Hamm - Hamz

 

Hamm, Diane L., comp. Military Intelligence: Its Heroes and Legends. Arlington Hall Station, VA: U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, 1987. [http://carlisle-www. army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/genmisc.htm]

[MI/Army/Overviews]

Hammant, Thomas R.

1. "Communications Intelligence and Tsarist Russia." Studies in Intelligence 22, no. 2 (Summer 1978): 29-38.

2. "Some Communications Intelligence in Tsarist Russia." CRYPTOLOG, Jan. 1984, 1-12.

"[R]evised and expanded version" of 1 above.

3. "Some Communications Intelligence in Tsarist Russia." Cryptologia 24, no. 3 (Jul. 2000): 235-249.

Reprint of 2 above. "[E]xplores the early development and use of communications intelligence by the tsarist Russian regime through World War I, and the importance attached to it, especially by the Russian Navy."

4. "Russian and Soviet Cryptology II -- The Magdeburg Incident: The Russian View." Cryptologia 24, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 333-338.

"[T]he Russians played a major and on-going role, both in the cryptanalytic exploitation effort of the Magdeburg material and in the effective use of this communications intelligence by naval commanders of the Baltic Sea Fleet."

[Russia/Historical]

Hammer, Ellen J. A Death in November: America in Vietnam, 1963. New York: Dutton, 1987.

Hammer, Joshua, et al. "A Job For The Agency." Newsweek, 23 Jun. 2003.

The Central Intelligence Agency "can help stop the bloodletting between Israelis and Palestinians. But CIA aid could also backfire. The CIA has quietly solved some hopeless-looking Mideast messes before. It was the [CIA] that came to the rescue last year during the siege at Bethlehem's Church of the Nativity after talks broke down between the Israeli Defense Forces and Palestinian Authority negotiators. Bypassing official channels, the CIA's Tel Aviv station chief, Jeff O'Connell, secretly shuttled between Israel's domestic security agency, the Shin Bet, and Yasir Arafat's Kurdish-born chief financial adviser, Mohammed Rashid."

[CIA/00s/03/Gen]

Hammer, Joshua, and Douglas Waller. "Special Ops: The Top-Secret War." Newsweek, 18 Mar. 1991, 32.

[MI/Ops/90s/DesertStorm]

Hammer, Paul E.J. "An Elizabethan Spy Who Came in from the Cold: The Return of Anthony Standen to England in 1593." Historical Research 65 (1992): 277-295.

[UK/Historical]

Hammes, Thomas X. "Insurgency: Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation." Strategic Forum (Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University) 214 (Jan. 2005): 1-7.

"Fourth-generation warfare, which is now playing out in Afghanistan and Iraq, is a modern form of insurgency. Its practitioners seek to convince enemy political leaders that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit.... Because it is organized to ensure political rather than military success, this type of warfare is difficult to defeat."

[MI/SpecOps/00s]

Hammes, Thomas X. [COL/USMC] The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century. Osceola, WI: Zenith, 2004.

From advertisement: The author shows "how war is evolution, not revolution, and that a 'weaker' opponent will continually evolve to use ways to avoid direct military engagement. Instead of winning militarily, an insurgency will work to test the political will of a more powerful nation to stay the course during a war.... He also examines in detail 'transnational' enemies like Al Qaeda, and how the U.S. military's focus on high-tech weapons designed to overpower an enemy in a short amount of time means little when the enemy has a different concept of the time the conflict will last."

[MI/SpecOps/00s]

Hammond, Nicholas. Venture into Greece: With the Guerrillas, 1943-44. London: Kimber, 1983.

The author, who died in April 2001, commanded "underground British troops stationed in the Pindus range during the German occupation of Greece" in World War II. Telegraph (London), 5 Apr. 2001.

[OtherCountries/Greece/WWII; UK/WWII/Med]

Hammond, Thomas H. "Intelligence Organizations and the Organization of Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 23, no. 4 (Winter 2010-2011): 680-724.

The author works through a substantial amount of literature on organizational design for the Intelligence Community. However, "[t]he design of an appropriate structure for the Intelligence Community cannot be guaranteed to prevent intelligence failures," since institutional structure is only one of the problems behind such failures.

[GenPostCW/2010]

Hammond, Thomas H. "Why Is the Intelligence Community So Difficult to Redesign? Smart Practices, Conflicting Goals, and the Creation of Purpose-Based Organizations." Governance 20, no. 3 (Jul. 2007): 401–422.

"One central argument is simply that it was very difficult to discover a clearly superior structure; in fact, the long-standing structure may have had some unrecognized virtues. But the other central argument is that one smart practice may have emerged since the 9/11 attacks: It involves the creation of problem-focused interagency centers that are intended to enhance the sharing and integration of information within the intelligence community."

[Reform/00s/Gen]

Hammond, Thomas Taylor, comp. and ed. Soviet Foreign Relations and World Communism: A Selected, Annotated Bibliography of 7,000 Books in 30 Languages. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Rocca and Dziak: "See pp. 1108-1119 for 109 selected items from the 1940s to the 1960s on 'Soviet espionage', with perceptive commentary by Robert M. Slusser. Especially useful is the inventory of defector and official sources, including U.S. Congressional publications."

[Russia/Reference]

Hampshire, A. Cecil.

1. On Hazardous Service. London: Kimber, 1974.

According to Constantinides, On Hazardous Service concerns aspects of naval warfare in World War II "that are not too well known and that have features of covertness or of special operations."

2. The Secret Navies. London: Kimber, 1978.

Constantinides says that this book covers selected areas of British special naval operations in World War II. It serves to "shed[] some light on these little-known units and their activities."

3. Undercover Sailors: Secret Operations of World War II. London: Kimber, 1981.

[UK/WWII/Services/Navy]

Hampshire, James. "'Spy Fever' in Britain, 1900 to 1914." The Historian [London] 72 (2001): 22-27.

[UK/Historical]

Hampton, Larry N. "The National Cryptological Adjunct Faculty Program." Military Intelligence 24, no. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 1998): 47-48.

[MI/Training][c]

Hamrick, S.J. Deceiving the Deceivers: Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, and Guy Burgess. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004.

According to DKR, AFIO WIN 44-04 (29 Nov. 2004), the author argues that "British intelligence knew far earlier [than the spring of 1951] that Maclean was Moscow's agent and concealed that knowledge in a 1949-1951 counterespionage operation that deceived Philby and Burgess. Hamrick also finds evidence that in 1949-1950 the British ran a disinformation op that used Philby to mislead Moscow about British-U.S. retaliatory capability in case of Soviet aggression against Western Europe."

Bath, NIPQ 21.1 (Mar. 2005), calls this work "an interesting, if not totally convincing, exercise in theory." On the other hand, Kruh, Cryptologia 29.2 (Apr. 2005), says that Hamrick presents "compelling evidence" regarding the use of Philby in a disinformation initiative against the Soviets. The author "breaks new ground in reinterpreting ... the final espionage years of three famous spies."

To Goodman, I&NS 21.1 (Feb. 2006), this book is "based on conjecture." The author's "reading of the primary sources ... is fundamentally and unacceptably flawed." The reviewer concludes that the book's content is "pure fabrication." Similarly, West, IJI&C 19.1 (Spring 2006), finds "serious and glaring faultlines crisscrossing Hamrick's landscape." He concludes that the author's "elaborate 'deception' ... is but a fleeting mirage."

Lefebvre, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, Feb. 2005 [http://www.h-net.org], comments that the author "is particularly adept at finding holes and fallacies of omission or assumption in the material he perused. To make his case, however, he must fill in the blanks through logical deduction, often without any supporting and corroborating evidence other than the coherence of his propositions."

[UK/Spycases/B&M & Philby]

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