Goscha, Christopher E.
1. "Intelligence in a Time of Decolonialization: The Case of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam at War (1945-50)." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 100-138.
The focus here is "the birth, development, and major functions" of the DRV's "Public Security and Intelligence services in a time of decolonization." It includes three case studies "as a way of considering wider themes relating to the question of intelligence and decolonization."
2. tr. "Three Documents on Early Vietnamese Intelligence and Security Services." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 139-146.
3. Pribbenow, Merle. "Commentary." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 147-150.
The documents unearthed by Goscha "illustrate several important stages in the development of the Vietnamese communist intelligence and security services into a powerful and effective apparatus."
4. Marr, David. "Commentary." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 151-154.
5. Thomas, Martin. "Insurgent Intelligence: Information Gathering and Anti-Colonial Rebellion." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 1 (Feb. 2007): 155-163.
"[T]hese Vietnamese intelligence documents offer numerous insights into the evolution of the Viet Minh as a national movement." They also "confirm that intelligence was as critical a factor for all warring parties in struggles of decolonialization as in other, more conventional conflicts."
Goss, Porter J. "Don't Release Pollard." Washington Times, 5 Jan. 1999, 15.
The HPSCI chair argues: "Pollard is still an unrepentant criminal, fairly adjudicated by the country he betrayed. It would be a grave mistake to barter our justice system as a sweetener for Mr. Netanyahu who found the Wye Plantation Agreement a bit too sour."
Goss, Porter J. "Millions of Pictures and No One to Look at Them." IntellectualCapital.com, 18 Jun. 1998. [http://www.intellectualcapital.com]
The HPSCI chairman argues that "[t]he fact is, we must have both tactical and strategic capabilities, but the high cost of fulfilling tactical requirements has, in a time of diminishing resources, dried up the resources dedicated to the strategic."
Goss, Porter J. "Representative Porter Goss Responds to CIA Critics." National Security Law Report 18, no. 8 (Dec. 1996): 1, 8-11.
Excerpts of remarks by Representative Goss (R-FL) to ABA Standing Committee on Law and National Security's Review of the Field Conference in Washington, DC, 10 December 1996. Goss expresses his belief that the Intelligence Community "is under relentless attack by the media." Many of the reports are wrong, but they are also impossible to answer. Goss also comments on the continuing need for intelligence and the requirement that intelligence and law enforcement work together.
Goss, Porter J. "Speech at CIRA Luncheon." CIRA Newsletter 23, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 3-8.
In his speech at the Ft. Myer Officer's Club on 3 May 1999, Representative Goss [R-FL] stressed the importance of HUMINT in working against today's intelligence targets.
Gossett, Renée Pierre-. Tr., Nancy Hecksher. Conspiracy in Algiers, 1942-1943. New York: The Nation, 1945.
Woolbert, FA (Oct. 1945), notes that the French journalist author "was in Algiers from the spring of 1941 until after the Allied invasion of North Africa, during which time she was employed by the American Government in various capacities. Her circumstantial story of the negotiations, plots and personalities involved in the North African affair will prove of value to future historians." For Gruin, Saturday Review, 20 Oct. 1945, "Gossett was in a position to observe and understand much more than most Allied newsmen.... She sheds a great deal of light on the details of what actually happened in those cloak-and-dagger months."
Goudsmit, Samuel A. ALSOS. New York: Henry Schuman, 1947. ALSOS: The Failure of German Science. London: Sigma, 1947.
Pforzheimer: The author led the civilians on a joint military-scientific team that went into Germany with the advancing Allied forces on a scientific intelligence mission. The goal was determine what the Germans knew about our atomic bomb and the extent of German progress in producing such a device. The leader of the military side of the team was Boris Pash, whose version (The ALSOS Mission) is regarded by Constantinides as "more operational and intelligence oriented" than Goudsmit's account.
Gough, Barry M. "Lieutenant William Peel, British Naval Intelligence, and the Oregon Crisis." Northern Mariner 4, no. 4 (1994): 1-14.
Gough, Richard. SOE Singapore 1941-1942. London: Kimber, 1985. Singapore: SNP Editions, 1987.
From publisher: "A true story by a veteran of WWII in Singapore."
[UK/WWII/FEPac & Services/SOE
Gould, Jonathan S. "The OSS and the London 'Free Germans.'" Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 1 (2002): 11-29.
The author's father, U.S. Army Lt. Joseph Gould, recruited and trained German OSS agents for the London office of OSS' Secret Intelligence Branch (SI). Here, he tells the story of seven German trade unionists recruited and dispatched into Germany as the war was drawing to a close. The agents came from the ranks of the Free Germany Committee of Great Britain. It appears that the agents were sent to him after vetting through Soviet intelligence with the famous Sonya (Ursula Kucznski, aka Ruth Werner) as intermediary.
Goulden, Joseph C.
Goulter, Christina. "The Role of Intelligence in Coastal Command's Anti-Shipping Campaign, 1940-45." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 84-109.
This article surveys the role of intelligence in the RAF's effort against German merchant shipping. In contrast to the anti-submarine war, the anti-shipping offensive relied less on signals intelligence and "more upon intelligence derived from photographic reconnaissance and agents in the Occupied Countries." However, Enigma intercepts were particularly important in assessing the battle damage resulting from Coastal Command's attacks.
Goulter-Zervoudakis, Christina. "The Politicization of Intelligence: The British Experience in Greece, 1941-1944." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 1 (Spring 1998): 165-194.
From "Abstract": Because "a large portion of the intelligence effort had to be devoted to gathering political intelligence,... SOE operatives became embroiled in the internecine struggles between communist based and other resistance groups. Intelligence work was made even more difficult by inter- and intra-departmental rivalries, and tensions among the Allies involved in Greece."
Gourley, Robert D. [LCDR/USN] "Intuitive Intelligence." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): 61-75.
In times of crisis, analysts "are expected to do what they have been taught their whole career to avoid; they must make rapid assessments of enemy intentions and well developed projections based on intuition." The author makes some suggestions on how analysts might be better prepared to respond to requirements for instananeous assessments.
Gourley, Robert D. [LCDR/USN] "A War Japan Won with Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 10, no. 3 (Summer 1994): 1-4.
This article addresses the use of "operational intelligence" by Admiral Togo in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905. Gourley argues that the Japanese Navy was supported by "a massive intelligence effort." He also sees a successful integration of intelligence into the battle plan.
Gouzenko, Igor. The Iron Curtain. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1948. Toronto: Dent, 1948. This Was My Choice. 2d ed. Montreal: Palm, 1968.
Clark comment: Gouzenko was a Soviet code clerk who defected in Ottawa in 1945. His revelations of Soviet espionage in Canada caused a significant commotion at the time. See Canada, Royal Commission, The Report of the Royal Commission.... (1946); and Bothwell and Granatstein, The Gouzenko Transcripts (1982). Constantinides reminds us that the Gouzenko "case was an eye-opener on the methods, levels, and quality of Soviet agents, as well as their political and ideological motivations, and was the prelude to subsequent discoveries of other well-placed Soviet spies."
Government Executive. Editors. "State's Intelligence Chief, Ray S. Cline: Intangible Merchandise." 2 (Dec. 1970): 34.
In the course of the 1960s and early 1970s, Ray Cline served successively as Deputy Director of Intelligence at the CIA and Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research at the State Department.
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