Hers - Herz

 

Hers, J. F. Ph. "The Rise of the Dutch Resistance: A Memoir." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 4 (Oct. 1992): 454-472.

The author discusses the social, religious, and ideological roots that underlay the formation of the Wilton-Feyenoord Geuzen resistance group, which began to take nascent shape as early as 1938. The sabotage work at the Wilton-Feyenoord shipyard after the German occupation of the Netherlands, and the price extracted by the Germans, is detailed.

[WWII/Eur/Resistance][c]

Hersh, Burton. Bobby and J. Edgar: The Historic Face-Off Between the Kennedys and J. Edgar Hoover That Transformed America. New York: Carroll & Graf, 2007.

Goulden, Washington Times, 23 Sep. 2007, finds that this book "does a serious disservice to history (and the truth)." The author has produced "a nose-holder of a book"; it is "laden with outlandish assertions.... Repeating nut stuff serves only to keep nonsense in circulation." For Harter, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), this is "a well-written hodgepdge, blending fact, rumor and innuendo." It has "nothing new." Hersh "includes some mighty tell tales ... which stretch belief, and challenge common sense." Although it is "at times an interesting account," the author too often "allowed speculation to become fact; rumor and innuendo to masquerade as reality."

To Theoharis, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), this is a "well-written, massive, and extensively research study" that "does not advance our understanding" and "devolve[s] into gossipy, at times conspiratorial, assertions.... Hersh's affinity for the sensational at times leads to his distortion of a more complex reality."

[FBI/00s/Gen; GenPostwar/60s/Gen]

Hersh, Burton. The Old Boys. The American Elite and the Origins of the CIA. New York: Scribner's, 1992.

Powers, NYRB (13 May 1993) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 295-320, suggests that "if you want a sense of the brash confidence of the early days of the CIA, you will find much reliable information in The Old Boys that has seen the light nowhere else. If Hersh can be faulted it is because he gives his cast of characters hardly any of the credit they can claim for eventual American victory in the cold war."

According to MacPherson, I&NS 8.2, The Old Boys is "more ... an evocation of a peculiar atmosphere." It presents a "gossipy detailing of elite anecdotes in a style that is more flippant than witty. Hersh also tends to affect a world-weary tone that grows increasingly irritating over 450 pages." The book's "interpretive framework is often flimsy.... [Hersh] indulges in some remarkably cavalier caricaturing of the circumstances pertaining to America's transition to Cold War.... One could ... just as easily underscore a military 'old-boy net' experienced in the use of 'operationally oriented' intelligence as war by other means." Overall, this is an "uneven, superficial portrait."

FILS 11.2 finds that the book's major subjects are "presented in jarringly colorful terms..., yet their professional contribution to U.S. national security receives only limited space.... [Hersh] maintains that these well-educated, experienced, elitist members of the intelligence community caused real wreckage to our democratic institutions, but he fails to prove this charge." Bates, NIPQ 9.1, comments that the reader "will learn precious little about the CIA and intelligence" from The Old Boys. The book's "structure is difficult to follow"; it is "choppy and difficult reading."

For Johnson, NYTBR, 14 Jun. 1992, the author "is easily diverted from his subject." The three "main subjects remain largely stick figures." Donovan "is given short shrift," while Dulles "flits in and out of the narrative superficially." The "most complete portrait is of Frank Wisner.... Yet even he keeps getting lost in the parade of piddling extras that keep marching across stage." Hersh's writing style "is inelegant ... at best." In addition, several of Hersh's assertions "lack adequate support." Only when he begins discussing rolling back the Iron Curtain does "the author's extensive research and interviews begin to yield valuable insights."

NameBase notes that "[t]en years of work, hundreds of interviews, and access to numerous library collections have produced this narrative of CIA history, from its emergence out of William Donovan's OSS to ... the Bay of Pigs." The reviewer finds that "Hersh's writing style is different -- a bit haughty (or even elitist), but seldom boring. His view of the CIA's self-anointed Ivy Leaguers playing in their international sandbox ... is basically critical. However, one cannot shake the suspicion that Hersh's objections are based more on closet envy than on ethical considerations."

[CIA/40s/Hersh][c]

Hersh, Seymour M.

Hershberg, James G.

1. "Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly Dobrynin's Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 75, 77-80.

2. "Before the Missiles of October: Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" Diplomatic History 14, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 163-198.

3. "More on Bobby [Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy] and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-1997): 274, 344-347.

The focus here is on Robert Kennedy's back-channel contacts with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.

4. "New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Winter 1996-1997): 270-338.

The documents, which cover the period 14 September-10 December 1962, begin on page 278 and include excerpts of a cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko reporting on his 18 October 1962 meeting with President Kennedy.

[GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis][c]

Hershberg, James G. "Soviet Archives: The Opening Door." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 1 (Spring 1992): 1, 12.

[Russia/RefMats]

Hershberg, James G. "Their Man in Havana: Anglo-American Intelligence Exchanges and the Cuban Crises, 1961-62." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 121-176.

From Abstract: "When the United States broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in January 1961, American officials turned to London, which maintained its embassy in Havana, to provide political, economic, and military intelligence on ... Cuba. Over the next two years,... the British government used this channel not only to provide information to its superpower ally, but also to try to 'moderate' Washington's anti-Castro policies ... and to deflect pressures to join its campaign of economic pressures against the island."

[CIA/60s/BoP; GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis; UK/Postwar/Gen]

Hershberg, James G. "The War in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra Affair: Missing Links?" Cold War History 3, no. 3 (Apr. 2003): 23-48.

From Abstract: This article "draws together declassified evidence to trace previously ignored connections" between the Soviet war in Afghanistan and the Iran-Contra affair. It demonstrates that "the secret arms dealings with Iran carried out by the Reagan administration's National Security Council staff included provisions for Tehran to transfer some of the American weapons it received to pro-Iranian mujaheddin in Afghanistan, and that covert cooperation against the Soviets in Afghanistan constituted an important dimension of the clandestine dialogue carried on by US and Iranian representatives."

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra]

Herskovitz, Don. "A Sampling of SIGINT Systems." Journal of Electronic Defense EW Reference and Source Guide Supplement, Jan. 1998, 30-36. Journal of Electronic Defense, Jul. 1998, 51-59.

The author outlines the components of a SIGINT system, and lists some 80 SIGINT-related systems produced by U.S., French, Italian, Israeli, German, and British companies.

[NSA/SIGINT][c]

Herz, Martin F., ed. Contacts With the Opposition: A Symposium. Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Georgetown University, 1979.

Fall of Shah of Iran.

[GenPostwar/70s/Iran]

Herz, Norman. Operation Alacrity: The Azores and the War in the Atlantic. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2004.

According to Bath, NIPQ 20.2, this work tells the story of the war in Atlantic in the context of the efforts to obtain Allied bases in the Azores. Although it is "not a book on intelligence,... [i]t is a well written account that documents a ...significant[] sidebar to the larger story of the U-boat war."

[WWII/Atlantic]

Herzog, Chaim. The War of Atonement: October 1973. Boston: Little, Brown, 1975. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975. London: Futura Publications, 1977. [pb]

Herzog, Jeffrey Owen. "Using Economic Intelligence to Achieve Regional Security Objectives." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 302-313.

Since there is a "link between development failures and conflict, economic intelligence can play an important role in supporting strategies for regional security goals ... by identifying key facets of the economy which relate to political outcomes and by preparing for economic disaster or reconstruction."

[GenPostwar/Econ]

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