Glees, Anthony. "Evidence-Based Policy or Policy-Based Evidence? Hutton and the Government's Use of Secret Intelligence." Parliamentary Affairs 58, no. 1 (Jan. 2005): 138-155.
Glees, Anthony. "Redefining the Limits of Secret Activity in the United Kingdom." International Journal of Intelligence Ethics 2, no. 2 (Fall 2011): 2-18.
The author examines "the issues of deriving intelligence from detainees with a view to clarifying how the practice of intelligence collection by British personnel is to be placed in a broader ethical context and to consider the implications of current allegations that British intelligence profits from the use of torture on future intelligence gathering by the British intelligence community more generally."
Glees, Anthony. Secrets of the Service: British Intelligence and Communist Subversion, 1939-51. London: Jonathan Cape, 1987. Secrets of the Service: A Story of Soviet Subversion of Western Intelligence. New York: Carrol & Graf, 1987.
Although he believes Glees' writing "is flat and repetitive," Cecil, I&NS 3.2, seems pleased that the author "makes mincemeat of the Wright-Pincher so-called evidence" against Roger Hollis. More broadly, however, Glees is writing in support of "an untenable thesis"; and "in the process he has distorted his evidence."
See Clifton J. Child, "In Defence of 'Tom' Delmer and Dr. Otto John: Notes for the Record," Intelligence and National Security 4, no. 1 (Jan. 1989): 127-136. Child was Chief Political Intelligence Officer with the Political Warfare Executive Special Operations Directorate during World War II. Here, he disputes the suggestion made by Glees that Denis Sefton Delmer was a Communist mole during and after the war.
Glees, Anthony. The Stasi Files: East Germany's Secret Operations against Britain. London: Free Press, 2003.
Maddrell, I&NS 19.3 (Autumn 2004), comments that "[p]oor judgement and relatively weak material make this an unsatisfactory book." The author "makes excessive use of speculation, presumption and unconvincing reasoning.... [H]e does not identify a single British informant with access" to classified information. In addition, "Glees' willingness to make claims about the [British] Security Service's operations, even though he had no access to its records, goes much too far."
In a response, Glees, I&NS 19.3 (Autumn 2004), argues that the reviewer "completely ignored the witness testimony" in the book. "The material ... may not be complete but that does not make it 'weak.' ... [By] ignoring the witness testimony, Meddrell fails to understand that in fact I rely as much on witness testimony as on the evidence in the files."
Peake, Studies 47.4 (2003), notes that the author "considers only HVA (East German foreign intelligence) operations involving British subjects.... This is not an easy book to read and understand. It is awkwardly organized and its analysis is steadfastly mediocre. There is doubt that the conclusions are supported by the evidence and [there is] no way to check" since Glees' "research is based on Stasi files that are no longer available to public examination."
[CIA/90s/98/Stasi/00; Germany/East/Gen; UK/SpyCases/Gen]
1. "The Stasi's UK Operations: Subversion and Espionage, 1973-1989." Journal of Intelligence History 7, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 61-82. [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/7-1.html]
2. "The Stasi and UK-GDR Relations." In The Other Germany: Perceptions and Influence in British-East German Relations, 1945-1990, eds. Stefan Berger and Norman LaPorte, 75-90 Augsburg: Wissner, 2005.
Glees, Anthony. "War Crimes: The Security and Intelligence Dimension." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 242-267.
Glees, Anthony, and Philip H.J. Davies. "Intelligence, Iraq and the Limits of Legislative Accountability during Political Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 848-883.
The authors use the inquiries of the UK's Parliamentary Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) and the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) into the issue of Iraq's possession/nonpossession of weapons of mass destruction to frame their discussion of the impact of political loyalties on the legislative oversight function. They conclude that "[a]s a means to provide reliable, trustworthy and hence legitimate and effective oversight,... the legislature and its committees are limited tools.... Legislative oversight ... needs to be combined with various forms of oversight such as independent, judicial and administrative arrangements."
Gleeson, James. Bloody Sunday: How Michael Collins' Agents Assassinated Britain's Secret Service in Dublin on November 21, 1920. Guilford, CT: Lyons, 2004.
Hopkinson, I&NS 21.4 (Aug. 2006), notes that this book was originally published in 1962 and that the only change "is the inclusion of an enthusiastic and completely uncritical introduction by Dermot McEvoy which reveals no awareness of the enormous developments in knowledge and understanding of the Irish revolutionary period in the last four decades." Nevertheless, Glesson understood just how much "the war was an intelligence conflict" and saw "the events of Bloody Sunday as the critical moment in the intelligence war."
Gleeson, James. They Feared No Evil: The Woman Agents of Britain's Secret Armies, 1939-45. London: Hale, 1976.
Clark comment: Includes profiles of the women who served with SOE in France in World War II. Deborah Van Seters, I&NS 7.4/410, finds Gleeson's language in discussing these women agents to be "hackneyed" and revealing of a "patronizing attitude."
[UK/WWII/SOE; Women/WWII/UK; WWII/Eur/Fr/Resistance]
Return to G Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents