Grable,
Joseph H. [CAPT/USA] "The S2 and Light Infantry Scouts." Military
Intelligence 19, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1993): 31-37.
Grable,
Joseph H. [CAPT/USA] "The S2 and Light Infantry Scouts." Military
Intelligence 19, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1993): 31-37.
"The scout platoon can be the most vital intelligence gathering asset for the light infantry battalion commander. However, scouts are not always used to their fullest, often because the battalion S2 fails to understand two key functions:... The S2 should be the scouts primary point of contact at the battalion.... Also, it is the S2 who recommends the mission in the first place."
[MI/Army][c]
Graham, Bob, with Jeff Nussbaum. Intelligence Matters: The CIA, the FBI, Saudi Arabia, and the Failure of American's War on Terror. New York: Random House, 2004.
According to Peake, Studies 49.1 (2005), this work "is a summary" of Senator Graham's role in the House-Senate Joint Inquiry into the Intelligence Community's performance prior to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks, "his views on the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and his recommendations for reform of the Intelligence Community.... Senator Graham has shared some interesting insights on how things work in Washington, and, although some of his views are controversial, he more than justifies the conclusion that intelligence matters."
[Overviews/U.S./00s; Reform/00s/04]
Graham, Bradley [Washington Post].
Graham,
Daniel O. Confessions of a Cold Warrior. Fairfax, VA: Preview Press, 1995.
Houser, Proceedings, Jan. 1996, reports that this book "is both an autobiography and a recording of the Cold War period, from the end of World War II to the present, told by someone who had a major role in its outcome.... Confessions of a Cold Warrior is about a gutsy young Army officer who didn't follow the rule book on how to succeed but rather sorted things out as right or wrong as he saw them.... He discloses the aggressive and corruptive competition between intelligence agencies.... This short book is one of a very few I wished was longer."
For those who know Graham, Bates, NIPQ 12.3, makes a telling comment about this book, noting that Graham "wrote like he talked and the story is always lively." The book has a chapter on Graham's "order-of-battle dispute with Sam Adams and his subsequent support to General Westmoreland in the General's suit against CBS." The last half of the book deals with the Strategic Defense Initiative and Graham's High Frontier organization.
[GenPostwar/CW; MI/Army/To90s]
Graham,
Daniel O. "Estimating the Threat: A Soldier's Job." Army
23 (Apr. 1973): 14-18. [Petersen]
[MI/Army/To90s]
Graham, Daniel
O. "DIA: The Unglamorous But Crucial Role of Satisfying the Foreign
Military Intelligence Requirements of DOD." Commander's Digest
17 (24 Apr. 1975): 1-20 (entire issue). [Petersen]
[MI/DIA]
Graham, Daniel
O. "The Intelligence Mythology of Washington." Strategic Review
4 (Summer 1976): 59-66. [Petersen]
[GenPostwar/70s/Gen]
Graham, Daniel
O. "The Soviet Military Budget Controversy." Air Force Magazine
59, no. 5 (1976): 33-37. [Petersen]
[Analysis/Soviet]
Graham,
Daniel O. U.S. Intelligence at the Crossroads. USSI Report 76-1.
Washington DC: United States Strategic Institute, 1976.
[GenPostwar/70s/Gen]
Graham, Richard H. SR-71 Blackbird: Stories, Tales, and Legends. St. Paul, MN: MBI, 2002.
From publisher: "Former SR-71 pilot, instructor and wing commander, Richard Graham, presents the most intriguing SR-71 stories ever told. This once highly classified program is fully revealed through the words of pilots, commanders, mechanics, and instructors involved in the Blackbird's creation and flight-testing."
[Recon/Planes]
Graham, Richard H. SR-71 Revealed: The Inside Story. Osceola. WI: MBI, 1996.
From publisher: "Former SR-71 Wing Commander Rich Graham ... provides a detailed look at the entire SR-71 story beginning with his application to be an SR pilot through commanding an entire wing."
[Recon/Planes]
Graham, Thomas, Jr., and Keith A. Hansen. Spy Satellites and Other Intelligence Technologies That Changed History. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2007.
Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), notes that this work deals with both the collection of monitoring data and verification issues involved in agreements on nuclear weapons. "The authors' narrative is not technical.... For those wishing to know how NTM [National Technical Means] contributed to the end of the Cold War and to learn about the demands placed on them by the war against terror," this "is an excellent place to start."
For Poteat, Intelligencer 15.3 (Summer/Fall 2007), this book "is an excellent primer on U.S. reconnaissance systems,... and the many arms control treaties made possible -- and mutually acceptable -- by both the U.S. and Soviet Union."
[Recon/Topics/Verification]
Grajewski, Marcin. "Spy for U.S Gets Mixed Reception in Poland." Reuters, 27 Apr. 1998. [http://dailynews.yahoo.com]
Ryszard Kuklinski returned to his native Poland on 27 April 1998. After meeting with the Cold War spy, Polish Premier Jerzy Buzek told reporters: "Kuklinski was a witness of history. He took his decision at moments that were very difficult for Poland. I have a right to suppose that these decisions saved our country from bloodshed." Public opinion polls show that Poles remain split over how to view Kuklinski's actions in spying for the CIA.
[CIA/80s/Kuklinski]
Gramer,
George K., Jr. [COL/USA] "Development of the Cradle-to-Grave Training
Strategies: Philosophy and Process." Military Intelligence 24,
no. 3 (Jul.-Sep. 1998): 4-8.
[MI/Training][c]
Gramer, George K., Jr. "Operation Joint Endeavor: Combined-Joint Intelligence in Peace Enforcement Operations." Military Intelligence 22, no. 4 (Oct.-Dec. 1996): 11-14.
This article discusses some of the challenges in conducting combined and joint intelligence operations. "Contributing to the intelligence frustration in the theater was the proliferation of intelligence entities by nations and agencies.... In Sarajevo, there were at least ten national intelligence centers primarily dedicated to providing intelligence releasable only to their own nations.... Human intelligence (HUMINT) was clearly the number one collector in theater.... NATO-releasable SIGINT reporting consistently was a day late and a dollar short.... Imagery intelligence (IMINT) ... was [generally] sufficient and satisfactory.... [H]owever,... an excess of tactical reconnaissance assets [were] deployed in theater, and the resultant products were often less than satisfactory."
[GenPostwar/Peacekeeping; MI/Ops/Bosnia][c]
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