Henriksen, Thomas. "Covert Operations, Now More Than Ever." Orbis, Winter 2000, 145-156. [http://www.hoover.org/publications/hoover-digest/article/8098]
"With its increased reliance on high-tech 'smart' bombs, Washington seems to have forgotten a much less costly, more humane, and often more effective form of warfare -- the covert operation."
Henry, Shannon. "In-Q-Tel, Investing in Intrigue: CIA Unit Scours Country for Useful Technologies." Washington Post, 1 Jul. 2002, E1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Since its creation in 1999, the CIA's venture capital unit "has made about a dozen investments in technologies that could potentially be used in information gathering and analysis of America's enemies." After September 11, "In-Q-Tel became a sort of anti-terrorism matchmaker, introducing those with problems to those with high-tech detective abilities."
Hensler, Alistair S.
"Hensler was the CSIS assistant director of operations in the late 1980s and early 1990s." Henderson, IJI&C 24.2 (Summer 2011), p. 418/fn. 1.
1. "Canadian Intelligence: An Insider's Perspective." Canadian Foreign Policy 6, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 127-132.
2. "Creating a Canadian Foreign Intelligence Service." Canadian Foreign Policy 3, no. 3 (Winter 1995): 15-35.
Henze C. "Recollections of a Medical Intelligence Officer in World War II." Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine 49, no. 11 (Nov. 1973): 960-973.
Henze, Paul B. The Plot to Kill the Pope. New York: Scribner's, 1984.
Rocca and Dziak find that the author "[a]dduces a strong case ... for Bulgarian/Soviet involvement in the May 1981 attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II."
Hepburn, Allan. Intrigue: Espionage and Culture. New Haven, CT, and London: Yale University Press, 2005.
From Yale Book News: The author "thoroughly examin[es] the tradition of the spy narrative from its inception in the late nineteenth century through the present day.... [T]his groundbreaking work revises the assumption that spy stories are formulaic. Instead, Hepburn emphasizes the responsiveness of this genre to particular historical instances involving espionage."
Leab, I&NS 21.6 (Dec. 2006), gives this work high marks, with only "miinor caveats." This "fascinating, engaging book" is written in "a clear jargon-free style." The author "has put together a wide ranging, intensely sophisticated, [and] enjoyable" discussion of "a complex literature." Some of his dropping in of movies to make a point "does not work too well.," and he has not been well served by the publisher placing his "erudite, fascinating, and lengthy notes at the back of the book."
Herbert, Matthew. "The Intelligence Analyst as Epistemologist." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 666-684.
"Intelligence analysis is about coping with epistemic complexity. Its core imperative is to develop a clear estimate of the sum of knowledge derived from partial, multivariate information, and to balance that estimate against a postulate of what ought, in ideal circumstances, to be known in order to support a rational decision." See Christopher Dreisbach, "The Challenges Facing an IC Epistemologist-in-Residence," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 4 (Winter 2011-2012): 757-792.
Herbert, Matthew. "The Motley of Intelligence Analysis: Getting over the Idea of a Professional Model." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 26, no. 4 (Winter 2013-2014): 652-665.
"[I]ntelligence analysis is not sisceptible to a precise definition." The author "argue[s] for dropping the search for a single, apt model" and for cultivating "cognitive diversity."
Herbert, R.G. Bullets With Names: The Deadly Dilemma, Master's Thesis. Monteray, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1992.
Surveillant 3.2/3: Herbert's "examination of the national security policy dilemma which political assassination presents ... draws two major conclusions: First, assassination cannot support long-term U.S. policy goals or warfighting efforts. Ultimately, such efforts could weaken America's global position. Second, while assassination has no place in the U.S. warfighting arsenal, the assassination ban itself has become dysfunctional and requires reevaluation."
Herbig, Katherine L. "American Strategic Deception in the Pacific, 1942-44." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul. 1987), 260-300.
"[T]he Americans tried to deceive the Japanese about their every strategic move during the last two years of the war.... [Prior to that, deception] was at an operational level, linked to a specific campaign or impending clash with Japanese forces, and intended primarily to have local or short-term significance.... The deception supporting Midway was an excellent example of how a small-scale locally planned and implemented deception could materially contribute to a victory which, in this case, had great strategic significance.... After much wrangling, the Joint Chiefs of Staff finally agreed on a general policy for deception against the Japanese in September 1943.... [After that time,] strategic deception helped to reduce the cost in lives by directing and holding Japanese forces away from the Marianas and ... from Okinawa, when these important strongholds were invaded."
Herbig, Katherine L.
1. Changes in Espionage by Americans: 1947-2007. Technical Report 08-05. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, Mar. 2008. [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/changes.pdf]
"This report documents changes and trends in American espionage since 1990.... [I]ndividuals are compared across three groups based on when they began espionage activities.... Findings include: since 1990 offenders are more likely to be naturalized citizens, and to have foreign attachments, connections, and ties. Their espionage is more likely to be motivated by divided loyalties.... Two thirds of American spies since 1990 have volunteered.... Six of the 11 most recent cases have involved terrorists, either as recipients of information, by persons working with accused terrorists at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, or in protest against treatment of detainees there. Many recent spies relied on computers, electronic information retrieval and storage, and the Internet."
2. and Martin F. Wiskoff. Espionage Against the United States by American Citizens, 1947-2001. Monterey, CA: Defense Personnel Security Research Center, 2002. [http://www.ncix.gov]
This work reflects an open-source analysis of 150 cases of espionage committed since 1947. The authors find that the characteristics of American spies have changed since the end of the Cold War.
Hergenrother, Andrew L. [Capt/USA] "Applying Standards." Military Intelligence 21, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1995): 6-7.
Hergesheimer, Joseph. Swords and Roses. New York: Knopf, 1929.
Herivel, John. Herivelismus and the German Military Enigma. Kidderminster, UK: M.M. Baldwin, 2008.
Hamer, Cryptologia 33.1 (Jan. 2009), says that is "a very important, eminently readable, and well-written book" by someone who was there.
Heritage Foundation. Homeland Security Task Force. Defending the American Homeland. Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 2002. [http://www.heritage.org]
Task Force chaired by L. Paul Bremer, III, and Edwin Meese, III.
Herken, Gregg. Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller. New York: Holt, 2002.
Hershberg, I&NS 19.2, says that this work "merits required reading for anyone seriously interested in nuclear history -- or nuclear espionage." The author's exploration of how Moscow's spy networks functioned during the Manhattan Project "is especially enlightening.... Herken firmly rebuts the charge" that Oppenheimer "spied for Moscow, or that his [earlier] communist activities disqualified him for wartime service for the US government."
Herken, Gregg. Cardinal Choices: Presidential Science Advising from the Atomic Bomb to SDI. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Surveillant 2.5 notes that "[i]ntelligence gathering and high technology are inextricably linked." In this book, Herken explores "the impact of proposed technology, including ... the U-2 spy plane [and] the electronic gadgets poured into Vietnam.... At the heart of the book is the tension between the experts and the politicians in the making of`cardinal choices.'"
Herken, G.F. The Winning Weapon: The Atomic Bomb in the Cold War, 1945-1950. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
Cold War Connection, "Top Books on the Cold War," http://www.cmu.edu/coldwar/annot.htm, finds that the author "describes the powerful, often-perverse influence the atomic bomb played in international relations between the end of World War II and the Korean War." Herken "is especially good in interpreting the debate over the internationalization of the atom and the domestic context in which that debate was conducted."
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