Hof

Hoffer, Peter. "MI6 'Plan for Austria Guerrilla Campaign.'" Electronic Telegraph, 15 Apr. 1996. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

During the Cuban missile crisis, MI6 was prepared to parachute specialists into Austria to lead resistance to a Soviet invasion of the country. "[A]n alleged former British MI6 agent, Simon Preston, in an interview with the Vienna daily newspaper, Die Presse," has supplied details of the British plan. Against the eventuality of a Soviet invasion, "the British had set up 33 concealed arms and food depots in their former occupation zone which they left in 1955."

[UK/Postwar/Gen]

Hoffman, Bruce. "The Confluence of International and Domestic Terrorism." Terrorism and Political Violence 9, no. 2 (Summer 1997): 1-15.

[Terrorism/90s]

Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 1998. Rev. & expanded ed. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.

Rose, FA 78.2, calls this work "a concise yet authoritative survey of trends in terrorism past and present."

According to a publisher's note, the revised edition includes "updated coverage" on 9/11 and its aftermath and the Madrid and London bombings.

[Terrorism/90s & 00s]

Hoffman, Bruce. "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 207-223.

Recent terrorist incidents in France, Japan, the United States, and Saudi Arabia "shed light on the inherent difficulties in preventing and countering terrorism even when intelligence on likely potential operations exists." They also illuminate "two key trends in international terrorism today that are likely to make these challenges even more problematical in the future: - the proliferation of terrorist groups motivated by a religious imperative; and - related to this - the overall diffusion of the terrorist threat by the increasing involvement of 'amateur' terrorists alongside their more easily identified 'professional' counterparts."

[Terrorism/90s]

Hoffman, Daniel M. "A Beltway Warrior Looks at Gulf War Intelligence." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Jan. 1993, 86-89.

[MI/Ops/Storm][c]

Hoffman, Daniel M. [LT/USNR] "Naval Counterintelligence in the 90s: A Whole New Way of Doing Things." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 5-7.

This article deals with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and its Naval Counterintelligence and Force Protection role. The author notes the shift toward support to the warfighting commands and joint activities.

[MI/CI][c]

Hoffman, Daniel N. Governmental Secrecy and the Founding Fathers: A Study in Constitutional Controls. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981.

[Overviews/Legal/Gen]

Hoffman, David [Washington Post].

Hoffman, Frank G. Homeland Security: A Competitive Strategies Approach. Washington, DC: Center for Defense Information, 2002.

Wiggins, Naval War College Review, Spring 2003, comments that the author "stays out of the tactical and operational level of the 'war' [on terrorism] and focuses on the strategic level and the planning cycle." Hoffman "offers a process to enhance U.S. capabilities through a simple 'course of action' analysis based on comparisons of known and perceived threats with strategies used by policy makers in recent history.... [He] provides valuable insights into the various strategies of homeland security that could be undertaken by the United States, making it clear that no single plan will suffice."

[Terrorism/00s/Gen]

Hoffman, Frank G. "Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?" Parameters 37, no. 2 (Summer 2007): 71-87.

"The newly issued Army/Marine counterinsurgency (COIN) manual ... is a product of our collective understanding of insurgency and ongoing experiences in Iraq. It is also the product of various schools of thought about modern insurgencies, including what can be called the classical school, based on the concepts of Mao and revolutionary warfare.[footnote omitted] In this article I will attempt to capture the impact and implications of the classical school on the new doctrine, as well as evaluate the final product."

[MI/SpecOps]

Hoffman. Fred [COL/USAR]. "The Role of Intelligence in President Jimmy Carter's Troop Withdrawal Decisions." American Intelligence Journal 21, nos. 1 & 2 (Spring 2002): 57-60. Military Intelligence, Jan.-Mar. 2002.

"This case study demonstrates that even the most timely, accurate, and compelling intelligence information can be of limited value if policy-makers choose to ignore it.... An abundance of intelligence information on Korea was available to Jimmy Carter when he was both President-Elect and President. However, due to the combination of his leadership style, personality traits, outsider status, and innate distrust of the intelligence community, intelligence information played a minor role in his decision-making on the troop withdrawal issue."

[GenPostwar/70s/Gen]

Hoffman, George F. "The Tactical and Strategic Use of Attache Intelligence: The Spanish Civil War and the U.S. Army's Misguided Quest for a Modern Tank Doctrine." Journal of Military History 62, no. 1 (Jan. 1998): 101-133.

ProQuest: "Tank warfare in the Spanish Civil War, military analysis of those operations and doctrinal decisions made as a result of a defective analysis caused by a military cultural bias rooted in the traditional branch chief organization dominated by the combatant arms and controlled by the infantry are examined."

[MI/Army/Interwar]

Hoffman, Jon T. "Legacy and Lessons of Operation Overlord." Marine Corps Gazette 78 (Jun. 1994): 68-72. [Seymour]

[WWII/Eur/D-Day]

Hoffman, Lisa. "FBI Scandal Leaves CIA Gloating." Sun-Times (Chicago), 11 Mar. 2001. [www.suntimes.com]

"When CIA mole Aldrich Ames was unearthed in 1994, Congress and President Bill Clinton punished the spy agency by yanking its control over its own counterintelligence operations and giving it to the FBI.... Now the tables have turned. It's the FBI in the hot seat this time, embarrassed by its damaging failure to detect its own alleged Russian mole, 15-year FBI counterintelligence operative Robert Hanssen."

[FBI/Hanssen]

Hoffman, Peter.

1. History of the German Resistance, 1933-1945. 3d ed. [Canada]: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996.

Powers, NYRB, 9 Jan. 1997, refers to this work as "authoritative and still unsurpassed."

2. Stauffenberg: A Family History, 1905-1944. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Elkes, I&NS 12.2, notes that "Hoffman's book concentrates in great detail on the individuals involved in the Resistance Movement and their motivations and intentions." See also Noel Annan's review in New York Review of Books, 6 Jun. 1996, 20-27.

[WWII/Eur/Ger/Resistance]

Hoffman, Robert L. More than a Trial: The Struggle over Captain Dreyfus. New York: Free Press, 1980.

[France/Historical]

Hoffman, Tod. The Spy Within: Larry Chin and China's Penetration of the CIA. Hanover, NH: Steerforth, 2008.

Kappler, Gazette (Montreal), 13 Sep. 2008, finds that this "book tells us as much as we'll ever know about Larry Chin, probably. Yet it also illustrates the limitations of the genre -- which Hoffman admits in a preface: In real life, 'spies are ghosts' and 'the mystery is never absolutely resolved.' We're left wanting to know more about what drove Chin."

[SpyCases/U.S./Chin]

Hofmann, Peter A. "The Making of National Estimates during the Period of the 'Missile Gap.'" Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 336-356.

The author looks at estimates of the Soviet ICBM force made by various NIEs between 1954 and 1963. "The early estimates (1954-55) were fairly cautious and predicted little or no capability.... [But] by 1960 (NIE 11-4-59) a pattern of serious overestimation began to form." Revisions downward began with NIE 11-8-61, issued on 7 June 1961; this trend was reinforced in NIE 11-8/1-61, issued on 21 September 1961. The author associates these revisions with material supplied by Oleg Penkovsky.

[Analysis/Estimates]

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