Franchetti, Mark. "Agent Reveals Young Putin's Spy Disaster." Sunday Times (London), 19 Mar. 2000. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
Klaus Zuchold, a Stasi agent recruited by Vladimir Putin, has told The Sunday Times that "he and Putin had met secretly several times between 1985 and 1990, when both were posted in Dresden." Zuchold turned himself in to German intelligence soon after reunification, "supplied the Germans with a detailed description of Putin," and "revealed the names of four former East German policemen who had spied for the KGB for years."
Franchetti, Mark. "Spymasters Vie For Kremlin: Yeltsin's Courtiers Fight to Keep Power." Sunday Times (London), 15 Aug. 1999. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
"'Putin is tough, decisive and never thinks twice about carrying out orders,' said one senior former intelligence officer. 'You can be sure that he will use all his KGB contacts to dig up as much dirt on Yeltsin's opponents as possible. If he fails, Yeltsin will just sack him.'"
Franchetti, Mark. "Spy Tells how Putin Blew It as KGB Rookie." Sunday Times (London), 11 Mar. 2001. [http://www.sunday-times.co.uk]
"A former KGB agent controlled by Vladimir Putin in the former East Germany during the mid-1980s has spoken for the first time about the Russian president's work as a young spy. He was so exasperated by Putin's inexperience that he almost left the agency. 'Agent M', a former East German criminal police inspector who specialised in undercover work, had been with the KGB for 10 years when he first met Putin in 1985 at a flat in Dresden. His first impressions were far from favourable."
Franck, Thomas M., and Edward Weisband. Foreign Policy by Congress. New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.
See especially Chapter 5, "Congress Tames the Intelligence Community," for an early view of the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
Franco, Arnold Clement, as told to Paula Aselin Spellman. Code to Victory: Coming of Age in World War II. Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1998.
White, IJI&C 12.2, notes that the author was "a cryptanalyst with the (Morse Code) Detachment A of 3rd Radio Squadron Mobile (G) [German]. This unit operated as an intercept and intelligence service working on German Luftwaffe voice and wireless telegraph (W/T) communications." According to Kruh, Cryptologia 24.1, the 3rd RSM was assigned to the 9th Air Force. The author "describes his work" and produces "a fascinating volume of reminiscences that evokes the realities of war."
Franco, Alberto. "Victor Reynolds: Our Man in Estremoz." British Historical Society of Portugal Annual Report 31 (2004): 12-21.
Francona, Rick. Ally to Adversary: An Eyewitness Account of Iraq's Fall from Grace. Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute Press, 1999.
According to Loeb, "Back Channels," Washington Post, 13 Nov. 2000, 25, Francona was a member of the CIA team that rescued the family of former Iraqi nuclear weapons scientist Khidhir Hamza from northern Iraq in 1995. Jonkers, AFIO WIN 34-99 (27 Aug. 1999), comments that Francona writes in a forthright and very readable fashion, weaving in anecdotes with policy perspectives and situation descriptions. His book contributes to understanding a recent past that is relevant to the present and future. Highly recommended reading." Clark comment: Francona has a Website at http://www.francona.com.
Frank, Charles [Sir]. Operation Epsilon: The Farm Hall Transcripts. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993.
Surveillant 3.2/3: These are "long-classified transcripts of secretly taped conversations among key German nuclear physicists." See also, Bernstein, Hitler's Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall (1995).
Frank, Diane. "Super-Secret NSA Transitioning to Commercial Services Model." Federal Computer Week, 21 Oct. 1999. [http://www.fcw.com]
Mike Jacobs, NSA deputy director of information systems, told the National Information Systems Security Conference on 20 October 1999 that the agency "is breaking away from its traditional role of building 'black boxes' for encrypting highly classified information" in favor of offering "security assessment, testing, red teams and diagnostics services to other Defense and civilian agencies."
According to Defense Information and Electronics Report, "NSA To Spend More on R&D to Protect Future Networks," 22 October 1999, 1, Jacobs also told the conference that NSA "has significantly increased its spending on research and development projects aimed at protecting the nation's critical information infrastructures."
Frank, Forrest. "JIOC and Beyond: An NMIA Interview with LTG Michael Maples, USA." American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 71-74.
This interview with the DIA Director took place in September 2006. The "subject was the emergence and development of the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs)."
Frank, Larry J. "The United States Navy v. the Chicago Tribune." The Historian 41 (Feb. 1980): 284-303.
Frank, Mitch. "4 Dots American Intelligence Failed to Connect." Time, 26 Apr. 2004, 30-31.
Ramzi Yousef/al-Qaeda conspiracy in Manila to blow up airplanes; meeting in Malaysia between two 9/11 hijackers; Phoenix agent Kenneth Williams' memo to the FBI; Zacarias Moussaoui flight training.
Frank, Richard B. "Why Truman Dropped the Bomb." Weekly Standard, 8 Aug. 2005. [http://www.weeklystandard.com]
"Revisionists" or "critics" (the author's preferred label) "divide over what prompted the decision to drop the bombs in spite of [what they argue was] the impending surrender [of Japan], with the most provocative arguments focusing on Washington's desire to intimidate the Kremlin.... [H]owever, a sheaf of new archival discoveries and publications has expanded our understanding of the events of August 1945....
"By far the most important single body of this new evidence consists of secret radio intelligence material, and what it highlights is the painful dilemma faced by Truman and his administration. In explaining their decisions to the public, they deliberately forfeited their best evidence" in accordance with "the stringent security restrictions guarding radio intercepts....
"The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion.... Intercepts [also] demonstrated that the Japanese had correctly anticipated precisely where U.S. forces intended to land on Southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic).... [In addition, f]rom mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four.... [The new] evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable."
Frank, Tibor. From Habsburg Agent to Victorian Scholar: G.G. Zerffi, 1820-1892. Highland Lakes, NJ: Atlantic Research and Publications, 2000.
Pastor, I&NS 17.3, notes that the author's "meticulously researched work" shows that "Zerffi worked for the secret service of Austrian Interior Minister Alexander von Bach for 15 years." Despite the quality of Frank's efforts, the work fails to provide sufficient historical background and, therefore, "is best appreciated by the specialist."
Frank, Willard C. "Politico-Military Deception at Sea in the Spanish Civil War, 1936-39." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 3 (Jul. 1990): 84-112.
In a contest with the two sides roughly balanced in fighting power, "[s]upply was the key to victory, and most of it had to come by sea." The focus here is on two aspects of deception: "(1) deception and maritime arms traffic and (2) clandestine naval intervention." The author finds that "German deception was the most successful of all, both in the supply effort and in clandestine submarine warfare, the result of favorable conditions, intense care and good luck."
[Germany/Interwar; OtherCountries/Italy/Interwar; Russia/Interwar; OtherCountries/Spain/CivilWar][c]
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