Hom - Hoo

Homer-Dixon, Thomas F.

1. "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict." International Security 16, no. 2 (Fall 1991): 76-116.

2. "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases." International Security 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 5-40.

[GenPostwar/NatSec/Env][c]

Hone, Thomas C. "Combine Strategy and Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jun. 1993, 59-60.

[MI/Navy/90s][c]

Honegger, Barbara. October Surprise. New York: Tudor, 1989.

Strong, I&NS 8.2, calls October Surprise a "classic example of ... the paranoid political conspiracy exposé.... [U]nsubstantiated hints of exotic government sponsored assassinations are part of a larger pattern involving a double standard in evidence evaluation." Honegger makes "extensive use of Richard Brenneke" and, in general, the book can "be dismissed as the work of a common conspiracy theorist gone off the deep end of history."

According to NameBase, Honegger's book "broke considerable ground on this story, which became much richer in detail over the following years.... Honegger and her loose circle of supporters (which includes the LaRouche organization) have made a definite contribution, but by now they may be victims -- either of their own success or of deliberate disinformation or both. October Surprise sources comprise a who's who of sleaze and spookery; paranoia and suspicion abound and it becomes difficult to know whom or what to believe."

[GenPostwar/80s/OctSurp]

Honig, Or Arthur. "A New Direction for Theory-Building in Intelligence Studies." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 4 (Winter 2007): 699-716.

The author posits that intelligence failures seem to be "a cluster of different types of phenomena that have been mistakenly lumped together." Additional research is needed in order to "place surprise attacks along a continuum between avoidable blunders and unavoidable tragedies."

[Analysis/Warning]

Hons, Joyce M., Juan R. Jimenez, Gabriell G. Marshall, and Johnny D. Ford. History of the Air Intelligence Agency, 1 January-31 December 1994, Volume I. San Antonio, TX: AIA, 1995. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]

[MI/AF/Overviews]

Hood, William. Mole. New York: Norton, 1982. New York: Ballantine, 1983. [pb] Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1993. [pb]

Clark comment: Hood served with OSS in England, France, and Switzerland. He later was a CIA Station Chief and retired in 1975. See his review of Mailer's Harlot's Ghost in IJI&C 6.1.

Halpern, IJI&C 1.1, suggests that Mole is a better way to learn about counterintelligence than Stansfield Turner's Secrecy and Democracy.

To Pforzheimer, this is "an excellent contribution to operational intelligence training. It is replete with tradecraft."

Petersen sees Mole as "an excellent account of U.S. penetration of Soviet military intelligence."

Noting Brassey's 1993 reprint, Surveillant 4.4/5 terms the book an "intelligence and tradecraft classic."

[CIA/50s/Popov][c]

Hood, William, James Nolan, and Sam Halpern. Myths Surrounding James Angleton: Lessons for American Counterintelligence. Working Group on Intelligence Reform. Washington, DC: Consortium for the Study of Intelligence, 1993.

Clark comment: Reading this piece together with Cleveland Cram's Of Moles and Molehunters (see above) will not tell readers all they need to know about the disputes surrounding Angleton, but careful perusers will certainly come away with some understanding of the complexities involved.

The reviewer in Surveillant 3.4/5 was quite enthusiastic about this Working Group release: "This ... is an important item.... [It is] delicious 'I-was-there' stuff, with their prejudices -- for 'im or against 'im -- out on the table."

Bates, NIPQ 10.2, says that "[a]ll three are supportive of Angleton, but not to the point where they did not see his faults and at times disagree with him.... [T]hey do a remarkable job. If counterintelligence is your bag, this pamphlet is for you.... [It is] pretty obvious that [Cleveland C.] Cram was the first to comment in the discussion period and to attack the whole presentation."

William R. Johnson, "Reader's Forum," IJI&C 7.3, asks the questions: Was Angleton right? Was Colby wrong? He answers with a qualified yes to each question. Angleton's firing "was the culmination of a conflict between two opposing operational philosophies that dated from the days of OSS."

[CIA/Angleton; CI][c]

Hoogenboom, Ari. "Spy & Topog Duty Has Been . . . Neglected." Civil War History 10, no. 4 (Dec. 1964): 368-370.

The author notes the deficiencies of maps available to both Union and Confederate generals. "The condition of Civil War maps reflects the [negative] attitude of prewar army officers toward the topographical service." The "most vocal and persistent critic" was Braxton Bragg. Hoogenboom cites from a 1844 series of articles by Bragg and a 1851 letter to his brother, an Alabama congressman.

[CivWar/Overviews][c]

Hook, Sidney. "The Incredible Story of Michael Straight." Encounter, Dec. 1983, 68-73. [Rocca & Dziak]

[SpyCases/U.S./Other]

Hook, Sidney. "Intelligence, Morality, and Foreign Policy." Freedom at Issue 25 (Mar.-Apr. 1976): 3-7. [Petersen]

[GenPostwar/Policy; Overviews/Ethics]

Hook, Sidney. "The Strategy of Political Warfare." In Political Power and Personal Freedom: Critical Studies in Democracy, Communism, and Civil Rights, 389-401. New York: Criterion, 1959. [Petersen]

[CA]

Hooker, Gregory. Shaping the Plan for Operation Iraqi Freedom: The Role of Military Intelligence Assessments. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2005.

From advertisement: "U.S. Central Command's senior intelligence analyst for Iraq offers a thoroughly detailed examination of pre-Iraq war planning. Covers the military's initial attempts to refocus on regime change and Washington's ineffective preparation for the postwar environment."

[MI/Ops/Iraq]

Hoopes, John M. [LCDR/USN (Sel.)] "Iranian Intelligence Under the Shah." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Jan. 1998): 7-9.

This is a brief review of SAVAK's role prior to the 1978 revolution. The point is made that the organization's resources and efforts were predominantly directed toward internal security matters.

Clark comment: A brief complaint as a professor: I wish we could get young writers not to use the overly cutesy formulation "the most famous or infamous...," but simply say "the best known."

[OtherCountries/Iran][c]

Hoopes, Townsend, and Douglas Brinkley. Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal. New York: Knopf, 1992.

Unsinger, IJI&C 7.4, describes Driven Patriot as "a well-balanced, easily readable, and informative account.... [T]he authors provide some insight into ... Forrestal's active support of covert operations.... Forrestal was an early player in the covert game unfolding before World War II," particularly in South America. After the war, Forrestal continued to support the use of covert action, including activities concerning the Ukraine, China, and the Italian elections of 1948. This book "is a good analysis of James Forrestal's life and times."

A review by Clay Blair, WPNWE, 4-10 May 1992, focuses on Forrestal's role in the services-unification battle, first, as Navy Secretary and, then, Defense Secretary. The book is judged to be a "very good, very professional job, with only a[n] occasional lapse."

For Hyland, FA 71.4, this biography is "well-written" and "thoroughly researched and documented." However, the book "is somewhat too episodic, and the chronology occasionally leaves the reader confused."

[GenPostwar/Immediate; WWII/Gen]

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