Michael S. Goodman


Goodman, Michael S.

1. "Books, Nukes and Spooks: British Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb." Cold War History 4, no. 3 (Apr. 2004): 126-139.

2. "British Intelligence and the Soviet Atomic Bomb, 1945-1950." Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 2 (Jun. 2003): 120-151.

From abstract: "[T]he first Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949 was not accurately predicted by the British. Meanwhile British war planning centred on the year 1957, based -- it was argued -- on strategic forecasts. Yet the impact of recently released intelligence material throws this into question, and instead reveals that the date reflected British war readiness, rather than when British intelligence predicted the Soviet Union would have achieved the nuclear capability to wage a successful war."


Goodman, Michael S.

1. "A Cold War Cover-Up: The Buster Crabb Affair." BBC History Magazine (Feb. 2008), 40-43.

2. "Covering Up Spying in the 'Buster' Crabb Affair." International History Review 30, no. 4 (2008): 768-784.


Goodman, Michael S. "The Dog That Didn't Bark: The Joint Intelligence Committee and the Warning of Aggression." Cold War History. 7, no. 4 (Nov. 2007): 529-51.

From abstract: The subject here is the Nicoll Report -- "a previously classified document written to assess the performance of the British Joint Intelligence Committee in warning about foreign acts of aggression. The Nicoll Report ... provides detail on intelligence estimates for case studies which have not yet been released into the archive"; and "it provides an examination of the JIC's failures and in doing so it is far more candid than the 'open' investigations conducted by Lord Franks and Lord Butler."


Goodman, Michael S. "First World War Spooks." BBC History Magazine 10, no. 12 (Dec. 2009), 39-44.

A special sub-committee of the Committee of Imperial Defence concluded by mid-1909 that Britain needed a secret service to counter what was perceived as an aggressive Germany. In October 1909, the two branches of the Secret Service Bureau (SSB) began operation. The SSB's foreign branch was headed by Sir Mansfield Cumming (C) and the domestic intelligence branch by Vernon Kell (K). "Perhaps the greatest example of their successes [in World War I] is the fact that they, and their agencies, survived."


Goodman, Michael S.

1. "Grandfather of the Hydrogen Bomb? Klaus Fuchs and Anglo-American Intelligence." Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 34, no. 1 (2003): 1-22.

2. "Klaus Fuchs: The Man Who Opened Pandora's Nuclear Box." BBC History Magazine (Feb. 2007), 38-42.

3. "Overview: Sir Michael Perrin's Interviews with Dr. Klaus Fuchs." In Exploring Intelligence Archives: Enquiries into the Secret State, eds. R. Gerald Hughes, Peter Jackson, and Len Scott, 123-132. London and New York: Routledge, 2008.

4. "Santa Klaus? Klaus Fuchs and the Nuclear Weapons Programmes of Britain, the Soviet Union and America." Prospero: The Journal of British Rocketry and Nuclear History 1, no. 1 (Apr. 2004): 47-70.

5. "Who Is Trying to Keep What Secret from Whom and Why? MI5-FBI Relations and the Klaus Fuchs Case." Journal of Cold War Studies 7 (Summer 2005): 124-146.

6. And Chapman Pincher. "Research Note: Attlee, Sillitoe and the Security Aspects of the Fuchs Case." Contemporary British History 19, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 67-78.

From Royal Historical Society Database: "Discussion of a recently released ... and previously classified file relating to the security aspects of the case surrounding the atom spy Klaus Fuchs. The file includes an eight-page memorandum, submitted by the Director-General of MI5, Sir Percy Sillitoe, to the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee."


Goodman, Michael S. "Jones' Paradigm: The How, Why, and Wherefore of Scientific Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 24, no. 2 (Apr. 2009): 236-256.

The reference in the title is, of course, to R.V. Jones. From abstract: "This article sets out the main components of scientific intelligence, seeking to explore how scientific intelligence has been defined, how it operates, and contemplates the key issues involved."


Goodman, Michael S. "Learning to Walk: The Origins of the UK's Joint Intelligence Committee." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 40-56.

The JIC "has endured a troubled past. Yet, despite everything as it passes its 70th birthday, the JIC has never been so important."


Goodman, Michael S. The Official History of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- Volume 1: From the Approach of the Second World War to the Suez Crisis. London: Routledge, 2014.

Peake, Studies 58.4 (Dec. 2014), sees this as "an extensively documented account of the JIC, from its origins as a military subcommittee before WW II to its performance in the Suez Crisis. The level of detail is impressive.... For those interested in the Anglo-American intelligence relationship, this official history will be a valuable source."


Goodman, Michael S. "Research Note: The Daniel Report on UK Atomic Intelligence, 1954." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 3 (Autumn 2003): 154-167.

Discusses and supplies redacted text of the 1954 report of Admiral Sir Charles Daniel on the Directorate of Atomic Energy (Intelligence).


Goodman, Michael S. "Sibling Rivalry: The Birth of the Post-War American Atomic Intelligence Community." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 2 (Summer 2006): 289-301.

Following the failure to anticipate the Soviet test in 1949, "increased emphasis [was] placed on the CIA as the specific body responsible for atomic intelligence, with the AEC acting more as a technical advisor.... Every major subsequent Soviet test was observed." (footnotes omitted)

[CIA/1940s/Gen; OtherAgencies/DOE]

Goodman, Michael S. Spying on the Nuclear Bear: Anglo-American Intelligence and the Soviet Bomb. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007.

Radchenko, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews (Oct. 2008) [http://www.h-net.org], says that this book "offers a close-up look at the operation of British (and to some extent, U. S.) atomic intelligence in the early years of the Cold War.... [It] is full of fascinating details about some ... little-known monitoring programs, which entailed the operation [of] a large number of stations around the world, regular air sampling, radio interception, and a host of other tricks." However, the work "is missing some of the essential analysis which would help us connect the history of British atomic intelligence with the bigger picture of the early years of the Cold War."

For Peake, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010), Goodman's presentation on "the impact of the [Soviet] espionage cases should be assessed with caution," as "Soviet atomic espionage [had been brought] to a halt by the end of the 1940s." However, his contributions on "the technical sources of intelligence are on point." Greenberg, NCWR 62.4 (Autumn 2009), believes that the author "has produced a definitive work,... a landmark effort in its devotion to prodigious research and commitment to truthful inquiry." To Schecter, I&NS 26.4 (Aug. 2011), this is "a deeply researched and thoughtful analysis." However, there is a need for "more and better-organized operational detail."

[GenPostwar/Issues/S&T/From90s; UK/Postwar/Gen]

Goodman, Michael S. "Studying and Teaching About Intelligence: The Approach in the United Kingdom." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 57-65.

"[I]n the United Kingdom the modern intelligence establishment can trace its roots to 1909. As an academic discipline, the subject really only extends to the mid-1970s.... The key events of the early 21st century have already defined intelligence as a new cornerstone of government.... One consequence of this has been the large-scale growth of intelligence study and teaching academically.... Yet a review of teaching practices in the United Kingdom today suggests that intelligence studies is one of those odd disciplines that is comfortable in a variety of academic departments, but perhaps never truly at home in any of them."


Goodman, Michael S. "With A Little Help from My Friends: The Anglo-American Atomic Intelligence Partnership, 1945-1958." Diplomacy and Statecraft 18, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 155-183.


Goodman, Michael S., and Wyn Bowen. "Calming the Crisis: Iran -- The Nuclear Issue." The World Today (Mar. 2008), 22-24.


Goodman, Michael S., and Wyn Bowen. "Nuclear Reaction: The Intelligence on Iran's Nuclear Capabilities." Jane's Intelligence Review (Mar. 2008), 2-5.


Goodman, Michael S., and Sir David Omand. "What Analysts Need to Understand: The King's Intelligence Studies Program." Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 4 (Dec. 2008): 1-12.

The authors discuss the "innovative course" for intelligence analysts created in the Department of War Studies at King's College, London.


Return to Gon-Goq