Feickert, Andrew.
Feickert, Andrew.
1. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 17 Apr. 2006.
"Proposals to elevate the command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the realignment of civil affairs, psychological operations (psyops) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) functions out from under the control of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)[] ha[ve] raised concerns that SOF is perhaps becoming too focused on immediate versus long-term results."
2. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 Jun. 2007. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf.
"Summary": "Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and the Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. Recent leadership changes, the availability of SOF special mission unit (SMU) forces, and circumstances surrounding a Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) incident in Afghanistan might be issues for congressional consideration."
[MI/SpecOps/00s]
Feifer, George.
"The Berlin Tunnel." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military
History 10, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 63-71.
This effort reads more like an article from True magazine (thereby showing my age) than a serious analysis of the Cold War's Berlin Tunnel episode. For an author who describes CIA Berlin Operations Base Chief William Harvey as engaging in "hyperbole," Feifer seems rather given to the same failing. His evident belief that he needed to pump just a little more zest into an already intriguing scenario diminishes, rather than enhances, his retelling of this well-known story. And overly familiar references to "Big Bill" really do not add a touch of verisimilitude, as Feifer seems to believe.
[CIA/50s/Tunnel][c]
Fein, Geoff. "Navy Stands Up Deep Red Cell to Study Enemy's Ability to Disrupt Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 2 (Apr. 2006): 28.
Interview from Defense Daily (20 Jan. 2006) with David Cattler, deputy assistant director of Naval Intelligence for Intelligence Support and director of Deep Red. "The Navy has established [in June 2005] Deep Red, an intelligence group that will offer a 'devil's advocate' perspective to ensure warfare commanders make more accurate decisions and to examine how adversaries might use available technologies, in non-traditional ways, to disrupt operations."
[MI/Navy/00s]
Feis, Herbert. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: Norton, 1970.
[GenPostwar/CW]
Feis, William B. Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.
From publisher: "In the western theater, Grant was successful despite limited intelligence resources.... In the absence of intelligence data, Grant's initiative, determination, and drive carried him to success. In the East, however, to overcome Lee's advantages of strategic and operational mobility coupled with his own initiative, Grant had to adapt and became more reliant on intelligence to provide information on Confederate movements and intentions."
Miller, Library Journal (from barnesandnoble.com), finds that the author "counters the common view that Ulysses Grant disdained military intelligence and fought on intuition alone by showing that Grant slowly acquired respect for and reliance on intelligence as the complexity and range of war widened and as intelligence gathering improved.... [F]inding the enemy and then striking him hard and often was Grant's formula for success. Military intelligence allowed him to act and especially guided his strategy in the East in 1864 and 1865.... Feis's book offers the first full-dress study of military intelligence and Grant's command. It also provides an essential primer on the ways intelligence was gathered and assessed during the war."
[CivWar/Un/Gen]
Feis, William
B.
1. "Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865." Civil War History 39, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 199-215.
ProQuest: "Good information coming at the right time was a key asset in the Union high command's effort to remove the Valley's strategic assets from Robert E. Lee's grasp and eliminate Early's chances to imitate Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley masterpiece of 1962."
2. "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12-July 14, 1964." Civil War History 36, no. 3 (Sep. 1990). [Petersen]
[CivWar/Battles]
Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.
In a prepublication report, Ricks and DeYoung, Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2008, call this book "a massive score-settling work" in which the author "blasts former secretary of state Colin Powell, the CIA, retired Gen. Tommy R. Franks and former Iraq occupation chief L. Paul Bremer for mishandling the run-up to the invasion and the subsequent occupation of the country."
Reporting on a book-launch event on 24 April 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Milbank, Washington Post, 25 Apr. 2008, notes that Feith's book is "designed to settle the score with his many opponents in the administration." With regard to the "campaign waged by Feith and his section of the Pentagon against the CIA when the agency argued that there was no evidence of al-Qaeda having ties to Saddam Hussein," Feith argued that "[t]he CIA and the intelligence community should not be shading intelligence." ... But the self-justification missed the obvious point: The CIA was correct."
[MI/Ops/Iraq/Books]
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