Harr - Hart

 

Harrington, Dale. Mystery Man: William Rhodes Davis, Nazi Agent of Influence. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1999.

Adams, I&NS 16.3, notes that American businessman Davis "built the largest oil refinery in Nazi Germany" and "became the sole provider to Germany of oil from Mexico that comprised almost 30 per cent of Hitler's supply.... The work is troubling in that ... Davis was a 'mystery man', and many of the author's assertions cannot be proven from the available sources."

[WWII/Eur/Ger/Ops]

Harrington, Joseph D. Yankee Samurai: The Secret Role of Nisei in America's Pacific Victory. Detroit, MI: Pettigrew, 1979.

From publisher: This book "is about Americans of Japanese ancestry who served secretly in the Pacific during World War II. Using their knowledge of Japanese, they shortened the conflict by at least two years, saving over 1,000,000 lives."

[WWII/FEPac/Nisei]

[Harrington, Kent M.] "Kent M. Harrington, Director of Public Affairs [CIA], Speaks at May Luncheon." CIRA Newsletter 14, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 3-6.

Remarks on 2 May 1994, to Central Intelligence Retirees' Association. Includes intelligence priorities, state of the Agency, and the Ames case.

[CIA/90s/93-94/Gen]

Harris, A-J

Harris, K-Z

Harrison, David. "Blake Praises 'Saint.'" Telegraph (London), 19 Sep. 1999. [http:// www.telegraph.co.uk]

Convicted spy George Blake, now living in Moscow, told BBC Radio 4's Today program on 18 September 1999 that Melita Norwood was "practically a saint."

[UK/SpyCases/99/Fever]

Harrison, Derrick. These Men Are Dangerous. London: Grafton, 1990.

Harrison, Edd [MAJ/USA]. "Enabling MI Analysts to Succeed in COIN Operations." Military Intelligence 37, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 2011): 43-45.

"The MI Corps needs to enable its analysts to produce quality assessments in COIN [counterinsurgency] operations by updating doctrine with the introduction of a COIN intelligence summary (INTSUM), create a cadre of Master Analysts to oversee the analytical process at the BCT [brigade combat team] and division level, and to increase the collaboration of BCT and division analysts with the Intelligence Community (IC) at large."

[MI/Army/10s]

Harrison, Edward D.R.

Harrison, Frederick. "Sharing Information Is Not Enough." Defense Intelligence Journal 15, no. 1 (2006): 25-29.

"To be effective, sharing needs to be done in a way that directly engages the people for whom the mass of information is being provided."

[GenPostCW/00s]

Hart, Gary. The Shield and the Cloak: The Security of the Commons. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Lloyd, NWCR 59.4 (Autumn 2006), notes that the author includes economic, environmental, health, energy, and educational issues in the definition of security. Hart believes that the U.S. military shield must be comprised of three principles: flexibility, reform, and intelligence. He "recommends appreciation of fourth-generation warfare and establishment of a human intelligence corps within the CIA. He consolidates all special forces into a fifth service, and brings the National Guard home to reassume its traditional duties of guarding the homeland."

[GenPostwar/Natsec/00s]

Hart, Jenifer. Ask Me No More. London: Peter Halban, 1998.

Clark comment: Hart was identified by Peter Wright, Spycatcher (1987), pp. 264-266, as a member of what he labeled the Oxford Ring of pre-World War II Soviet spies. This book is Hart's response, in spirit at least, if not directly. She essentially denies being a Soviet spy, while admitting her links to the Communist Party and clandestine meetings over a sustained period of time.

West, IJI&C 12.2, points up the dilemma by noting that Hart "has come tantalizingly close to conceding that almost everything Wright said about her is true, but she balked at the last fence, the identification of her English contact." From what we know today, the gaps in Hart's tale are "altogether too big to sustain." See IJI&C 13.3/402-403 for Hart's response to West's review and West's rejoinder.

[UK/SpyCases/Other]

Hart, John D. "The ALSOS Mission, 1943-1945: A Secret U.S. Scientific Intelligence Unit." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 508-537.

Although its primary goal "was to determine the extent of Germany's nuclear weapons program," the mandate of the ALSOS Mission "was subsequently extended to other areas, including the German BW [Biological Warfare] program."

[WWII/Eur/Germany/ALSOS]

Hart, John Limond. The CIA's Russians. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003.

In the "Foreword" (ix), William E. Colby noted that the author brought the approach of a "professional intelligence operator who also is a scholar" to this work. "[H]is depiction comes from many years of involvement in the recruitment, management, and sometimes even psychological counseling of real spies."

Peake, I&NS 19.2, finds that "[d]espite the relatively small sample of cases, Hart combines his experience and access to the case files to reach some first-order conclusions. They are important though not surprising." Seamon, Proceedings 129.8 (Aug. 2003), adds that the author spices his stories "with illuminating insights commendably free from any taint of professional jargon." Jonkers, AFIO WIN 20-03 (27 May 2003), calls this an "[o]utstanding book. Get a feel for what these spies were really like as human beings. Good, useful reading."

Focusing on Hart's handling of Yuri Nosenko and James J. Angleton, Evans, IJI&C 17.3 finds little to please in the book. Evans believes that an "unstated but blatant purpose of the book is to defend Nosenko.... A second, yet by no means secondary underlying purpose ... is to denigrate" Angleton. "Instead of helping the intelligence historian or the current case officer, Hart has transformed the CIA's Cold War operations into mere polemics."

[CIA/50s/Popov; CIA/60s/Penkovsky; CIA/Angleton/Related; CIA/C&C/Tradecraft]

Hart, John Limond. "Pyotr Semyonovich Popov: The Tribulations of Faith." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 (Oct. 1997): 44-74.

Although he argues that Popov "made an important contribution" to U.S. intelligence, Hart's article focuses on the GRU officer's personality and motivation. The author concludes that Popov's career as a U.S. agent "was the product of complex and often subtle motivation," but the reasons for his actions were "in no way ideological." It is interesting that, as Hart tells it, Popov was not a very good GRU officer, but became quite capable at getting his CIA handlers the information they wanted and at anticipating what they might want.

Hart, a retired senior CIA officer, criticizes the Agency for not making a major effort to dissuade Popov from complying with the order to return to the Soviet Union. Instead, the CIA officers seem to have gone along with Popov who was in one of his "irrationally optimistic phases."

[CIA/50s/Popov]

Hart, Jon-Paul. "Killer Spooks." Marine Corps Gazette 89 (Apr. 2005): 16-18.

The author argues for increasing the human intelligence collection capability of forces in the field by assigning collectors to tactical-level units. HUMINT collectors should become an organic element of reconnaissance organizations throughout the military.

[MI/Humint/00s]

Hart, M. Cordell. "Meeting Ames: A CT Classmate's Notes." CIRA Quarterly 40, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 4-7.

Comments on a series of self-initiated meetings with Aldrich Ames at the U.S. Penitentiary Allentown, PA, in 2011.

[SpyCases/Ames/Later]

Hart, Peter, ed. British Intelligence in Ireland, 1920-21: The Final Reports. Irish Narrative Series, ed. David Fitzpatrick. Cork: Cork University Press, 2002.

From publisher: "The Irish revolution of 1920-1921 ended in a military and political stalemate, resolved only through the mutual compromise incorporated in the Anglo-Irish Treaty." Historians have long accepted that the Irish won the intelligence war. "This judgement is challenged by the recent release of two confidential self-assessments prepared for the army and the police in 1922." The police report "indicates a marked improvement in operations superintended by ... Sir Ormonde de l'Épée Winter (1875-1962). His report, though self-serving and flawed, provides a uniquely detailed and personal account of Intelligence from the inside. The editor's introduction assesses the purpose, reliability and significance of these reports. Their publication is a significant contribution to the study of Irish revolutionary history."

[OtherCountries/Ireland; UK/Interwar/To29]

Hart, Scott. Washington at War, 1941-45. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970.

Wilcox: "Account of FBI activities during World War II."

[FBI/WWII]

Hart-Davis, Duff. Man of War: The Secret Life of Captain Alan Hillgarth Officer, Adventurer, Agent. London: Random House Century, 2012.

Peake, Studies 57.2 (Jun. 2013), notes that Hillgarth was naval attaché in Madrid.(1939-1943) and "developed a network of contacts among the Spaniards that proved valuable in monitoring German spies." This is a "fine biography" that records for history "the unusual career of an inadvertent but effective intelligence officer. A life adventure worth reading."

[UK/Biogs]

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