Garicano, Luis, and Richard A. Posner. "Intelligence Failures: An Organizational Economics Perspective." Journal of Economic Perspectives 19, no. 4 (Fall 2005): 151-170.
From abstract: "Two recent failures of the United States intelligence system have led to the creation of high-level investigative commissions..... We use insights from organizational economics to analyse the principal organizational issues raised by these commissions."
Garlinski, Jozef. The Enigma War. New York: Scribner's, 1979. Intercept: The Enigma War. London: Dent, 1980.
For Constantinides, this is neither Garlinski's best book nor the best book on the cryptographic aspects of World War II. The author relied too much on secondary sources and was "prone to repeat errors or speculations." Nautical Brass Bibliography calls Garlinski "[a]n excellent narrative story of Enigma, spies, and intelligence from the Polish point of view."
Garlinski, Jozef. Hitler's Last Weapons: The Underground War Against the V1 and V2. London: Friedmann, 1978. New York: Times Books, 1978.
Constantinides sees Garlinski as most concerned with "the contributions of the resistance, especially that of the Poles," to halting German development and deployment of the V weapons.
Garlinski, Jozef. Poland, SOE and the Allies. London: Allen & Unwin, 1969.
Constantinides says that this book gives "a good picture of Polish events and SOE relations to them with a primary focus on Polish personalities and activities in the covert war.... Garlinski's research made use of much material that had not previously been tapped."
Garlinski, Jozef. The Swiss Corridor: Espionage Networks in Switzerland during World War II. London: Dent, 1981.
Rocca and Dziak note Garlinski's argument that "the British fed relevant Enigma production to the Soviets via their Swiss GRU network, the Rote Drei." Aldrich, I&NS 6.1/212-213/fn. 5, refers to Garlinski's work as "[o]ne of the more carefully researched accounts of this period"; however, it "suffers from ignoring the CIA's Rote Kapelle, published in 1979."
Garmon, William T. "The KGB in the United Nations." Military Intelligence 13, no. 3 (1987): 12-13.
Garner, Joe R., with Avrum M. Fine. Code Name: Copperhead; My True-Life Exploits as a Special Forces Soldier. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993.
According to McCombie, Parameters, Autumn 1995, the former sergeant major, gives "a view from ground level" of the "modern Special Forces soldier.... He depicts well the individualism of the early Special Forces era and the willingness of SF soldiers to attempt and usually accomplish arduous, sometimes near-impossible missions." The reviewer concludes that "[t]his book of personal high adventure rings true."
Garnett, David. The Secret History of PWE: The Political Warfare Executive, 1939-1945. London: St. Ermin's, 2002.
Taylor, I&NS 18.3, identifies this as an "'official' history of PWE, produced in 1947 but subsequently buried.... [I]t is an essential addition to the library of any historian of propaganda."
Garofalo, Nicholas R. "Present and Future Capabilities of OTH Radars." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 2 (Spring 1969): 53-61. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]
Garst, Ronald D. A Handbook of Intelligence Analysis. 2d ed. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College, 1989.
Garst, Ronald D., and Max L. Gross. "On Becoming an Intelligence Analyst." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): 47-59.
The authors seek to describe the "set of talents, skills and personal characteristics required of the successful all-source intelligence analyst."
Garthoff, Douglas F. "Analyzing Soviet Politics and Foreign Policy." In Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003.
From "Introduction": The author provides "an account of the Agency's analysis of Soviet politics and foreign policy" and describes "the organizational changes that affected the production of political analysis within CIA during the Cold War.... Garthoff assigns the Agency and the Intelligence Community high grades for political analysis.... At the same time, he is critical of the Agency's cautious or conservative approach in evaluating statements regarding Soviet foreign policy."
As to whether the CIA predicted the Soviet demise, Garthoff "gives the Agency relatively high grades for the quality of its effort.... It may be said of CIA that it did not predict with exactitude that Gorbachev would fall or when he would fall, but it also must be acknowledged that CIA documented many indications of the troubles he encountered (and engendered) and the seriousness of their danger to his political health."
Garthoff, Douglas F. Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, 1946-2005. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005.
According to Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), this "study discusses every DCI.... It focuses on how the DCI interpreted and worked to fulfill his 'community' role. It also examines how his position as head of the CIA influenced his relationship with the other members of the community... This study is historically valuable, especially for those seeking to understand Intelligence Community management."
Richelson, IJI&C 20.2 (2007), notes the relatively brief treatment accorded each of the 19 DCIs covered, leading to some topics being "limited, or even omitted." Similarly, the author's "sourcing is also quite limited." Nonetheless, "Garthoff's book is a valuable contribution to both the history of the U.S. Intelligence Community and the study of the roles played by various" DCIs.
Garthoff, Raymond L.
Garvey, Todd, and Edward C. Liu. The State Secrets Privilege: Preventing the Disclosure of Sensitive National Security Information During Civil Litigation. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 16 Aug. 2011. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/secrecy/R41741.pdf.
From "Summary": "This report is intended to present an overview of the protections afforded by the state secrets privilege; a discussion of some of the many unresolved issues associated with the privilege; and a selection of high-profile examples of how the privilege has been applied in practice."
Garvin, Glenn. Everybody Had His Own Gringo: The CIA and the Contras. Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1992.
Polk, WPNWE, 25-31 May 1992, says that "Garvin has it just about right": that the fumbling by the Reagan administration of its support to the contras "was a continuation of how American policy toward Nicaragua has always been run."
Garwin, Richard L. "Keeping Enemy Missiles at Bay." New York Times, 28 Jul. 1998. [http://www.nytimes.com]
A Rumsfeld Commission member expresses concern "that some have interpreted our findings as providing support for a new national missile defense system.... [T]here is no reason that the national missile defense advocated by some in Congress should be built now. No defensive system under consideration can neutralize the threats [identified in the Commission's report]. The defense that is now being developed would not even detect, let alone counter, ship-launched short-range missiles. Nor could the proposed defense work against ICBM's that employ simple countermeasures."
1. American Shadow: The Real Case Against the CIA. Stafford, VA: Dan River Press, 1980.
2. Under Cover: Thirty-five Years of CIA Deception. New York: Grove,1985.
NameBase identifies this as a revision of Garwood's American Shadow. "This new version is better, and two of its best features are the introduction (36 pages) and chronology (9 pages) by Tom Gervasi. Sandwiched between these is Garwood's research and reporting on over a dozen epochs [?] in CIA history. Over half involve foreign exploits and the others concern domestic issues. It is not exhaustive by any means, but is highly readable and ... an excellent introduction to the field....
"Garwood is one of the only writers to deal with the 1955 attempt on Zhou En-lai. 'The strongest possible circumstantial evidence, overwhelming in the light of subsequent discoveries, later left no room for doubt that the agency, working through the Chinese Nationalists, had used a time bomb to blow up and send crashing into the Pacific the Air India passenger plane on which Zhou was scheduled to fly to the Bandung Conference.' Part of this evidence is a memoir ... by John Discoe Smith, published after he defected to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. In it Smith claims that he was instructed to deliver a package to a KMT agent, which he later discovered had contained the time bomb."
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