Max Holland

 

Holland, Max. "I.F. Stone: Encounters with Soviet Intelligence." Journal of Cold War Studies 11, no. 3 (Summer 2009): 144-205.

Alexander "Vassiliev's handwritten notes from documents in KGB archives" show that from April 1936 until at least the fall of 1938 Stone had "a meaningful relationship" with Soviet intelligence. "What was the nature of the link over time? Did it have a bearing on Stone's journalism? This essay attempts to answer the first question by retracing the history of the allegations leveled about Stone.... The article assesses the provenance and credibility of the allegations both as discrete claims and when taken together as a whole. The balance of the essay addresses the second question by juxtaposing the allegations with Stone's writings to discern the significance and meaning of the ostensible associations."

[SpyCases/U.S./Other/Stone]

Holland, Max. "Operation PBHISTORY: The Aftermath of SUCCESS." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 300-332.

PBHISTORY was "the cryptonym for the project dedicated to gathering and exploiting Guatemalan Communist documents." There were few, if any, sensational disclosures from this project. Nonetheless, "PBHISTORY supplied the U.S. intelligence community with a ground-level look at a Communist takeover by slow motion.... Yet PBHISTORY did not succeed in its most vital purpose -- to persuade Latin America to look at Communist penetration of the hemisphere from the standpoint of the United States."

[CIA/50s/Guat]

Holland, Max. "The 'Photo Gap' that Delayed Discovery of Missiles in Cuba." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 4 (2005): 15-30.

"The political decision to desist from intrusive or risky overflights [of Cuba] and stretch out the missions" contributed to "a dysfunctional surveillance regime in a dynamic situation." The result was to delay the discovery of the offensive missiles at San Cristóbal by almost a month.

[GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis]

Holland, Max. "The Politics of Intelligence Postmortems: Cuba 1962-1963." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 415-452.

"What is striking was how the four ex post facto analyses varied in their findings and conclusions regarding the performance of the Intelligence Community in the run-up to the missile crisis, notwithstanding the sameness of the facts at issue." Central to Holland's discussion is the treatment in the postmortems of the results and/or meaning of the 10 September 1962 meeting where the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR) agreed to restrict the regularly scheduled U-2 overflights of Cuba. The author concludes that "the lesson from 1962-1963 would seem to be that all such inquests should be viewed critically, and with the utmost caution."

Following the release in June 2007 of CIA IG Jack Earman's November 1962 report, Holland extends the thesis of this article in "More on Postmortems," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 188-189.

[GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis]

Holland, Max. "The Power of Disinformation: The Lie that Linked CIA to the Kennedy Assassination." Studies in Intelligence 11 (Fall-Winter 2001): 5-17.

In a sad-but-true story, the author details how a "successful deception" by the Rome daily Paese Sera "turns out to be a major reason why many Americans believe, to this day, that the CIA was involved in the assassination of President Kennedy." The linkage between Jim Garrison's investigation and the paper's piece of disinformation is summed up this way: "The epicenter of Garrison's prosecution, and the wellspring for his ultimate theory of the assassination, was the DA's belief in a fantasy published by a Communist-owned Italian newspaper."

[CIA/Accusations; Russia/Disinformation]

Holland, Max. "The Propagation and Power of Communist Security Services Dezinformatsiya." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 1-31.

The author surveys the KGB's use of disinformation against the United States. He sees the allegation that U.S. forces used CBW weapons in the Korean war as "one of the most effective disinformation efforts ... in the Cold War's first decade.... One of the most singular and persistent efforts at disinformation revolved around the spate of assassinations [particular that of President Kennedy] that occurred inside the United States in the 1960s."

[Russia/Disinfo&Decept]

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