Gates, Robert M. "The ABC's of Spying." New York Times, 14 Mar. 1999. [http://www. nytimes.com]
This Op-Ed by the former DCI argues that "[t]he current furor in Washington over Chinese espionage at Los Alamos offers fresh evidence that finger-pointing and sound bites are a lousy way to protect and advance American security interests.... [B]oth the Clinton Administration and its critics neglect [a reality]: despite the bonhomie of countless summit meetings and press statements, the post-cold-war world is a very tough neighborhood in which nations still cynically and ruthlessly pursue their own interests."
Gates, Robert M. "The Case for Confirming Anthony Lake." Wall Street Journal, 29 Jan. 1997, A10.
Gates, Robert M. "The CIA and American Foreign Policy." Foreign Affairs 66, no. 2 (Winter 1987-1988): 215-230.
This article describes broadly the role of intelligence analysis in the foreign policy process. Gates also addresses some of the issues with regard to "politicized" intelligence.
Gates, Robert M. "The CIA and the University: An Address by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency, before the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, October 10, 1987." Periscope 12, no. 4 (1987): 17-19.
Gates, Robert M. "The C.I.A.'s Little-Known Résumé." New York Times, 29 Oct. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]
In this Op-Ed piece, the former DCI argues that "[t]he C.I.A. has played a prominent, if discreet, role in international negotiations and in monitoring cease-fires and treaty compliance for decades." Examples mentioned include monitoring troop withdrawals following the 1973 Yom Kippur war, participating in arms control delegations, and Gates' own trip to the Indian subcontinent in May 1990 to avert war between Pakistan and India.
Gates acknowledges that there are organizational and other risks associated with the CIA's very visible involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian agreement. Nevertheless, "it seems fitting in this new era of openness that the C.I.A.'s longstanding behind-the-scenes role in helping to wage peace should finally become public alongside its long history in waging covert war."
Gates, Robert M. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.New York: Knopf, 2014.
To Jaffe, Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2014, "Gates takes the reader inside the war-room deliberations of Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama and delivers unsentimental assessments of each man's temperament, intellect and management style."
For Lubold, Foreign Policy, 9 Jan. 2014, Gates' reputation "seems diminished by the scrappy, petty nature of many of his criticisms -- even though some are substantive and legitimate -- and a legacy he seemed quietly determined to protect may be permanently reduced to something less than what it once was."
[Gates, Robert M.] "DCI Robert Gates Featured Speaker at 1992 AFIO Convention." Periscope 17, no. 10 (1992): 1-4.
Text of speech given 14 November 1992 at eighteenth convention of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers in Boston, MA.
Gates, Robert M. From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996.
Selected quotes from the numerous reviews of this important and very readable book are available at reviews of From the Shadows.
Gates, Robert M. "Future Intelligence Challenges." Periscope 13, no. 4 (Fall 1988): 14-19.
Gates, Robert M. "Guarding against Politicization." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 5-13.
Remarks by DCI Gates on 16 March 1992 in the CIA auditorium.
Gates, Robert M. "Intelligence, Democracy and Freedom." Presidential Studies Quarterly 22, no. 2 (Jun. 1992): 231-237.
Gates, Robert M. "In War, Mistakes Happen." New York Times, 12 May 1999. [http:// www.nytimes.com]
The former DCI argues that "there was a system failure as well as mistakes by individuals. The source of all mapping information for United States military targeting is" NIMA, "a joint military and civilian intelligence organization. According to The New York Times, that agency was apparently the source of outdated maps. Then the C.I.A. analysts apparently misidentified the target. And finally, military databases in the United States and NATO used to check the accuracy of such information failed to catch the error.... Americans ... should understand that outdated maps and insufficient personnel are related to 12 years of budget cuts in both the military and intelligence."
Gates, Robert M. "Is the CIA's Analysis Any Good?" Washington Post, 12 Dec. 1984, A25.
Gates, Robert M. "An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House." Washington Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Winter 1989): 35-44.
Gates, Robert M. "The Prediction of Soviet Intentions." Studies in Intelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 1973): 39-46.
The author notes that CIA's analysis of "Soviet political intentions and decisions" has been less on the mark than assessments of military and economic matters. The reasons for this are numerous, and include the changeability of the decisionmakers. There are, however, steps that can be taken "to improve our ability at least to offer the policy maker a more accurate appraisal of the options open to the Soviet leaders in a given situation, and to provide a better estimate of their more likely choices."
Gates, Robert M. "Strengthening Congressional Oversight of Intelligence." National Security Law Report 15, no. 2 (Feb. 1993): 1-5.
Text of speech given 18 February 1993 at meeting organized by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Law and National Security in Washington, DC. Associated coverage of question and answer session published as: National Security Law Report. Editors. "Gates Opposes CIA Role in Industrial Espionage or Active Law Enforcement." 15, no. 2 (Feb. 1993): 1, 5-6.
Gates, Robert M. "Unauthorized Disclosures: Risks, Costs, and Responsibilities." American Intelligence Journal 9, no. 1 (1988): 6-8.
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