Fis

Fischer, Benjamin B. - A - L

Fischer, Benjamin B. - M - Z

Fischer, Bernd J. "Resistance in Albania during the Second World War: Partisans, Nationalists and the SOE." East European Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1991): 21-47.

[WWII/OSS/Albania]

Fischer, Beth A. "Perception, Intelligence Errors, and the Cuban Missile Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1998): 150-172.

"[T]he accuracy and usefulness of intelligence can only be improved so far. Cognitive and motivational psychology helps us see that there is a performance limit to intelligence assessment. Misperceptions that result from perfectly normal cognitive processes and psychological needs are, for analysts and policy makers alike, a professional hazard."

[GenPostwar/60s/MissileCrisis]

Fischer, David Hackett. Paul Revere's Ride. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Bates, NIPQ 10.4: "There is not a lot of intelligence sources and methods [here], but enough to make it worth your while.... This is an elegant book, both in its story and its presentation.... Revere was not only the Boston leadership's intelligence briefer, but also their early warning system.... [Revere] was far more than a minor figure serving his social superiors as a messenger."

[RevWar/Other]

Fischhoff, Baruch, and Cherie Chauvin, eds. Intelligence Analysis: Behavorial and Social Scientific Foundations. Washington, DC: National Research Council, National Academies Press, 2012.

Manosevitz, Studies 56.4 (Dec. 2012), finds that this work "provides a handy reference to the range of social science work that could be useful for improving analysis.... [I]t represents the state of academic debate on the subject."

[Analysis/T&M]

Fish, Hamilton.

Fish, a former member of the U.S. Congress (R-NY), died in 1991. His memoirs continued the anti-FDR theme established in at least two earlier books.

1. Hamilton Fish: Memoir of an American Patriot. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1992.

Surveillant 2.5: Fish argued that the "U.S. defeat at Pearl Harbor was compounded by the knowledge that it was deliberately provoked by a U.S. President influenced by a Soviet spy in his own government. That spy, we are told, was Harry Dexter White. White, called here a Soviet spy taking direct orders from Moscow, assisted FDR in implementing a covert and treasonous plan to issue a war ultimatum to the Japanese in order to prompt a strike on the U.S."

2. FDR: The Other Side of the Coin -- How We Were Tricked into World War II. New York: Vantage, 1976.

3. Tragic Deception -- FDR and America's Involvement in World War II. Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1983.

[WWII/PearlHarbor]

Fishbein, Warren, and Gregory Treverton.

1. "Making Sense of Transnational Threats." Occasional Papers 3, no. 1. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Oct. 2004.

"Intelligence Community analytic organizations need to institutionalize processes to consider whether and how they might 'have gotten it wrong' to enhance their abilities to anticipate potential threats in highly complex, fast-moving transnational issues, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation. Such processes would involve sustained, collaborative efforts by analysts to question their judgments and underlying assumptions.... For such processes to be effective, significant changes in the cultures and business processes of analytic organizations will be required."

2. "Rethinking 'Alternative Analysis' to Address Transnational Threats." Occasional Papers 3, no. 2. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, The Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, Oct. 2004.

Abridged version of above.

"Understanding complex transnational issues, such as terrorism and weapons proliferation, requires an alternative analysis approach that is more an ongoing organizational process aimed at promoting 'mindfulness' -- continuous wariness of analytic failure -- than a set of tools that analysts are encouraged to employ when needed."

[Analysis/Critiques]

Fishel, Edwin C.

Fishel, Reverdy S. "The Attack on the Liberty: An 'Accident?'" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 345-352.

This article ostensibly deals with Davis Rodman's review in IJI&C 7.4 of Loftus and Aarons' The Secret War Against the Jews. Beyond that, however, Fishel uses the article to restate the case for a planned and deliberate attack by the Israelis on the USS Liberty. Fishel takes strong exception to Rodman's statement that the "most credible" explanation of the attack is that it was an "accident": "In fact, Israel's assault on the Liberty was as accidental as Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor." Fishel calls Loftus and Aarons' book, "a collection of preposterous and demonstrably false theories and allegations. With regard to the Liberty attack, the only significant detail they get right is that it was deliberate."

David Rodman, "Against Fishel: Another Look at the Liberty Incident," International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 73-80. The author expresses and explains his continuing skepticism with regard to "the claim that the Israelis knowingly attacked an American ship."

[GenPostwar/60s/Liberty][c]

Fisher, Dan. "Israeli Space Program Sets Lofty Goals; Security, Industrial Development Are Prime Concerns." Los Angeles Times, 10 Jun. 1985, sec. 4, 1.

[Israel/Space]

Fisher, David. The War Magician. New York: Coward-McCann, 1983. The War Magician: The Man Who Conjured Victory in the Desert. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2004.

Royal Historical Society Database: "Recounts the World War II activities and triumphs of British music-hall illusionist Jasper Maskelyne and his specially trained team, who fought their part of the war with an amazing array of illusions (in North Africa, 1941-43)."

[UK/WWII/NAfME]

Fisher, John. Burgess and Maclean: A New Look at the Foreign Office Spies. London: Hale, 1977.

Fisher, John. Gentleman Spies: Intelligence Agents in the British Empire and Beyond. Stroud: Sutton, 2002.

Foden, Guardian, 9 Aug. 2002, sees this as an "entertaining and well-informed history."

[UK/Interwar/20s]

Fisher, John. "On the Baghdad Road: On the Trail of W.J. Childs. A Study in British Near Eastern Intelligence and Historical Analysis, c.1900-1930.". Archives 24, no. 101 (1999): 53-70.

[UK/Historical & Interwar/Gen]

Fisher, John. SOE Operations in the Balkans: A Guide to the Newly Released Records in the Public Record Office. London : HMSO, 1998.

[UK/RefMats; UK/WWII/Services/SOE; WWII/OSS/RefMats]

Fisher, Louis.

Fisher, Maria Sudekum. "CIA Papers Show Agency Struggled in Korean War." Associated Press, 17 Jun. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 16 June 2010, the CIA "released 1,300 documents," including "900 papers that either had not been made public earlier or contained new information..... The CIA documents were released on a CD-ROM distributed at the Harry S. Truman Library and Museum in Independence [MO] to participants at a two-day conference on the Korean War and were to be made available on the CIA's website. They include intelligence reports, correspondence and National Intelligence Estimates, and foreign media accounts of activity in the region."

"Baptism By Fire: CIA Analysis of the Korean War" (17 Jun. 2010) at http://www.foia.cia.gov: "This collection includes more than 1,300 documents consisting of national estimates, intelligence memo, daily updates, and summaries of foreign media concerning developments on the Korean Peninsula during 1947-1954. The release of this collection ... coincides with the 60th anniversary of the start of the war.... The release of these documents is in conjunction with the conference, 'New Documents and New Histories: Twenty-First Century Perspectives on the Korean War,' co-hosted by the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and the CIA in Independence, Missouri."

{GenPostwar/50s/Korea]

Fishman, Jack. And the Walls Came Tumbling Down. London: Souvenir Press, 1982. London: Pan, 1983. [pb]

From Publisher: "Four months before D-Day the Gestapo captured several members of the French resistance who knew when and where the landings would take place. The Allied high command could not risk them revealing the secret under torture. Instead, British aircraft attacked Amiens prison where the men were held: bombing from very low level, the aircraft broke down the prison walls.... Some 700 prisoners escaped, not just resistance members but thieves, forgers, pimps, prostitutes and murderers. All were hunted by the Gestapo, the SS and the German army -- as well as the Allied spy network that had to spirit the right people to safety."

[WWII/Eur/Fr/Resistance]

Fisk, Charles E. "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute: A Comparison of the Conventional and Bayesian Methods for Intelligence Warning." Studies in Intelligence 16, no. 2 (Spring 1972): 53-62. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 264-273. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

"Although it cannot be said categorically that the Bayesian method excels as a forecasting device, the Sino-Soviet experiment [detailed in the article] indicates that it might provide a means for such an accounting." See companion article: Zlotnick, "Bayes' Theorum for Intelligence Analysis."

[Analysis/T&M & Warning][c]

Fisk, Robert. In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster, and the Price of Neutrality. Brandon, Ireland: A. Deutsch, 1983. Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, 1985. [pb]

Horgan, London Review of Books 5.13 (21 Jul. 1983), sees this book as "both absorbing and provocative."

[OtherCountries/Ireland/WWII; UK/WWII/Overviews]

 

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