Hayden, Michael V. [LTGEN/USAF, DIRNSA]
1. "Background on NSA: History, Oversight, Relevance for Today." Defense Intelligence Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 13-26.
"[S]lightly reformatted and edited version" of the DIRNSA's presentation at American University on 17 February 2000 and his testimony before the HPSCI on 12 April 2000.
2. "The Change Imperative." Defense Intelligence Journal 9, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 27-37.
The DIRNSA discusses the efforts undertaken to revamp NSA to fit the changed world in which it is operating.
Hayden, Michael V. "Defenders At Risk: How Blame Games Are Costing Spy Agencies." Washington Post, 19 Jun. 2009. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The retired general and former DCIA, argues that because of Phillip Mudd's refusal to participate in a political circus, "the republic will do without the officer clearly most qualified to fill the head intelligence position at DHS." Hayden broadens his comment by adding that "Phil's fate is symptomatic of a larger and even more troubling reality. A whole swath of intelligence professionals -- the best we had, the ones we threw at the al-Qaeda challenge when the nation was in extremis -- are suffering for their sacrifice, being held up to recrimination for many decisions that were never wholly theirs and about which there was little protest when we all believed we were in danger."
[Hayden, Michael V.] [GEN/USAF] "Remarks by Gen. Michael V. Hayden (USAF), Deputy Director of National Intelligence, 5 October 2005." CIRA Newsletter 30, no. 4 (Winter 2005): 3-10.
These remarks are interesting in their candor and the insight they offer to current events within the Intelligence Community. They include Gen. Hayden's responses to questions from the audience.
Hayden, Michael V. "Warfighters and Intelligence: One Team - One Fight." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 17-30.
In recent events, EUCOM intelligence personnel have been tasked with supplying intelligence to a wide range of customers: In Bosnia, to "American consumers, the NATO alliance and United Nations forces"; and in Rwanda, to international relief organizations. In addition, the type of information needed was "both more varied and more detailed," the areas were not those where we had "traditionally invested much energy," and the operations "frequently departed dramatically from classic warfighting."
The author proposes that intelligence should be properly understood in these kinds of environments, not just in support of operations, but as part of operations. He questions whether the two major regional contingencies concept is adequate for structuring intelligence. He also offers other thoughts based on EUCOM operational experience.
Return to Haw-Haz