H - Had

 

Haakon, Christopher P. "Commercial Space Imagery for National Defense." Defense Intelligence Journal 8, no. 1 (Summer 1999): 24-32.

"Soon, commercial satellites will deliver great volumes of high quality imagery at incrementally decreasing prices." To keep its existing edge, the U.S. Intelligence Community "should continually invest in the latest technology -- especially unique or experimental programs, because these are harder for opposition forces to replicate -- exploiting the best technology for handling gigantic data masses."

[MI/Imagery]

Haas, Michael E.

Haas, Roland W. Enter the Past Tense: My Secret Life as a CIA Assassin. Herndon, VA: Potomac, 2007.

Goulden, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer-Fall 2007), warns prospective buyers that this book "is evoking howls of glee from intelligence professionals who do not buy a word of Mr. Haas' tale. That he boasts of drinking a liter of vodka daily perhaps factored into the story." Frequent reviewer and former CIA operations officer Robert D. Chapman, IJI&C 22.1 (Spring 2009), devotes entirely too much time to this fable. He notes (perhaps wishfully -- that is a joke, Mr. Chapman) that "[m]y colleagues and I, in our long service in the country's clandestine services, have never seen or even contemplated the adventurism equal" to that displayed in this book.

[CIA/Accusations/00s]

Haass, Richard N. "Don't Hobble Intelligence Gathering." Washington Post, 15 Feb. 1996, A27.

Haass, Richard N. "Supporting US Foreign Policy in the Post-9/11 World." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 1-13.

"Successful intelligence ... requires a mutual understanding between policy-makers and the Intelligence Community that is all too often lacking." How that gap might be closed is the subject matter of this article by Ambassador Haass, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State.

[Analysis/Critiques; GenPostwar/Issues/Policy/00s]

Haass, Richard N. War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009.

Hammes, Prism 1.3 (Jun. 2010), notes that Haass sees Operation Desert Storm as a war of necessity and Operation Iraqi Freedom as a war of choice. However, he "is not totally convincing in calling the 2003 invasion ... a war of choice." In fact, both Presidents Bush "used some of the same reasons ... to justify action against Iraq." This book is "both useful and relevant. [Haass] focuses on the idea that a nation should know whether it is embarking on a war of necessity or of choice. However, he also highlights how ... difficult it is to determine to which category a conflict belongs."

[MI/Ops/Iraq/Books]

Haberman, Clyde. "Israel, Unhappy with U.S., Orbits Its Own Spy Satellite." New York Times, 6 Apr. 1995, A7 (N).

Haberstich, Art. "The Mariner as Agent." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1 (Winter 1966): 45-55.

"It is common knowledge that intelligence services use seamen of their own or friendly countries' merchant fleets to make clandestine port observations in denied areas. The potential for clandestine activities broadens considerably, however, when we consider for use as carriers and agents the merchant ships and seamen of the target country itself."

[CIA/Components/DO]

Hacaoglu, Selcan. "Turkish Spy Agency Raises Profile." Associated Press, 7 Aug. 1999.

"Turkey has raised the profile of its spy agency," the National Intelligence Organization, better known by its Turkish initials MIT, "sending its agents abroad to capture the leaders of the Kurdish separatist movement."

[OtherCountries/Turkey]

Hack, Karl.

1. "British Intelligence and Counter-Insurgency in the Era of Decolonisation: The Example of Malaya." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 124-155.

The author argues that if the Malayan Emergency (1948-1960) is used as the example, then, explanations of British success in counter-insurgency should place "more emphasis ... on government use of 'population control'" and "less on winning 'hearts and minds' or concentrating power on one leader."

2. "Corpses, Prisoners of War and Documents: British and Communist Narratives of the Malayan Emergency, and the Dynamics of Intelligence Transformation." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 211-241.

"British accounts of the Malayan Emergency argue intelligence underwent a major transformation in 1952-54, as part of a campaign-winning infusion of new leadership. This article uses the recent statements of Chin Peng, Secretary-General of the Malaysian Communist Party from 1947, to construct a contrasting Communist analysis ... which sees the insurgent campaign as flagging by 1951.... It then tries to reconcile these contradictory ... narratives."

3. Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia: Britian, Malaya and Singapore, 1941-1968. London: Curzon, 2001.

4. "'Iron Claws on Malaya': The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency." Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30, no.1 (1999), 99-125.

5. "Screwing Down the People: The Malayan Emergency, Decolonisation and Ethnicity." In Imperial Policy and Southeast Asian Nationalism, eds. Hans Antlov and Stein Tonnesson, 83-109. London: Curzon, 1995.

[UK/Postwar/Malaya]

Hackett, James. "Radar Satellites Required." Washington Times, 14 Sep. 1999.

The Discoverer 2 spy satellite is a joint project of DARPA and the NRO. Its goal "is to see if a radar satellite can spot and track troop and vehicle movements on the ground in all kinds of weather.... It is estimated that 18 to 24 satellites in orbit could provide continuous unobscured observation of anything that moves or goes under cover.... The House Appropriations Committee zeroed funding for [the project],... citing technical risk, concern it may cost more than expected and lack of a formal ... requirement.... Defense Secretary William Cohen reportedly is sending a letter to Congress asking the appropriations conference to approve the requested $108 million" for fiscal year 2000.

[Recon/Sats]

Hackler, Tim. The Press and National Security Secrets. McLean, VA: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 1992.

Surveillant 2.5: "[T]he justification of a public's right to know has sometimes served merely as a rationalization to cover up more prosaic and self-interested motives."

[GenPostwar/NatSec]

Hackman, J. Richard. Collaborative Intelligence: Using Teams to Solve Hard Problems. San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2011.

According the Peake. Studies 56.1 (Mar. 2012) and Intelligencer 19.2 (Summer-Fall 2012), the author's research is based on "observing IC teams at work, and while the results were found to be applicable to teams in general ... the focus of this book is on intelligence.... Those considering careers in intelligence, those recently employed in the profession, and seasoned professionals will find Collaborative Intelligence a well documented, very valuable source of proven concepts."

[GenPostCW/10s/Gen]

Haddick, Robert. "The CIA Finds Job Security in Afghanistan." Foreign Policy, 2 Oct. 2009. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com]

On September 20, 2009, the Los Angeles Times reported that "the CIA's head count in Afghanistan will increase to 700, led by increases in paramilitary officers, intelligence analysts, and operatives tracking the behavior of Afghan government officials." All of the options for U.S. policy in Afghanistan share "a requirement for greater CIA participation. Options that have fewer U.S. military forces directly providing security imply more Afghans providing security. This will require greater employment of U.S. liaison officers and advisors from both the U.S. military and the CIA's clandestine service."

[CIA/00s/09; MI/Ops/00s/Afgh/09]

Hadley, Arthur T. "Complex Query: What Makes a Good Spy?" New York Times Magazine, 29 May 1960, 12, 43-44.

[GenPostwar/60s/Gen]

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