Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Early Development of Communications Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 1 (Winter 1959): 99-114.
The author traces the development of radio intercept and codebreaking in World War I. "There is a certain irony in the fact that at the very time when the Russians in the east were exposing themselves by clumsy use of radio so disasterously that the course of the Battle of Tannenberg wrecked their entire blitz campaign, the Germans in the west should be making the same mistake with the same result.... In the east, it was the Battle of Tannenberg; in the west it was the Battle of the Marne."
On Tannenberg, see also, Richard N. Armstrong, "Tactical Triumph at Tannenberg," Military History 14, no. 3 (Aug. 1997): 58-64, 80; and John M. Denkler, "Tannenberg," Cryptolog 15, no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 3, 17-18.
Flicke, Wilhelm F. "The Lost Keys to El Alamein." Studies in Intelligence 3, no. 4 (Fall 1959): 73-80.
This account is "[e]xcerpted from ... War Secrets in the Ether." It can "be presumed to exaggerate the importance to Rommel of the intercepted messages it cites; but that they were of some importance is attested in other sources." (p. 73/fn.1)
Flicke, Wilhelm F. War Secrets in the Ether. 2 vols. Vol. I (parts 1 & 2): to World War II; Vol. II (Part 3): World War II. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Books, 1977. Reprinted as 1 vol., 1994.
Denkler, Cryptolog 15.1, notes that "Flicke joined the German [signals intelligence] service at the beginning of World War I and remained through World War II.... Perhaps the most fascinating part is his description of the role of the service in counterintelligence operations in World War II."
According to McGinnis, Cryptolog 16.2, "Flicke gives a good account of German failures in the COMINT field during WWI, as well as their successes, such as the Battle of Tannenberg.... Flicke spent much of WWII dealing with agent and partisan communications networks operating within Germany or German occupied territories.... They did locate many of the agent transmitters.... There were so many of the transmitters, and enemy agents, that the flow of intelligence from within German territory to the Allied powers was not greatly interrupted. This is a landmark publication which deserves to be read by any serious student of COMINT.... The work has many defects, and is shallow reading in many parts, but the defects are frequently overshadowed by the author's remarks about how things should have been. He is clearly a proponent of centralized control of intelligence by a single body."
White, IJI&C 7.3, says that Flicke's "accounts of the radio intercept role in the famous engagements of both wars are fascinating." However, Pforzheimer finds some instances "where Flicke's memory is incorrect or his information is incomplete." As does Constantinides, who comments that "there are enough instances of error or incomplete information to warn that not everything Flicke says is automatically authoritative." Peake, AIJ 15.1/90, sees Flicke's work as "an informative overview," but adds that "the absence of sources and the availability of much more recent material greatly limits its utility."
Reviewing the one volume edition (1994), Surveillant 4.1 notes that "Flicke tells the story of German successes in reading the secret codes of both enemies and friends. Historians have long pondered how General Rommel knew in advance th[e] moves of the British army in North Africa. Flicke reveals the reason: the Germans had broken the U.S. secret code between Cairo and Washington."
[Germany/Interwar & WWI; WWII/Eur/Ger]
Flink, John [LTJG/USNR]. "Intelligence Engagement in Africa." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Jan. 2008): 20-21.
"Intelligence is part of the comprehensive package of military specialties being taken to the continent in the run-up to next year's full-fledged debut of United States Africa Command, or AFRICOM, a new combatant command that achieved interim operating status in Stuttgart in October" 2007.
Flory, Harriette. "The Arcos Raid and the Rupture of Anglo-Soviet Relations, 1927." Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 4 (1977): 707-723.
Flower, Ken. Serving Secretly: An Intelligence Chief on Record -- Rhodesia into Zimbabwe, 1964 to 1981. London: Murray, 1987. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988.
Heather, I&NS 4.2, notes the extraordinary longevity of Flower as founder and head of Rhodesia/Zimbabwe's Central Intelligence Organization (CIO), serving under prime ministers from Winston Field to Robert Mugabe. The author "certainly does not 'tell all' in his book.... Overall, however, Mr. Flower appears quite candid about the activities of CIO in both its successes and failures."
Flowers, Thomas H.
1. "Colossus." In Colossus: The Secret of Bletchley Park's Codebreaking Computers, eds. B. Jack Copeland, et al., 91-100. Copeland, B. Jack, et al. Colossus: The Secret of Bletchley Park's Codebreaking ComputersOxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
2. "D Day at Bletchley Park." In Colossus: The Secret of Bletchley Park's Codebreaking Computers, eds. B. Jack Copeland, et al., 78-83. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
Floyd, Dale E. "U.S. Army Officers in Europe, 1815-61." In Proceedings of the Citadel Conference on War and Diplomacy, 1977, 26-30. Charleston, SC: The Citadel, 1979.
Floyd, William F., Jr. "The Work of British Code Breakers at Bletchley Park during World War II Foiled the German U-Boat Threat." Military Heritage 16, no. 6 (May 2015): 16-19, 70.
The capture of an Enigma machine from U-110 and the code breaking work on Alan Turing's "bombes" at Bletchley Park.
Flynn, John T.
Flynn was a conservative journalist and a leader in the pre-World War II America First movement. In the two pamphlets listed below, "Flynn accused [President] Roosevelt of pursuing policies against Japan throughout 1941 that could only lead to war." Zimmerman, I&NS 17.2/127.
1. The Truth about Pearl Harbor. New York: J.T. Flynn, 1944.
2. The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor. New York: J.T. Flynn, 1945.
Flynn, Michael [LTCOL/USA]. "Intelligence Must Drive Operations: How Intelligence Can Clear the Fog of War." Military Intelligence 26, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 2000).
Flynn, Michael T. [BGEN/USA], Rich Juergens [COL/USA], and Thomas L. Cantrell [MAJ/USAF]. "Employing ISR: SOF Best Practices." Joint Force Quarterly 50 (Third Quarter 2008): 56-61.
The airstrike that killed Abu Musab al-Zarqawi "was only a fraction of the effort to find and accurately target him.... Airborne ISR was a critical and necessary piece, but it alone was not sufficient to target Zarqawi. Instead, it was focused and directed by a robust all-source intelligence network employing human intelligence (HUMINT), detainee intelligence, and signals intelligence (SIGINT). This collection and intelligence analysis was part of a network of personnel, systems, and mechanisms woven into the daily operations of and directed by a joint special operations task force (JSOTF)."
Flynn, Michael T. [MGEN/USA], Matt Pottinger [CAPT/USMC], and Paul D. Batchelor. Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan. Washington, DC: Center for a New American Security, Jan. 2010. [http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/AfghanIntel_Flynn_Jan2010_code507_voices.pdf]
Richard Allen Greene, Pam Benson, and Mike Mount, "Top Intel Officer Slams Work of U.S. Spies in Afghanistan," CNN, 5 Jan. 2010.
Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn, the top U.S. military intelligence officer in Afghanistan, said in a report published on 4 January 2010 that "U.S. military intelligence officers in Afghanistan spend too much time focusing on enemy groups and tactics and not enough on trying to understand Afghanistan's culture, people and networks." Flynn co-wrote the report for a Washington think tank, the Center for a New American Security.
Walter Pincus, "Coalition Urged to Revamp Intelligence Gathering, Distribution in Afghanistan," Washington Post, 6 Jan. 2010, A8.
See Leo Blanken and Justin Overbaugh, "Looking for Intel? or Looking for Answers? Reforming Military Intelligence for a Counterinsurgency Environment," Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 4 (Aug. 2012): 559-575.
Blanken and Overbaugh caution that implementation of the reforms proposed in the report by Maj. Gen. Michael Flynn and his colleagues (Fixing Intel) "would constitute a poor fit with the realities of the human resources currently available to the military.... [R]ather than focus on reforming the military intelligence system, we would rather place the onus on the political-strategic leadership to provide better guidance to the existing apparatus. More specifically, we note the lack of leadership in identifying coherent grand strategic goals and how operational tasks fit within the military's operational mandate in Afghanistan."
Flynn, Richard. "Estimating Soviet Gold Production." Studies in Intelligence 19, no. 3 (Fall 1975): 11-22.
"Intelligence methods used to estimate gold production in the USSR are highlighted by a new methodology developed to estimate the capacity of the Muruntau, the largest gold plant in the world." (footnote omitted)
Return to F Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents