Ford, Kirk, Jr. OSS and the Yugoslav Resistance, 1943-1945. College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1992.
Surveillant 2.6 says that the author uses "recently declassified operational records of the OSS.... Ford corresponded with and interviewed hundreds of ex-OSS officers.... [His] findings challenge the frequent portrayals of Tito as Yugoslavia's 'liberator' and Mihailovich as an Axis collaborator." According to Welles, WIR 13.1, Ford "covers the well-known division and indeed rivalry between the United States and Great Britain that existed on the question of the roles irregular forces of each nation played." This account is "helpful in understanding present-day conflict in Croatia, Serbia, and, of course, Bosnia."
A reviewer for AIJ 14.1 comments that for "intelligence and policy advisers a study of regional Balkan history ... is topical as an input to addressing core issues, and within that context, Professor Ford's book is highly recommended." Anderson, I&NS 9.3, calls this book the "most detailed and extensively researched account to date." It presents a "fair and balanced treatment of the internal conflict."
Ford, Peter. "Friction Over 'Friendly' Spying." Christian Science Monitor, 3 Sep. 1999, 1. "What's a Little Spying between Friends?" 6 Sep 1999. [http://www.nandotimes.com]
"As details emerge of US intelligence agencies eavesdropping on the e-mail, faxes, and phone calls of European businesses, politicians [in Europe] are calling for better ways to safeguard industrial secrets. The most contentious source of trenchcoat contretemps among transatlantic allies: Internet encryption."
Ford, Roger. Fire From the Forest: The SAS Brigade in France, 1944. London: Cassell, 2003. 2004. [pb]
From publisher: "This is a comprehensive account of the behind-the-lines operations that preceded and supported the D-Day landings and the breakout from Normandy.... [T]his is the story of how small teams of SAS men fought their secret war behind enemy lines."
Ford, Roger. Steel From The Sky: The Jedburgh Raiders, France 1944. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.
According to Peake, Studies 49.1 (2005), the author tells "the stories of many of the [Jedburgh] teams in the field[;]... describes how they evolved organizationally[;]... recounts the seemingly endless ... bureaucratic struggles for power within SOE, the inter-allied battles with the French and OSS over responsibilities, and the team training programs and equipment that had to be developed from scratch.... Unfortunately, he does not provide source notes; however, he does mention some sources in the narrative that check out well."
Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), adds that "Ford has relatively short descriptions about many teams," and reiterates that the author's "failure to include source notes reduces the scholarly value of his otherwise impressive contribution."
Ford, Ronnie E.
1. "Intelligence and the Significance of Khe Sanh." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 1 (Jan. 1995): 144-169.
"Khe Sanh's significance lies not in its role as a military victory or defeat, but as a stepping stone for a larger Communist plan to defeat the Americans. This plan incorporated a combined political-military- diplomatic strategy that targeted waning American political will."
The author sees Khe Sanh as a test. The United States ultimately failed that test, despite a significant military victory. That failure led to the North Vietnamese decision to launch the Tet offensive -- because the United States showed it would not launch a ground attack into the North. At the same time, Khe Sanh led to the military failure of the Tet offensive -- because it prevented the North Vietnamese from reinforcing its troops in the South.
"Ironically, various US intelligence agencies collected the information proving all aspects and objectives of the North's plan. But the Americans lacked the ability to fuse their information and garner an understanding of the strategic intent Hanoi planned with its activities." Thus, the surprise of the Tet offensive -- not its achievements -- shook American resolve and gave the North Vietnamese the "decisive victory" (negotiations) that it was seeking. An abbreviated version of this article is carried in American Intelligence Journal 16, no. 2/3 (Autumn-Winter 1995): 63-68.
2. Tet 1968: Understanding the Surprise. London: Frank Cass, 1995.
Carland, I&NS 11.3, finds "much of interest" in Ford's book, including his demonstration that significant differences existed among decision-makers in Hanoi and between those decision-makers and "principal players" in the South. Ford concludes that these differences "considerably compromised" the impact of their plan. Ford also concludes that the U.S. military was not surprised by the Tet offensive per se but, rather, by its "actual scale and level of coordination." The cause of the surprise was "a lack of hierarchy which left no one person or agency clearly in charge." Despite some problems with editing and sourcing, this is "an important book" for those interesting in understanding what and why things happened in the 1968 Tet Offensive.
3. "Tet Revisited: The Strategy of the Communist Vietnamese." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 242-286.
Ford, Sarah. One Up: A Woman in Action with the SAS. London: HarperCollins, 1997. New York: HarperCollins, 1997. [pb]
According to CASIS Intelligence Newsletter 31/28, this autobiographical book describes the author's "two years as a member of the 14 Intelligence Company of the British Special Air Service (SAS)." The unit, formed in 1974, "provide[s] surveillance in the most hostile parts of Northern Ireland." West, History 26.1, notes that this book is written by the first woman member of this "extraordinarily secretive" unit. The organization "mounts highly sophisticated surveillance operations." See also, James Rennie, The Operators (1997).
[UK/Postwar/IRA & SAS; Women/Misc/SAS]
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