Fei - Fel

 

Feickert, Andrew.

1. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 17 Apr. 2006.

"Proposals to elevate the command of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the realignment of civil affairs, psychological operations (psyops) and combat search and rescue (CSAR) functions out from under the control of the U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)[] ha[ve] raised concerns that SOF is perhaps becoming too focused on immediate versus long-term results."

2. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 28 Jun. 2007. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf.

"Summary": "Special Operations Forces (SOF) play a significant role in U.S. military operations and the Administration has given U.S. SOF greater responsibility for planning and conducting worldwide counterterrorism operations. Recent leadership changes, the availability of SOF special mission unit (SMU) forces, and circumstances surrounding a Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) incident in Afghanistan might be issues for congressional consideration."

[MI/SpecOps/00s]

Feifer, George. "The Berlin Tunnel." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 10, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 63-71.

This effort reads more like an article from True magazine (thereby showing my age) than a serious analysis of the Cold War's Berlin Tunnel episode. For an author who describes CIA Berlin Operations Base Chief William Harvey as engaging in "hyperbole," Feifer seems rather given to the same failing. His evident belief that he needed to pump just a little more zest into an already intriguing scenario diminishes, rather than enhances, his retelling of this well-known story. And overly familiar references to "Big Bill" really do not add a touch of verisimilitude, as Feifer seems to believe.

[CIA/50s/Tunnel][c]

Fein, Bruce E.

Fein, Geoff. "Navy Stands Up Deep Red Cell to Study Enemy's Ability to Disrupt Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 2 (Apr. 2006): 28.

Interview from Defense Daily (20 Jan. 2006) with David Cattler, deputy assistant director of Naval Intelligence for Intelligence Support and director of Deep Red. "The Navy has established [in June 2005] Deep Red, an intelligence group that will offer a 'devil's advocate' perspective to ensure warfare commanders make more accurate decisions and to examine how adversaries might use available technologies, in non-traditional ways, to disrupt operations."

[MI/Navy/00s]

Feis, Herbert. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: Norton, 1970.

[GenPostwar/CW]

Feis, William B. Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

From publisher: "In the western theater, Grant was successful despite limited intelligence resources.... In the absence of intelligence data, Grant's initiative, determination, and drive carried him to success. In the East, however, to overcome Lee's advantages of strategic and operational mobility coupled with his own initiative, Grant had to adapt and became more reliant on intelligence to provide information on Confederate movements and intentions."

Miller, Library Journal (from barnesandnoble.com), finds that the author "counters the common view that Ulysses Grant disdained military intelligence and fought on intuition alone by showing that Grant slowly acquired respect for and reliance on intelligence as the complexity and range of war widened and as intelligence gathering improved.... [F]inding the enemy and then striking him hard and often was Grant's formula for success. Military intelligence allowed him to act and especially guided his strategy in the East in 1864 and 1865.... Feis's book offers the first full-dress study of military intelligence and Grant's command. It also provides an essential primer on the ways intelligence was gathered and assessed during the war."

[CivWar/Un/Gen]

Feis, William B.

1. "Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865." Civil War History 39, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 199-215. [Fishel: 39, no. 4 (Dec. 1993).]

ProQuest: "Good information coming at the right time was a key asset in the Union high command's effort to remove the Valley's strategic assets from Robert E. Lee's grasp and eliminate Early's chances to imitate Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley masterpiece of 1962."

2. "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12-July 14, 1964." Civil War History 36, no. 3 (Sep. 1990). [Petersen]

[CivWar/Battles]

Feklisov, Alexandre. Confession d'un Agent Soviétique. Paris: Éditions du Rocher, 1999. Feklisov, Alexander, and Sergei Kostin. Intro, Ronald Radosh. Tr., Catherine Dop. The Man Behind the Rosenbergs: Memoirs of the KGB Spymaster Who Also Controlled Klaus Fuchs and Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Enigma, 2001.

Commenting on the French-language edition, Kiracofe, AFIO WIN 24-99 (18 Jun. 1999) and Intelligencer 10.2, notes that Feklisov served as the case officer for both Julius Rosenberg (1943-1946) and Klaus Fuchs (1947-1949). The author "reveals significant details concerning his long career in Soviet intelligence, including a definitive presentation of the Rosenberg case.... There are also accounts of the successful exfiltration to the Soviet Union of Rosenberg colleagues Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant." Feklisov "includes much interesting commentary" about the Fuchs case. According to the reviewer, the author's "comments on his behind-the-scenes contacts, via John Scali, with the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis are particularly interesting."

Haynes, I&NS 17.3, finds that, with regard to the Rosenbergs, Feklisov "corroborates, fills in gaps, or fleshes out the story told in Radosh and Milton's The Rosenberg File." Feklisov is, however, "detailed and candid only in regard to Julius Rosenberg and the impressively large network of Communist engineers that Rosenberg brought into espionage. He describes other sources and agents, but in vague terms."

For Unsinger, IJI&C16.3, Radosh's introduction is "an interesting critique of Feklisov's revelations." However, Radosh "gives the impression that the entire book was about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, but it is about far more than them alone."

[GenPostwar/60s/Cuba; Russia/IntelMemoirs; SpyCases/US/BombGen; SpyCases/US/Rosenbergs]

Feldman, Daniel L. "Constitutional Dimensions of the Iran-Contra Affair." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 3 (Fall 1988): 381-397.

"The balance between security concerns, reflected in executive secrecy, and the free flow of information, necessary for informed dissent and debate, has shifted too far toward secrecy, and should be shifted back to a balance between the two."

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra; Overviews/Legal][c]

Feldt, Eric. The Coast Watchers. Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1946. Abridged edition. New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Pforzheimer: "Feldt was the original organizer and leader of the Coastwatchers."

[WWII/FE/Pac/AIB]

Felix, Christopher [James McCarger].

Feller, A.H. "OWI on the Home Front." Public Opinion Quarterly 7 (1943): 55-65. [Winkler]

[WWII/PsyWar]

Fellman, Philip Voss, and Roxana Wright. "Modeling Terrorist Networks: Complex Systems at the Mid-Range." Intelligencer 14, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2004): 59-66.

While acknowledging the impossibility of total predictivity, the authors argue that "the greatest room for improving the performance of those organizations tasked with preventing or combating terrorism is at the mid-range [emphasis in original]. That is, we think the application of the most recent advances in science is most likely to bear fruit in the fight against terrorism ... at an intermediate or organizational level."

[Terrorism/00s]

Felsen, Milt. The Anti-Warrior: A Memoir. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa, 1989.

http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/ww2/oss.htm: "Adventures as volunteer in Spain 1937-38 and w[ith] OSS, WWII. See Chaps. 11-13."

[WWII/OSS/Individuals]

Felstead, Sidney T. German Spies at Bay: Being an Actual Record of the German Espionage in Great Britain During the Years 1914-1918, Compiled from Official Sources. London: Hutchinson, 1920. New York: Brentano's, 1920.

Felstead, Sidney T. Germany and Her Spies: A Story of the Intrigues of the Nazis. London: Hutchinson, 1940.

Felstead, Sidney T. Intelligence -- An Indictment of a Colossal Failure. London: Hutchinson, 1941.

Wilcox: "General account of failure of pre-WWII intelligence efforts."

[UK/Interwar/Gen]

Felt, W. Mark. The FBI Pyramid from the Inside. New York: Putnam's, 1979.

Felton, John.  "Eight Americas Killed: Congress Rallies Behind Carter after Abortive Rescue Mission." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 26 Apr. 1980, 1067-1068.

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran]

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