Greer, Kenneth E. "CORONA: The First Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite." Studies in Intelligence Supplement 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37.
Cited in Norman Polmar, "Here's Looking at You, Boris," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 121.12 (Dec. 1995): 87-88.
Greer, Mark [CAPT/USN]. "ONI Uses Advanced Information Technology in Support of Warfighters." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 19, nos. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2003): 12-13.
ONI "has become a community leader in leveraging information technology (IT) in support of the Naval Intelligence mission. The IT Directorate (ONI-4) ... has implemented a number of cutting edge solutions over the last 3-4 years, in addition to its more traditional missions of providing the IT infrastructure at ONI."
Gregg, Donald P. "An Interrupted Mission." Washington Post, 24 Jun. 1998, A17.
Clark comment: In a ceremony on 25 June 1998, DCI George Tenet presented the Director's Medal to John T. "Jack" Downey and Richard G. Fecteau. (Jonkers, AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes, 28 Jun. 1998.) The two were shot down in 1952 while on a clandestine suppy mission from Korea into Manchuria. Fecteau was imprisoned for almost 20 years, Downey for over 20 years. In the listed article, the former Ambassador to Korea (1989-1993) focuses primarily on Downey (who Gregg knew in his early CIA days) as "a shining example of how to deal gracefully with those unexpected tragedies that fate may hold in store."
Gregg, Donald P. Pot Shards: Fragments of a Life Lived in CIA, the White House, and the Two Koreas. Washington, DC: New Academia Publishing, 2014.
Nathan, FA 94.3 (May-Jun. 2015), finds that the author "recounts his experiences with insight and humor." However, "Gregg offers few details of his work for the CIA, drawing more from his NSC and ambassadorial postings."
Gregg, Heather S. "Beyond Population Engagement: Understanding Counterinsurgency." Parameters 39, no. 3 (Autumn 2009). [http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/]
"The short-term goals of COIN are now fairly well understood: engage the population and win their support. Whichever side wins the support of the population ... wins the battle. The battle is not the war, however. The long-term goal of a counterinsurgency campaign requires the creation of a functioning state, a government that can stand on its own, provide for its citizens, and promote regional and international stability; this achievement is victory in a counterinsurgency. Transitioning from the short-term success of population engagement to long-term viability of the host nation is far more difficult and less understood."
Gregory, Shaun. Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence in the Gulf War. Working Paper No. 238. Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1991.
Gregory, William H. "Burn Before Reading." Aviation Weekly & Space Technology 113 (1 Sep. 1980): 37.
Editorial on the Hollowell report.
Grell, William F. "A Marine With OSS." Marine Corps Gazette 29 (Dec. 1945): 14-18.
Petersen: "OSS aid to the resistance in France."
Grèmion, Pierre. L'Intelligence de L'Anticommunisme: Le Congrès pour la liberté de la culture à Paris, 1950-1975. Paris: Fayard, 1995.
Grendel, Frédéric. Beaumarchais: The Man Who Was Figaro. New York: Crowell, 1977.
Constantinides notes that the intelligence aspects of the life of Beaumarchais -- such as his role as an agent for Louis XV and Louis XVI, or his role in France's choice to openly support the American Revolution -- are not central to this biography.
Grendler, Paul F. "Giacomo Antonio Marta: Antipapal Lawyer and English Spy, 1609-1618." Catholic Historical Review 93, no. 4 (2007): 789-814.
Grenier, Robert L. 88 Days to Kandahar: A CIA Diary. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015.
Finn, Washington Post, 20 Feb. 2015, calls this "an admirably frank addition to the bookshelf" of CIA memoirs. The author was "CIA station chief in Islamabad, Pakistan, before and after 9/11." He tells "a sweeping story ... in a sharp, straightforward style while pausing to let us in on the ad-hoc decision-making of the sometimes absurd world he inhabited.... The centerpiece of the book, the evolution of the improvised, chaotic assault on southern Afghanistan by teams of CIA officers and Special Operations forces alongside hastily mustered Afghans, is vividly told."
For Rubin, New York Times, 11 Feb. 2015, what this book "chiefly offers are details of the role of both the C.I.A. and the Pakistanis in the Pashtun areas of Afghanistan in the months after 9/11.... Hampering the account, however, is a sometimes brash and even self-congratulatory tone that raises questions about his reliability as a narrator.... Those looking for insight into Pakistan's willingness to give the Taliban a safe haven and for America to tolerate it will find Grenier's account illuminating."
Mazzafro, Proceedings 141.7 (Ju. 2015), believes this book "will be useful to anyone interested in better understanding Afghanistan's place in the global war on terror, but scholars will be frustrated by the ... lack of footnotes and biblography." He also implies but does not overtly say that he is somewhat bothered by a self-centeredness to the author's narrative. To Freedman, FA 94.3 (May-Jun. 2015), this "book illuminates the intricacy of the area's politics and provides some interesting characterizations of players on both sides of the porous Afghan-Pakistani border."
Peake, Studies 59.2 (Jun. 2015), says that "88 Days To Kandahar is first a stimulating, provocative, and forthright account of America's First Afghan War. Second, it is an assessment of national security policy since 2001 in South Asia and the resurgence of the Taliban that led to the Second American Afghan War.... Third, and more broadly, it is also an insightful appraisal of the challenges we face today in South Asia. A fine contribution, it deserves a place on the bookshelf -- virtual or traditional -- of every officer, but only after reading."
Gressang, Daniel S., and Jeffrey A. Baxter. "Crawling into the Terrorist's Head: Coordination and Cooperation across Levels of Government." Defense Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (2005): 121-140.
The most interesting portion of this article discusses the Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) as a potential model for local, state, and federal coordination on counterterrorism.
Gribben, August. "Chinese Spies Take Advantage of Open U.S. Society." Washington Times, 31 May 1999.
"[T]he People's Republic of China has perfected the technique of using against the United States its most envied and cherished virtues -- its liberty and openness.... [B]y 'being very, very patient in taking bits and pieces to make the larger whole,' Chinese intelligence has scored impressively....
"Consider that each year, U.S. government agencies, universities and businesses routinely invite Chinese bureaucrats, business representatives, scientists, educators and students to attend conferences, trade shows, workshops, expositions and the like.... Chinese participation in such events seems harmless. To the PRC, they seem like targets of opportunity.... The Cox report and defense analysts make clear that the Chinese have relentlessly exploited every opening to tease from the United States the information China wants or needs."
Gribbin, Peter. "Brazil and CIA." CounterSpy, Apr.-May 1979, 4-23.
Clark comment: After wading through the anti-imperialist rhetoric that substitutes for documentation in this article, you are left with unsubstantiated and overblown assertions blaming the CIA and U.S. AID for most of the ills in Brazil in the early 1960s. The article includes lists of Brazilians who supposedly attended "CIA-connected police programs in the U.S." and "who participated in CIA-directed labor training courses." It also has a list of "CIA Officers in Brazil as of August, 1978" and another rather strange list of "CIA Collaborators in Brazil as of August, 1978," that is, U.S. government employees who "collaborated or worked with the CIA in a functional capacity."
Gribble, Leonard. On Secret Service. London: Burke, 1958.
Wilcox: "British spy tells his story of adventure and intrigue."
Gribkov, Anatoli I., and William Y. Smith. Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis. Chicago: Edition Q, Inc., 1994.
According to Friedman, NSLR, Oct. 1994, this book "compares the views of two senior military officers who were adversaries in the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.... Joint Chiefs were unaware that Kennedy had determined that the United States could live with Castro.... Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev clearly articulated their objectives in the time period immediately preceding the crisis." Hansen, Studies 46.1/50/fn.4, calls this "a vital source, given Gen. Gribkov's role in planning and implementing the operation."
Return to G Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents