Goodman, Allan E. "The CIA and the Universities: The Prospects for Improved Relations Have Never Been Better." Chronicle of Higher Education, 25 Nov. 1992, B1-B2.
Goodman, Allan E.
1. "Dateline Langley: Fixing the Intelligence Mess." Foreign Policy 57 (Winter 1984-1985): 160-179.
2. "Reforming U.S. Intelligence." Foreign Policy 67 (Summer 1987): 121-136.
"[T]he intelligence community's performance in the Iran-contra dealings reflects long-standing problems stemming from the intrusion of politics into intelligence collection and analysis as well as alarming defects in the executive and congressional oversight process." The focus here is on both intelligence analysis and covert action activities.
3. "Intelligence and Foreign Policy: Reforming U.S. Intelligence." Current 299 (Jan. 1988): 34-40.
Goodman, Allan E.
1. "Does Covert Action Have a Future?" Parameters 18 (Jun. 1988): 74-88.
The author argues that covert actions should be a function of the Defense Department, not the CIA.
2. "Secret Operations: Does Covert Action Have a Future?" Current 306 (Oct. 1988): 27-30.
Goodman, Allan E. "The Future of US Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 4 (Oct. 1996): 645-656.
Goodman' s theme is that "virtually none of the reforms aimed at preparing the intelligence community for the missions and analytical challenges of the twenty-first century is likely to be adopted." The concern is that, absent fundamental organizational change, "Americans will do what we have always done with intelligence organizations when a war is over: gradually dismantle what remains and leave ourselves vulnerable to the nastiest of surprises."
Goodman, Allan E. "Shifting Paradigms and Shifting Gears: A Perspective on Why There Is No Post-Cold War Intelligence Agenda." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 4 (Oct. 1995): 3-9.
Goodman argues that analysts "need more direct exposure to the national security decision-making process. They need to see how the process actually works and how the policy makers use their products."
Goodman, Allan E., and Bruce D. Berkowitz. "Intelligence Without the Cold War." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 301- 319.
The authors' thesis "is that intelligence after the cold war will best serve US national security by focusing on the relatively few problems where it can make a genuine unique contribution.... [T]he central purpose of intelligence is to warn the President and the National Security Council (NSC) of foreign threats to American interests.... [T]he product should focus on those hard-to-collect and understand problems and issues on which there is both a vital need-to-know what is happening and a high degree of difficulty in finding answers from conventional and open sources.... [F]urther [budget] cuts lie ahead, and ... they can be accomplished by eliminating obsolete programs that were either devoted to monitoring the Soviet Union's power projection capabilities or to collect information on or conduct operations against Warsaw Pact forces.... [O]ne could dismiss all of the analysts and still not reduce spending by more than 10 per cent. To cut intelligence spending significantly, one must reduce spending on technical collections systems." Solutions are offered.
Goodman, Allan E., and Bruce D. Berkowitz.
1. The Need to Know: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Covert Action and American Democracy. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1992. Click for Twentieth Century Fund, The Need to Know...
2. In From the Cold: The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on the Future of U.S. Intelligence: Background Papers. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996.
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