Fit - Fiz

 

Fitch, Herbert Taylor. Traitors Within: The Story of the Special Branch, New Scotland Yard. Garden City, NY: Doubleday-Doran, 1933. [Wilcox]

[UK/Overviews/Other]

Fitch, Stephen D. "The FBI Library Awareness Program: An Analysis." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 101-111.

Fitzgerald, Dennis D. "Commentary on 'The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office': NRO Leadership Replies." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 2 (2002). [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol46no2/article12.html] National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 45-49. [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

In response to Robert Kohler, "One Officer's Perspective: The Decline of the National Reconnaissance Office," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 2 (2002): 13-20; National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 35-44 [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html], NRO's Deputy Director argues basically that "times are different now." The senior officers "who serve in the NRO today ... work on requirements-driven and cost constrained overhead technical collection systems in an environment characterized by public openness and intense oversight by Congress. In the Peace Dividend era, I believe that they are producing superior intelligence under conditions that Mr. Kohler and his contemporaries never experienced."

[NRO/Kohler-Fitzgerald]

Fitzgerald, Dennis D. "Commentary on Kohler's 'Recapturing What Made the NRO Great: Updated Observations on "The Decline of the NRO."'" National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 59-66. [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

See Robert Kohler, "Recapturing What Made the NRO Great: Updated Observations on 'The Decline of the NRO,'" National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 51-57. [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

The NRO Deputy Director takes particular issue with Kohler's assertion that "the NRO is unwilling to fund programs adequately." Fitzgerald points out that among the results of the 1995 funding crisis was that "[t]he absence of margin and the certainty of cost overruns presented the NRO with a reality of not being able to fund programs adequately. Another result ... was the NRO lost budget autonomy; whenever a program exceeded its funding limits, we had to go back to Congress to get permission to move money from some other program in the NRO to fix the problem."

In addition, "whenever the Intelligence Community (IC) finds itself with a financial crunch, the NRO tends to be the 'piggy bank' of choice.... [I]f CMS [Community Management Staff, now part of the DNI's Office] takes money out of the NRO, there is no visable impact tomorrow when the President looks for his intelligence. However, five years later when a needed satellite capability cannot be delivered, the NRO customers have a problem.... The current funding problem is ... that the NRO does not have the flexibility required to manage its programmatic portfolio effectively."

[NRO/Kohler-Fitzgerald]

Fitzgerald, Dennis D. "Risk Management and National Reconnaissance from the Cold War Up to the Global War on Terrorism." National Reconnaissance: Journal of the Discipline and Practice (2005-U1): 9-18. [A scanned version is available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/journal/index.html]

The NRO Deputy Director stresses that as the NRO "addresses the application of its resources to support the Global War on Terrorism, it is being faced not only with new emerging demands, but also with traditional demands.... However, the long-term fiscal experience has been one where the budgetary environment had been flat or declining."

From its beginning until the end of the Cold War, the NRO's successes and achievements resulted in "a reputation as an organization that was exceptionally successful at pushing the boundaries of technology and that always exceeded requirements.... This reputation and trackrecord was, in no small part, because of the streamlined financial and oversight environment that existed." But that environment changed from about 1990 forward to the aftermath of 9/11.

"Current expectations are that there can be no coverage gaps in overhead intelligence collection capabilities because the military is heavily dependent upon NRO systems and products for planning and operations." This environment "has led the NRO to become increasingly conservative in terms of ensuring continued mission performance at a time when there is also tremendous pressure to move on to the next-generation systems." NRO's "organizational imperative has shifted from advancing technology boundaries to meeting current mission requirements."

[NRO/00s/05]

Fitzgerald, E.M. "Intelligence and Preventive War: Importance of Intelligence Perception as Demonstrated in the Preventive War Concept." British Army Review 45 (Dec. 1973): 70-75. [Marlatt]

[UK/Postwar/Gen]

Fitzgerald, John M. The Impact of Modern Information Technology on the Structure of Military Intelligence at the Tactical Level. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1969. [Petersen]

[MI/Overviews]

FitzGerald, Mary C. "Russian Views on Electronic Signals and Information Warfare." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring/Summer 1994): 81-87.

[Russia/Sigint][c]

Fitzgerald, Michael, and Richard Ned Lebow. "Iraq: The Mother of all Intelligence Failures." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 884-909.

This is a devastating assessment of the Bush administration's decision to invade Iraq. It is, however, difficult not to consider it a polemic, rather than an analysis. Also, the comparison to a Greek tragedy is a little too cute for my taste. That said, however, the authors make too many valid points to be ignored. They state that "[t]he underlying principle of the Bush administration goals in the Middle East and, ironically, the roots of its failure," is found in its "assumption that military force could achieve political goals throughout the region.... [T]he decision to invade Iraq was not a response to any imagined WMD threat.... While the [CIA] is not entirely without fault, blaming it for the failure to find WMD is an oversimplification and a convenient distraction.... The fundamentally flawed nature of the administration's assumptions doomed the occupation to a long list of poor decisions and failed policies which began even before US forces captured Baghdad."

[MI/Ops/Iraq/06]

Fitzgerald, Patrick. "An Incalculable Loss for MI5." New Statesman & Society 7 (10 Jun. 1994): 12-13.

Fitzgerald, Penelope. The Knox Brothers. New York: Coward, McCann, & Geoghegan, 1977. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: Counterpoint, 2000.

According to Kruh, Cryptologia 25.2, this is the biography of the author's father (Edmund) and his three brothers. One of the brothers was Dillwyn "Dilly" Knox who played a major role as a British codebreaker in World War I (Room 40), during the interwar years (Foreign Office) and in World War II (Bletchley Park).

Sexton terms this an "[o]utstanding biography of the four Knox brothers." The author views Dillwyn Knox as "one of the most important cryptanalysts of all time."

[UK/Biogs; UK/WWII/Ultra; WWI/UK]

Fitzgerald, Stephen K. MAGIC and ULTRA in the China-Burma-India Theater. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, 1992.

According to Surveillant 3.2/3, this book concerns the "operational use of MAGIC and ULTRA." The author "concludes that neither ULTRA nor MAGIC were able consistently to fathom Japanese intentions in Burma and that the ultimate importance of MAGIC and ULTRA was to confirm intelligence obtained from other sources."

Kruh, Cryptologia 18.1, notes that this work "is well documented with 274 foornotes and a comprehensive bibliography which provides opportunities for further reading or research."

[WWII/FE/Pac/CBI]

FitzGibbon, Constantine. Secret Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. London: Hart-Davis, MacGibbon, 1976. New York: Stein & Day, 1977.

For Constantinides, this book has "many errors of fact and judgment," and the author "often comments without providing the necessary supporting documentation." Sexton refers to it as a "[w]ell written account of thrice-told tales of espionage."

[Overviews]

FitzGibbon, Constantine. "Spies, Spies, Spies." Encounter 45 (Aug. 1975): 69-75.

Petersen: "Observations on modern intelligence."

[Overviews]

FitzGibbon, Constantine. "'The Ultra Secret': Enigma in the War." Encounter 44 (Mar. 1975): 81-85.

This is a review of Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret.

Sexton sees the article as a "balanced account ... that serves as a needed corrective to popular myths" surrounding the use of Ultra.

[UK/WWII/Ultra]

Fitzsimons, Peter. Nancy Wake: The Inspiring Story of One of the War's Greatest Heroines. London: HarperCollins, 2002.

Nancy Wake-Fiocca ("Andreé") was an Australian national who was living in Marseilles when France fell in June 1940. She joined the Resistance and had to flee France when the escape organization with which she was working was rolled up in March 1943. She parachuted back into France as an SOE liaison with the Maquis in March 1944. Cookridge, Inside SOE, p. 355. See also Nancy Wake, The White Mouse (Melbourne: Macmillan, 1985), and Russell Braddon, Nancy Wake (New York: Norton, 1957).

Peake, Studies 46.4, says that this "is a fine example of the little known roles that women played in the clandestine service during the war."

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE; Women/WWII/UK; WWII/Eur/Fr]

Return to F Table of Contents

Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents