Hart, Gary. The Shield and the Cloak: The Security of the Commons. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Lloyd, NWCR 59.4 (Autumn 2006), notes that the author includes economic, environmental, health, energy, and educational issues in the definition of security. Hart believes that the U.S. military shield must be comprised of three principles: flexibility, reform, and intelligence. He "recommends appreciation of fourth-generation warfare and establishment of a human intelligence corps within the CIA. He consolidates all special forces into a fifth service, and brings the National Guard home to reassume its traditional duties of guarding the homeland."
[GenPostwar/Natsec/00s]
Hart, Jenifer.
Ask Me No More. London: Peter Halban, 1998.
Clark comment: Hart was identified by Peter Wright, Spycatcher (1987), pp. 264-266, as a member of what he labeled the Oxford Ring of pre-World War II Soviet spies. This book is Hart's response, in spirit at least, if not directly. She essentially denies being a Soviet spy, while admitting her links to the Communist Party and clandestine meetings over a sustained period of time.
West, IJI&C 12.2, points up the dilemma by noting that Hart "has come tantalizingly close to conceding that almost everything Wright said about her is true, but she balked at the last fence, the identification of her English contact." From what we know today, the gaps in Hart's tale are "altogether too big to sustain."
See IJI&C 13.3/402-403 for Hart's response to West's review and West's rejoinder.
[UK/SpyCases/Other]
Hart, John D. "The ALSOS Mission, 1943-1945: A Secret U.S. Scientific Intelligence Unit." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 508-537.
Although its primary goal "was to determine the extent of Germany's nuclear weapons program," the mandate of the ALSOS Mission "was subsequently extended to other areas, including the German BW [Biological Warfare] program."
[WWII/Eur/Germany/ALSOS]
Hart, John Limond. The CIA's Russians. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.
In the "Foreword" (ix), William E. Colby noted that the author brought the approach of a "professional intelligence operator who also is a scholar" to this work. "[H]is depiction comes from many years of involvement in the recruitment, management, and sometimes even psychological counseling of real spies."
Peake, I&NS 19.2, finds that "[d]espite the relatively small sample of cases, Hart combines his experience and access to the case files to reach some first-order conclusions. They are important though not surprising." Seamon, Proceedings, Aug. 2003, adds that the author spices his stories "with illuminating insights commendably free from any taint of professional jargon." Jonkers, AFIO WIN 20-03, 27 May 2003, calls this an "[o]utstanding book. Get a feel for what these spies were really like as human beings. Good, useful reading."
In his review, Joseph C. Evans, IJI&C 17.3, focuses on Hart's handling of Yuri Nosenko and James J. Angleton, and finds little to please in the book. Evans believes that an "unstated but blatant purpose of the book is to defend Nosenko.... A second, yet by no means secondary underlying purpose ... is to denigrate" Angleton. "Instead of helping the intelligence historian or the current case officer, Hart has transformed the CIA's Cold War operations into mere polemics."
[CIA/50s/Popov; CIA/60s/Penkovsky; CIA/Angleton/Related; CIA/C&C/Tradecraft]
Hart, John Limond. "Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The Tribulations of Faith." Intelligence
and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 44-74.
Although he argues that Popov "made an important contribution" to U.S. intelligence, Hart's article focuses on the GRU officer's personality and motivation. The author concludes that Popov's career as a U.S. agent "was the product of complex and often subtle motivation," but the reasons for his actions were "in no way ideological."
It is interesting that, as Hart tells it, Popov was not a very good GRU officer, but became quite capable at getting his CIA handlers the information they wanted and at anticipating what they might want.
Hart, a retired senior CIA officer, criticizes the Agency for not making a major effort to dissuade Popov from complying with the order to return to the Soviet Union. Instead, the CIA officers seem to have gone along with Popov who was in one of his "irrationally optimistic phases."
[CIA/50s/Popov]
Hart, Jon-Paul. "Killer Spooks." Marine Corps Gazette 89 (Apr. 2005): 16-18.
The author argues for increasing the human intelligence collection capability of forces in the field by assigning collectors to tactical-level units. HUMINT collectors should become an organic element of reconnaissance organizations throughout the military.
[MI/Humint/00s]
Hart, Peter, ed. British Intelligence in Ireland, 1920-21: The Final Reports. Irish Narrative Series, ed. David Fitzpatrick. Cork: Cork University Press, 2002.
From advertisement: "The Irish revolution of 1920-1921 ended in a military and political stalemate, resolved only through the mutual compromise incorporated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty." Historians have long accepted that the Irish won the intelligence war. "This judgement is challenged by the recent release of two confidential self-assessments prepared for the army and the police in 1922." The police report "indicates a marked improvement in operations superintended by ... Sir Ormonde de l'Épée Winter (1875-1962). His report, though self-serving and flawed, provides a uniquely detailed and personal account of Intelligence from the inside. The editor's introduction assesses the purpose, reliability and significance of these reports. Their publication is a significant contribution to the study of Irish revolutionary history."
[OtherCountries/Ireland; UK/Interwar/To29]
Hart,
Scott. Washington at War, 1941-45. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970.
Wilcox: "Account of FBI activities during World War II."
[FBI/WWII]
Hartcher,
Peter. "KGB Spy Still at Large after Infiltrating ASIO." Australian
Financial Review, 29 Jun. 2000. [http://afr.com.au]
According to materials provided by former KGB archivist Vasili Mitrokhin, who defected to Britain in 1992, a KGB agent penetrated the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), remained "undetected for a decade[,] and is still living in Australia. The agent ... rose to a senior position.... Officials said he was not prosecuted because of a lack of evidence."
[Australia/00]
Hartcup,
Guy. Camouflage: A History of Concealment and Deception in War. Newton Abbot, UK: David & Charles, 1979.
Constantinides: This work deals primarily with visual deception from a British viewpoint. There is relatively little on other types of concealment and deception, or on other countries use of deception in general. The author "makes debatable judgments on Japanese susceptibility to deception," and "is wrong when he laments the lack of available information on Soviet camouflage."
[MI/Deception; UK/Overviews/MI]
Hartcup,
Guy. The Effect of Science on the Second World War. New York: St. Martin's, 2000.
Kruh, Cryptologia 25.2, calls this "an essential book on a rarely addressed topic that will contribute to a better understanding of an important subject."
[WWII/TechIntel]
Hartline, Martin C. "Michael Collins and Bloody Sunday." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 1 (Winter 1969): 69-78.
The eventual success of the Irish nationalists "constitutes a classic example of the effectiveness of unconventional warfare in forcing a powerful adversary to the negotiating table. [footnote omitted] The Irish intelligence service was one of the architects of the victory. The Director of Intelligence of the Irish Republican Army during the last act of the drama was Michael Collins."
[OtherCountries/Ireland/ToWWII]
Hartlyn,
Jonathan, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Varas, eds. The United States and Latin America in the 1990s. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. F1418V652
[LA/Gen]
Hartmann, Frederick
H., and Robert L. Wendzel. Defending America's Security. 2d ed.,
revised. Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), 1990.
Aging today but at one time a better text for a defense policy course than most of the other works around.
[GenPostwar/NatSec]
Haruna Mikio. Himitsu no fairu: CIA no tainichi kosaku [Secret Files: The CIA's Operations against Japan]. 2 vols. Tokto: Shincho Bunko, 2003.
Mercado, IJI&C 18.1 (Spring 2005), calls this "an impressive history" of U.S. intelligence. The author "begins on the eve of Pearl Harbor" and continues through World War II and the U.S. occupation before turning to the Cold War era. In high praise, the reviewer comments: "As impressive as Haruna's thoroughness is his rational view of intelligence."
[CIA/Overviews; Japan/Postwar]
Harvard [Journals]
Harwood, Richard. "Series of Mishaps Defeated Rescue in Iran." Washington Post, 2 May 1980, A1.
[GenPostwar/80s/Iran]
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