Io - Ise

Ippolito, Dennis S. Blunting the Sword: Budget Policy and the Future of Defense. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1994.

[GenPostwar/NatSec]

Iraq Study Group. The Iraq Study Group Report: The Way Forward -- A New Approach. Washington, DC: 6 Dec. 2006. [Available for downloading at: http://www.usip.org/isg/iraq_study_group_report/report/1206/index.html]

Clark comment: There are times when I wonder why anyone -- and especially not intelligent, savvy individuals -- would even consider sitting on a panel such as this. It must be supremely embarrassing to be completely ignored.

This 10-member bipartisan panel was headed by former GOP Secretary of State James Baker and former Democratic Congressman Lee Hamilton.

[MI/Ops/Iraq/06]

Irving, Clifford, and Herbert Burkholz. Spy: The Story of Modern Espionage. New York: Macmillan, 1969. [Chambers]

[Overviews/Gen]

Irving, Clive, et al. Anatomy of a Scandal: A Study of the Profumo Affair. New York: Mill, 1963. [Wilcox]

[UK/SpyCases/Other]

Irving, David, ed. Breach of Security: The German Intelligence Files on Events Leading to the Second World War. London: William Kimber, 1968.

According to Constantinides, this work is based on a report of the German Air Ministry's monitoring and intercept service which "broke traffic, tapped telephones, and opened letters.... The book is badly organized, making it difficult to ascertain what was in the original source and what are the credited remarks." There was much here that at the time was new information. Sexton notes that examples of decrypted diplomatic messages from Britain, Bulgaria, France, Italy, Japan, and Turkey are included.

[Germany/Interwar]

Irwin, Will [LTCOL (Ret.)]. The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944. New York: Public Affairs, 2005.

Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), finds that the author "tells the story of six representative Jedburgh teams in considerable detail while mentioning others that interacted with them." His epilogue is "comprehensive, interesting and informative. It tells what happened to many of the Jeds.... He also includes key members of SOE and military participants who contributed to the success of the Jedburgh program."

For Huck, Periscope (Summer 2006), the author's account of the Jedburghs "provides the essentials, although not always as clearly as it might."

[UK/WWII/Servs/SOE; WWII/OSS/France]

Irwin, William Henry, and Thomas M. Johnson. What You Should Know About Spies and Saboteurs. New York: Norton, 1943.

Wilcox: "Popular account."

[Overviews/Gen]

Isaacson, Irving. Memoirs of an American Spy: The Story of the First OSS Spy in the Cold War with the Russians. Cushing, ME: Stones Point Press, 2001.

Berube, NIPQ 18.2/3, says that this is "a readable book, told in a simple, conversational narrative." It offers "a very personal, ground view of the latter days of WWII and the early Cold War." The author's "description of the early OSS iintelligence operations in Eastern Europe is of particular interest because it is lacking in more general books."

[WWII/OSS/OtherOps]

Isaacson, Walter. Kissinger: A Biography. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.

According to Surveillant 2.6, this biography devotes "almost two chapters to a surprising account of extensive wiretaps and eavesdropping, within the US and abroad, by NSA and others."

[GenPostwar/70s/Gen; NSA/Overviews]

Isachenkov, Vladimir. "Russia Honors Cold War Spies for Soviets." Associated Press, 12 Nov. 2007. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 12 November 2007, Russian intelligence honored George Blake, "one of Moscow's most important Soviet-era spies." Blake was praised by "the Foreign Intelligence Service, a KGB successor agency, in comments carried by Russian media, and by the service's spokesman." The accolades for Blake, and the award of Russia's highest medal to George Koval, "another prominent Soviet spy, came five months after Queen Elizabeth II honored Oleg Gordievsky, a high-level KGB man who defected to Britain in 1985." An interview with Blake on his 85th birthday was broadcast by "Russia Today, an English-language cable TV network," on 11 November 2007.

George Koval "was born to Jewish parents who [had] emigrated [to Iowa] from Czarist Russia. In the early 1930s, the family returned to the Soviet Union.... After he graduated from a Moscow university, Soviet intelligence sent him back to the U.S. in the 1940s. He was drafted and assigned to the Manhattan Project.... Other Soviet spies also got into the project, but Koval was 'the only Soviet agent who infiltrated secret U.S. nuclear facilities which produced plutonium, enriched uranium and polonium for building atomic weapons,' a statement from President Putin's office said."

[SpyCases/U.S./Bomb/Koval; UK/SpyCases/Blake]

Isby, David C. "Double Agent's D-Day Victory." World War II (Jun. 2004). [http://www.historynet.com/wwii/bldoubleagent/]

"A double agent code-named 'Garbo' led Adolf Hitler to believe that the Normandy invasion was just a diversion."

[WWII/Eur/Deception]

Isenberg, David. The Pitfalls of U.S. Covert Operations. Policy Analysis No. 118. Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 7 Apr. 1989. [http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/PA118.HTM]

"An examination of U.S. covert-action policy since World War II reveals two facts that are not always fully appreciated. First, both the scope and the scale of such operations have been enormous.... Second, the success of U.S. covert operations has been exaggerated."

[CA; Reform]

Isenberg, David. "The Real Intelligence Failure." IntellectualCapital.com,18 Jun. 1998. [http://www.intellectualcapital.com]

This is a judicious look at the problems involved in the Intelligence Community's failure to predict the Indian nuclear tests. Among other points made by the author is the argument that: "If there was a failure, it was one of mirror imaging on the part of the administration. It committed the classic mistake that Machiavelli warned against -- assuming the other guy will never do something you would never do. " The content of the article is marred by Isenberg's reference to Adm. David Jeremiah as "former CIA head."

[CIA/90s/98/IndiaNukes]

Isenberg, David. See, Speak, and Hear No Incompetence: An Analysis of the Findings of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction. Special Report 2005.1. London and Washington, DC: British American Security Information Council, Oct. 2005. [http://www.basicint.org/]

"Overall, the Commission's recommendation are not particularly impressive. Most involve initiatives that were already in the works before the Commission released its report, and doubts remain about how effective they will be.

"More significantly, however, the recommendations completely ignore arguably the most important aspect of the problem. Intelligence is inevitably murky and uncertain. Rather than simply focusing upon changes to the hierarchy, the Commission could have explored how to encourage dissenting voices and diverse opinions within the intelligence community, in order to prevent bias and distortion, or what some have referred to as 'groupthink' within the intelligence community."

[GenPostCW/00s/05/WMD]

Isenberg, David, and Ian Davis. "Unravelling the Known Unknowns: Why No Weapons of Mass Destruction Have Been Found in Iraq." British American Security Information Council (BASIC) Special Report 2004.1. Jan. 2004. [http://www.basicint.org/pubs/Research/2004WMD.htm]

From "Executive Summary": With regard to Iraq's possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), "[t]he conclusion is inescapable: there is nothing to be found. This means that President Bush and Prime Minister Blair made a WMD mountain out of what, at best, was a molehill.... The main conclusion [of this study] is that the failure to find banned weapons in Iraq suggests very strongly that the UN weapons inspectors succeeded in their mandate, and that the Iraqi government complied with its obligations."

[GenPostwar/00s/04/WMD]

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