Fuo - Fz

 

Furer, Julius A. "The Pearl Harbor Attack." In Administration of the Navy Department in World War II, 87-102. Washington, DC: GPO, 1959. [Petersen]

[WWII/PearlHarbor]

Furlong, Patrick. "Allies at War? Britain and the 'South African Front' in the Second World War." Suid-Afrikaanse Historiese Joernaal: South African Historical Journal 54 (2005): 16-29.

[UK/WWII/Africa]

Furnas, Wendell J. [CAPT/USN (Ret.) "From JICPOA to Guam: Hitchhiking with the Marines." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 13, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 1-3.

Furnas was a Navy Japanese Language Officer who landed with Third Marine Division on Guam in June 1944. The mission was to interrogate prisoners and translate documents; collect high priority documents, equipment, and prisoners for immediate dispatch back to JICPOA and FRUPAK; and ship back other captured documents and equipment of longer-term interest.

[WWII/Services/Navy][c]

Furnas, Wendall J. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "The 'Negative' Side of Intelligence: DIO 12 ND in the 1950s." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Oct. 1999): 11-13.

Investigations as a District Intelligence Officer (DIO) in Northern California and Nevada in the 1950s.

[MI/Navy/To90s]

Furse, George A. Information in War: Its Acquisition and Transmission. London: Clowes, 1895.

[Overviews/Gen/To89]

Fursenko, Alexander, and Timothy Naftali. Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary. New York: Norton, 2006.

Dobbs, Washington Post, 1 Feb. 2007, notes that this work "is the latest example of a literary collaboration that became possible only with the collapse of the Soviet Union.... But there are pitfalls ... in gaining access to closed archives, and they are clearly on display" in this book. Although the authors "have unearthed many interesting details about the Soviet side of the Cold War," the book is "marred by sloppy research, including mistranslations of Russian documents. The errors are so numerous that it becomes difficult to have much confidence in the authors' uncheckable citations from Soviet archival documents that remain closed to other scholars."

[GenPostwar/CW; Russia/CW]

Fursenko, Alexander, and Timothy Naftali.

1. "Soviet Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 64-87.

"Soviet intelligence contributed to the disappointments of 1962.... [Both the KGB and GRU] failed to provide the Kremlin with sufficient warning of President John F. Kennedy's intentions toward Cuba in the months preceding October 1962. Later, during the missile crisis itself, Soviet intelligence proved incapable of providing precise reports of the activities of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm)."

2. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1958-1964. New York: Norton, 1997.

Szulc, Washington Post Book Week, 29 Jun. 1997, and Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 14 Jul. 1997, faults the authors for failing "to make some sense of the extraordinary materials they have secured from Soviet archives." Fursenko and Naftali "demonstrate an appalling ignorance of the Cuban revolutionary process, and this, in turn, distorts their narration of the 1962 events." However, "One Hell of a Gamble is a useful study in that it reveals the enormous dangers of basing policies on wishful thinking and of profoundly misunderstanding other cultures and other intelligence systems."

For Bates, NIPQ 14.2, One Hell of a Gamble is "a fascinating revelation [of] what the adversaries in Moscow, Washington, and Havana knew and when they knew it." Miner, FA 76.4, views this work as "perhaps the most comprehensive narrative of the perilous moment yet to appear.... One of the study's more significant findings concerns the limitations of intelligence" -- on both sides.

Chapman, IJI&C 11.2, is not totally enthralled with One Hell of a Gamble. For him, the book's "treatment of the Cuban revolution and the Bay of Pigs leaves much to be desired, and sorely disappoints. The research done by the authors appears to be a rehash of the fancied fiction we've been reading for the past forty years." The reviewer notes that the book "covers the Cuban missile crisis in detail, presenting lots of new, interesting information." Nevertheless, the "presumption should be that there is a slant to the Soviet archives, much as would be expected of anything coming out of Whitehall or the White House." Chapman finds that the authors' resurrection of a right-wing plot by Texas oilmen to kill President Kennedy only serves to "seriously weaken[] an otherwise most useful book."

To Powers, London Review of Books (13 Nov. 1997) and Intelligence Wars (2004), 171-184, this work "is an unusually comprehensive and rich account of the inner workings of the Soviet government during a moment of crisis."

3. "Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis." Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 58-62.

"The KGB documents substantiate claims that for the Kremlin the Scali-Feklisov [alias Fomin] meetings were a sideshow that played no part in the U.S.-Soviet endgame of October 26-28 [1962]."

[CIA/60s/BoP; GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis]

Furst, Alan. "Autumn Deceptions." Intelligence Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1986): 4-5.

Petersen: "Application of intelligence deception precepts in professional football."

[WhatIsIntel?]

Furst, Alan. "The Listeners of World War II." Intelligence Quarterly 3, no. 1 (1987): 1.

Bainbridge Island, WA, was a Naval Security Group listening post and training center for most of World War II and Korea.

[WWII/Services/Navy]

Fury, Dalton [Pseud.]. Kill Bin Laden: A Delta Force Commander's Account of the Hunt for the World's Most Wanted Man. New York: St. Martin's, 2008.

Morgan, Parameters 39.2 (Summer 2009), says that this "book is engaging, a well-written and readable 'page turner,'" that also has "strong research.... The entire book is poignant and compelling. Fury and his team are a real band of brothers-in-arms." The "fast-paced description of the battle and realistic portrayal of the allied Afghan warlords General Hazret Ali and Haji Zaman Ghamshareek are additional virtues of the book. Finally, the candid discussion of the operational failures and poor interoperability of American forces will make the volume a valuable contribution to lessons learned."

[MI/Ops/00s/Afgh/Books & SpecOps/00s]

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953. Rev. ed. Office of Air Force History. Washington, DC: GPO, 1983.

Petersen: "Extensive coverage of intelligence matters."

[GenPostwar/50s/Korea]

Futrell, Robert F. The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia: The Advisory Years to 1965. Office of Air Force History. Washington, DC: GPO, 1981. Available at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/49985453/Advisory-Years-to-1965.

[MI/AF/To89; Vietnam/Gen]

Futterman, Stanley N. "Toward Legislative Control of the CIA." New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 4, no. 3 (Winter 1971): 431-458.

[Oversight/To90s]

Fysh, Michael, Q.C., ed. The Spycatcher Cases. UK: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989.

Return to F Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents