Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Early Development of Communications Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 99-114.
Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Early Development of Communications Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 99-114.
The author traces the development of radio intercept and codebreaking in World War I. "There is a certain irony in the fact that at the very time when the Russians in the east were exposing themnselves by clumsy use of radio so disasterously that the course of the Battle of Tannenberg wrecked their entire blitz campaign, the Germans in the west should be making the same mistake with the same result.... In the east, it was the Battle of Tannenberg; in the west it was the Battle of the Marne."
[Germany/WWI; WWI/Other/Gen]
Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Lost Keys to El Alamein." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 73-80.
This account is "[e]xcerpted from ... War Secrets in the Ether." It can "be presumed to exaggerate the importance to Rommel of the intercepted messages it cites; but that they were of some importance is attested in other sources." (p. 73/fn.1)
[UK/WWII/NAfME; WWII/Eur/Ger]
Flicke, Wilhelm
F. War Secrets in the Ether. 2 vols. Vol. I (parts 1 & 2): to
World War II; Vol. II (Part 3): World War II. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Books,
1977. Reprinted as 1 vol., 1994.
Denkler, Cryptolog 15.1, notes that "Flicke joined the German [signals intelligence] service at the beginning of World War I and remained through World War II.... Perhaps the most fascinating part[] is his description of the role of the service in counterintelligence operations in World War II."
According to McGinnis, Cryptolog 16.2, "Flicke gives a good account of German failures in the COMINT field during WWI, as well as their successes, such as the Battle of Tannenberg.... Flicke spent much of WWII dealing with agent and partisan communications networks operating within Germany or German occupied territories.... They did locate many of the agent transmitters.... There were so many of the transmitters, and enemy agents, that the flow of intelligence from within German territory to the Allied powers was not greatly interrupted. This is a landmark publication which deserves to be read by any serious student of COMINT.... The work has many defects, and is shallow reading in many parts, but the defects are frequently overshadowed by the author's remarks about how things should have been. He is clearly a proponent of centralized control of intelligence by a single body."
White, IJI&C 7.3, says that Flicke's "accounts of the radio intercept role in the famous engagements of both wars are fascinating." Pforzheimer finds some instances "where Flicke's memory is incorrect or his information is incomplete." Constantinides agrees, commenting that "there are enough instances of error or incomplete information to warn that not everything Flicke says is automatically authoritative."
Peake, AIJ 15.1/90, sees Flicke's work as "an informative overview," but adds that "the absence of sources and the availability of much more recent material greatly limits its utility."
Reviewing the one volume edition (1994), Surveillant 4.1 notes that "Flicke tells the story of German successes in reading the secret codes of both enemies and friends. Historians have long pondered how General Rommel knew in advance th[e] moves of the British army in North Africa. Flicke reveals the reason: the Germans had broken the U.S. secret code between Cairo and Washington."
See also, Richard N. Armstrong and John M. Denkler.
[Germany/WWI; WWII/Eur/Ger]
Flink, John [LTJG/USNR]. "Intelligence Engagement in Africa." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 20-21.
"Intelligence is part of the comprehensive package of military specialties being taken to the continent in the run-up to next year's full-fledged debut of United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM, a new combatant command that achieved interim operating status in Stuttgart in October" 2007.
[MI/Navy/00s]
Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record -- Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981. London: Murray, 1987. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.
Heather, I&NS 4.2, notes the extraordinary longevity of Flower as founder and head of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), serving under prime ministers from Winston Field to Robert Mugabe. The author "certainly does not 'tell all' in his book.... Overall, however, Mr. Flower appears quite candid about the activities of CIO in both its successes and failures."
[OtherCountries/Zimbabwe]
Floyd, Dale E. "U.S. Army Officers in Europe, 1815-61." In Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy, 1977, 26-30. Charleston, SC: The Citadel, 1979.
[MI/Attaches]
Flynn, John T.
Flynn was a conservative journalist and a leader in the pre-World War II America First movement. In the two pamphlets listed below, "Flynn accused [President] Roosevelt of pursuing policies against Japan throughout 1941 that could only lead to war." Zimmerman, I&NS 17.2/127.
1. The Truth about Pearl Harbor. New York: J.T. Flynn, 1944.
2. The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. New York: J.T. Flynn, 1945.
[WWII/PearlHarbor]
Flynn, Michael [LTCOL/USA]. "Intelligence Must Drive Operations: How Intelligence Can Clear the Fog of War." Military Intelligence 26, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2000).
[MI/Army/00s]
Flynn, Richard. "Estimating Soviet Gold Production." Studies in Intelligence 19, no. 3 (Fall 1975): 11-22.
"Intelligence methods used to estimate gold production in the USSR are highlighted by a new methodology developed to estimate the capacity of the Muruntau, the largest gold plant in the world." (footnote omitted)
[Analysis/Sov]
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