Examination of the Israeli attack on The U.S.S. Liberty," Naval Law Review (Winter 1986), 1-52. [Bamford2]

[Postwar/60s/Liberty]

Jacobson, Philip. "France's Secret Police Betrayed by Informer." Electronic Telegraph , 13 Apr. 1997. [http://www.theherald.co.uk]

"For more than a year, inside information about operations by the Renseignements Généraux, the police special branch, has been fed to an investigating magistrate in Paris" by "a well- informed whistleblower" who uses "the cover name of Le Corbeau -- 'The Crow.'"

[France]

Jacoby, L.E. [RADM/USN] "Operational Intelligence: Lessons from the Cold War." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sep. 1999, 102-104.

Discusses September 1998 conference of active-duty and retired Naval Intelligence professionals at the Navy and Marine Corps Intelligence Training Center, Dam Neck, VA. Operational intelligence is defined as "the art of providing near-real-time information concerning the location, activity, and likely intentions of potential adversaries."

[MI/Navy]

Jaeger, Paul T, et al. "The Impact of the USA Patriot Act on Collection and Analysis of Personal Information Under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act." Government Information Quarterly 20. no. 3 (Jul. 2003): 295-314.

[Overviews/Legal/FISA/Gen & Topics/PatriotAct]

Jaggers, R. C. "The Assassination of Reinhard Heydrich." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 1 (Winter 1960): 1-19.

The assassination of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Reinhard Heydrich was planned and carried out by Czech intelligence in exile. Two young Czech soldiers volunteered for an assignment that assuredly meant they would die even if they were successful. On 29 May 1942, they attacked; Heydrich died of his wounds a few days later. The Nazi retaliation was horrific. The killing did not stop even after the two Czech heroes were finally cornered and killed. The author also presents the debate over whether killing Heydrich was worth the deaths of so many others.

[OtherCountries/Czech]

Jähnicke, Burkhard. "Lawyer, Politician, Intelligence Officer: Paul Leverkuehn in Turkey, 1915-1916 and 1941-1944." Journal of Intelligence History 2, no 2 (Winter 2002). [http://www. intelligence-history.org/jih/previous.html]

From abstract: "As a member of the secret Scheubner-Richter expedition in World War I, travelling to the Turkish-Persian frontier, and as spy chief in Istanbul from 1941 until 1944, Leverkuehn represents the history and development of German intelligence in Turkey....  His intelligence activities ended abruptly in February 1944, when his co-worker Erich Vermehren and his wife defected to the British."

See also Paul Leverkuehn, German Military Intelligence (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1954. New York: Praeger, 1954).

[Germany/WWI; WWII/Eur/Ger]

Jajko, Walter. The Future of Defense Intelligence. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993.

Jajko, Walter. "The State of Defense Counterintelligence: An Opinion." Intelligencer 14, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2004): 7-9.

"The time is long past for a reconceptualization of Defense counterintelligence, for a basic rethinking of its intellectual foundations and doctrinal derivations." Defense counterintelligence is "antiquated" and "not up to its mission." There is a need for "an effective, integrated, centralized, single Department of Defense Counterintelligence Service."

Roy Reed and Anthony McIvor, "'The State of Defense Counterintelligence': A Reply," Intelligencer14, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2005): 7-11, respond to Jajko's (and others) criticisms with the argument that (1) "significant ameliorative measures are well underway"; and (2) Defense CI is "on the threshold.of attaining a substantial capability to contribute to national security as a strategic asset."

[MI/CI]

Jajko, Walter [BGEN/USAF (Ret.)]. "Strategy: Back to Basics." Intelligencer 15, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007): 7-9.

"The planning and application of a mutually reinforcing effort against an enemy has to be the result of an integrated, coherent orchestration of a sustained national strategy that is suffused with an authentically strategic direction. Unfortunately, in the U.S. an understanding of this necessity and an organization for its conduct are absent."

[GenPostwar/Policy/00s]

Jakub, Jay. Spies and Saboteurs: Anglo-American Collaboration and Rivalry in Human Intelligence Collection and Special Operations, 1940-45. London: Macmillan, 1998. New York: St. Martin's, 1999.

Jonkers, AFIO WIN, 7 May 1999, notes that this book "is based almost exclusively on recently declassified OSS and British intelligence documents and survivor interviews.... Excellent reading for students of history."

For Smith, I&NS 14.3, this is "an excellent work which has cast much new and clear light on William J. Donovan and the COI/OSS." Jakub has provided "an organizational history of the COI/OSS, as well as a summary study of its field operations, stage by stage from 1941 to 1945.... [In addition,] he traces the stresses and strains engendered by the closeness of Anglo-American secret activity partnership.... The bibliography and notes of sources cited clearly show that the author has done his homework."

Wiant, Studies 46.1, comments on the author's focus on "how OSS matured as a field-operating agency and increasingly developed the capacity for independence from its early British mentoring."

[Liaison; WWII/OSS/Gen]

 

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