Ignatius,
David. "After Five Decades, a Spy Tells Her Tale." Washington
Post, 28 Dec. 1998, A1. "The Reluctant Spy." Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, 4 Jan. 1999, 10-12.
Ignatius,
David. "After Five Decades, a Spy Tells Her Tale." Washington
Post, 28 Dec. 1998, A1. "The Reluctant Spy." Washington
Post National Weekly Edition, 4 Jan. 1999, 10-12.
This is the story of Jeannie Rousseau (de Clarens) who was a member of Georges Lamarque's Resistance operation (with the code name "Amniarix"). She became "one of the most effective if unheralded spies of World War II. Her precise reports on the German's secret military plans, particularly the development of the V1 flying bombs and V2 rockets, helped persuade Prime Minister Winston Churchill to bomb the test site at Peenemunde....
"Her exploits later landed her in three concentration camps [Ravensbruck, Torgau, and Konigsberg] which she survived without ever disclosing the great secret she had stolen from the Germans."
See R. James Woolsey, Doyle Larson, and Linda Zall, "Honoring Two World War II Heroes: Prestigious Intelligence Rewards," Studies in Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995), 27-36, for remarks at 27 October 1993 ceremony at CIA Headquarters honoring R.V. Jones and Jeannie de Clarens.
[Women/WWII/Other; WWII/Eur/Fr/Resistance][c]
Ignatius, David. "Avoiding Another 'Slam-Dunk.'" Washington Post, 24 May 2006, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DNI John Negroponte has picked INR's chief, Thomas Fingar, to be his deputy for analysis. "Fingar's first job was to figure out who worked for him. He ... found more than 15,000 analysts at the 16 intelligence agencies under the DNI umbrella.... Though some people (including me) think that Negroponte should consolidate all-source analysis under his DNI structure, he and Fingar have resisted that approach. Instead, Fingar wants to create 'virtual teams' of analysts drawn from across the intelligence community.... The CIA's Directorate of Intelligence will still have a crucial role, but it is no longer the central and dominant player. At the center of the new structure is the National Intelligence Council, chaired by Fingar, which reports to Negroponte."
[Analysis/Historical; DNI/06]
Ignatius,
David. "Bugged at the State Department." Washington Post,
22 Dec. 1999, A33. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The season's most intriguing puzzle is how Russian spies managed to install a bug in a seventh-floor conference room at the State Department.... Now a sorry answer is emerging: The Russian penetration of our diplomatic inner sanctum may be partly the result of bureaucratic delay by top State Department officials. Internal State Department documents show that more than a year ago, the department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security tried to issue new access-control rules that would have prevented visitors from wandering the building unescorted. But implementation of these rules was blocked by senior officials."
[OtherAgencies/State]
Ignatius, David. "The CIA's Dissidents." Washington Post, 6 Apr. 2004, A21. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The author comments on a CIA-sponsored conference in Rome, which he attended as an invited journalist. The conference, "New Frontiers of Intelligence Analysis," was arranged by a small CIA group called the Global Futures Partnership. The members of the group "see their role as in-house dissidents and agents of change, and the very fact that they are in business suggests that top CIA officials know they have a problem and want to fix it."
[Analysis/Gen; CIA/00s/04]
Ignatius, David. "The CIA at Rock Bottom." Washington Post, 7 May 2006, B7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
CIA Director Porter Goss "was dumped by a president who doesn't like to fire anyone.... That was a sign of how badly off track things had gotten at the CIA.... What may have hurt Goss most inside the White House was sharp criticism from ... the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.... I'm told some of the board's judgments on Goss and his management team were devastating....
"Though Goss long ago served as a CIA case officer, he arrived from Capitol Hill with a phalanx of conservative aides, soon dubbed the 'Gosslings,' who viewed the agency as a liberal, leak-prone opponent of conservative causes. That image is mostly nonsense.... Goss's attacks on senior officers were reckless, and they peeled away a generation of senior CIA managers. Sadly, the Bush White House mostly applauded his jihad on what they viewed as CIA naysayers.
"An example of the political frictions that harmed the agency involved CIA reporting from Iraq. From late 2003 on, the agency was warning about the rise of the Iraqi insurgency and the failings of the administration's political strategy. In 2004 the CIA station chief in Baghdad was sending warnings every 60 days ... about the deteriorating situation. This candid and largely correct reporting is said to have angered White House officials, who complained that the Baghdad chief was defeatist and not a team player. At the end of his tour, he was punished with a poor assignment."
[CIA/00s/06/Gen & DCIs/Goss/Resignation]
Ignatius, David. "The CIA as Venture Capitalist." Washington Post, 29 Sep. 1999, A29. Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 4 Oct. 1999, 26.
"The CIA has decided to create its own venture capital firm, called 'In-Q-It' [later changed to In-Q-Tel], to help the agency connect better with the Internet revolution. The fear at Langley is that in a world of start-ups and instant millionaires, the CIA isn't getting technology's best and brightest anymore. So the spymasters have opted to create their own start-up.... The idea is for In-Q-It to fund promising technologies that can help the CIA keep pace with the information explosion."
[CIA/90s/99/InQIt]
Ignatius, David. "The CIA and the WMD." Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2003, A25. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
"If the CIA's predictions about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction prove to be wrong, how can Americans have confidence in CIA intelligence warnings in the future?"
[CIA/00s/03/Gen]
Ignatius, David. "Danger Point In Spy Reform." Washington Post, 21 Oct. 2005, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The most dangerous moment in any transition is halfway through, when the old structure is badly weakened but the new one isn't yet strong enough to carry the load. That's where the Bush administration stands in its incomplete effort to restructure the intelligence community.... [R]ather than consolidate and streamline the overlapping agencies, the new system has added even more boxes to the organization chart. The result has been a further layering of the intelligence community's bureaucracy and further demoralization among career intelligence officers."
[GenPostCW/00s/05/Gen; Reform/00s/05/DNI]
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