Fei - Fek

Feickert, Andrew. U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 6 Feb. 2013. Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS21048.pdf.

From "Summary": "On January 5, 2012, the Administration unveiled its new strategic guidance refocusing U.S. strategic efforts to the Pacific and the Middle East and, at the same time, proposing significant cuts to ground forces. This new strategic direction has the potential to significantly affect U.S. SOF. USSOCOM leadership continues to pursue additional authorities that would enable it to control the movement of SOF units deployed to a theater of operations as well as give additional authorities to Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs).... Another possible issue for congressional consideration is the balance between direct and indirect special operations activities in world-wide counterterrorism operations."

[MI/SpecOps/10s/13]

Feifer, George. "The Berlin Tunnel." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History 10, no. 2 (Winter 1998): 63-71.

This effort reads more like an article from True magazine (thereby showing my age) than a serious analysis of the Cold War's Berlin Tunnel episode. For an author who describes CIA Berlin Operations Base Chief William Harvey as engaging in "hyperbole," Feifer seems rather given to the same failing. His evident belief that he needed to pump just a little more zest into an already intriguing scenario diminishes, rather than enhances, his retelling of this well-known story. And overly familiar references to "Big Bill" really do not add a touch of verisimilitude, as Feifer seems to believe.

[CIA/50s/Tunnel][c]

Feigin, Judy. The Office of Special Investigations: Striving for Accountability in the Aftermath of the Holocaust. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Dec. 2006. [Available at: http://documents.nytimes.com/confidential-report-provides-new-evidence-of-notorious-nazi-cases?ref=us#p=1]

From New York Times description: "An internal history of the United States government's Nazi-hunting operation provides gripping new evidence about some of the most notorious Nazi cases of the last three decades. The Justice Department kept the 600-page report secret for the last four years, releasing a heavily redacted version last month to a private research group that sued to force its release. A complete version was obtained by The New York Times."

[GewnPostwar/40s/Germans]

Fein, Bruce E. "The Constitution and Covert Action." Houston Journal of International Law 11, no. 1 (1988): 53-68. [Petersen]

[Overviews/Legal]

Fein, Bruce E. "Nonofficial Cover Is Worth the Risk." World Intelligence Review 14, no. 6 (Nov.-Dec. 1995): 2.

Editorial comment that the CIA's use of nonofficial cover should be increased, that such covers should include cover as journalists, and that the expense of NOCs requires that they not be used except when the value of what they might collect justifies the risk.

[CIA/90s/95/Gen][c]

Fein, Bruce E. "Official Secrecy and Deception Are Not Always Bad Things." Insight, 8 Jun. 1992, 23-24.

[GenPostCW/90s/Gen]

Fein, Bruce E. "Trivializing the CIA." World Intelligence Review 16, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1997): 2.

"[Anthony] Lake's nomination ... corroborates the trivialization of the CIA within the national security establishment. President Clinton treats the DCI post as no different than other high-level offices filled to accommodate his political needs."

[CIA/90s/97/Lake][c]

Fein, Geoff. "Navy Stands Up Deep Red Cell to Study Enemy's Ability to Disrupt Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 2 (Apr. 2006): 28.

Interview from Defense Daily (20 Jan. 2006) with David Cattler, deputy assistant director of Naval Intelligence for Intelligence Support and director of Deep Red. The Navy established in June 2005 "Deep Red, an intelligence group that will offer a 'devil's advocate' perspective to ensure warfare commanders make more accurate decisions and to examine how adversaries might use available technologies, in non-traditional ways, to disrupt operations."

[MI/Navy/00s]

Feinstein, Dianne (Sen., D-CA). "Feinstein Honors Defense Intelligence Agency: Resolution Commemorating 50th Anniversary Passes Senate Unanimously." Press Release. 12 May 2011. [http://feinstein.senate.gov]

On 12 May 2011, the U.S. Senate "unanimously approved S. Res. 86, honoring the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) on its 50th anniversary."

[MI/DIA/10s]

Feis, Herbert. From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 1945-1950. New York: Norton, 1970.

[GenPostwar/CW]

Feis, William B. Grant's Secret Service: The Intelligence War from Belmont to Appomattox. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

From publisher: "In the western theater, Grant was successful despite limited intelligence resources.... In the absence of intelligence data, Grant's initiative, determination, and drive carried him to success. In the East, however, to overcome Lee's advantages of strategic and operational mobility coupled with his own initiative, Grant had to adapt and became more reliant on intelligence to provide information on Confederate movements and intentions."

Miller, Library Journal (from barnesandnoble.com), finds that the author "counters the common view that Ulysses Grant disdained military intelligence and fought on intuition alone by showing that Grant slowly acquired respect for and reliance on intelligence as the complexity and range of war widened and as intelligence gathering improved.... [F]inding the enemy and then striking him hard and often was Grant's formula for success. Military intelligence allowed him to act and especially guided his strategy in the East in 1864 and 1865.... Feis's book offers the first full-dress study of military intelligence and Grant's command. It also provides an essential primer on the ways intelligence was gathered and assessed during the war."

[CivWar/Un/Gen]

Feis, William B.

1. "Neutralizing the Valley: The Role of Military Intelligence in the Defeat of Jubal Early's Army of the Valley, 1864-1865." Civil War History 39, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 199-215.

ProQuest: "Good information coming at the right time was a key asset in the Union high command's effort to remove the Valley's strategic assets from Robert E. Lee's grasp and eliminate Early's chances to imitate Stonewall Jackson's Shenandoah Valley masterpiece of 1962."

2. "A Union Military Intelligence Failure: Jubal Early's Raid, June 12-July 14, 1864." Civil War History 36, no. 3 (Sep. 1990). [Petersen]

[CivWar/Battles]

Feith, Douglas J. War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terrorism. New York: HarperCollins, 2008.

In a prepublication report, Ricks and DeYoung, Washington Post, 9 Mar. 2008, call this book "a massive score-settling work" in which the author "blasts former secretary of state Colin Powell, the CIA, retired Gen. Tommy R. Franks and former Iraq occupation chief L. Paul Bremer for mishandling the run-up to the invasion and the subsequent occupation of the country."

Reporting on a book-launch event on 24 April 2008 at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Milbank, Washington Post, 25 Apr. 2008, notes that Feith's book is "designed to settle the score with his many opponents in the administration." With regard to the "campaign waged by Feith and his section of the Pentagon against the CIA when the agency argued that there was no evidence of al-Qaeda having ties to Saddam Hussein," Feith argued that "'[t]he CIA and the intelligence community should not be shading intelligence.' ... But the self-justification missed the obvious point: The CIA was correct."

[MI/Ops/00s/Iraq/Books]

Feklisov, Alexandre. Confession d'un Agent Soviétique. Paris: Éditions du Rocher, 1999. Feklisov, Alexander, and Sergei Kostin. Intro, Ronald Radosh. Tr., Catherine Dop. The Man Behind the Rosenbergs: Memoirs of the KGB Spymaster Who Also Controlled Klaus Fuchs and Helped Resolve the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: Enigma, 2001.

Feklisov died on 26 October 2007. Martin Weil, "Alexander Feklisov, 93; Key Soviet Spy in U.S.," Washington Post, 3 Nov. 2007.

Commenting on the French-language edition, Kiracofe, AFIO WIN 24-99 (18 Jun. 1999) and Intelligencer 10.2, notes that Feklisov served as the case officer for both Julius Rosenberg (1943-1946) and Klaus Fuchs (1947-1949). The author "reveals significant details concerning his long career in Soviet intelligence, including a definitive presentation of the Rosenberg case.... There are also accounts of the successful exfiltration to the Soviet Union of Rosenberg colleagues Joel Barr and Alfred Sarant." Feklisov "includes much interesting commentary" about the Fuchs case. According to the reviewer, the author's "comments on his behind-the-scenes contacts, via John Scali, with the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis are particularly interesting."

Haynes, I&NS 17.3, finds that, with regard to the Rosenbergs, Feklisov "corroborates, fills in gaps, or fleshes out the story told in Radosh and Milton's The Rosenberg File." Feklisov is, however, "detailed and candid only in regard to Julius Rosenberg and the impressively large network of Communist engineers that Rosenberg brought into espionage. He describes other sources and agents, but in vague terms." For Unsinger, IJI&C16.3, Radosh's introduction is "an interesting critique of Feklisov's revelations." However, Radosh "gives the impression that the entire book was about Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, but it is about far more than them alone."

See also, Joseph Albright and Marcia Kunstel, "Retired KGB Spymaster Lifts Veil on Rosenbergs," Washington Times, 19 Mar. 1997, A1, A6.

[GenPostwar/60s/Cuba; Russia/IntelMemoirs; SpyCases/US/Bomb/Fuchs; SpyCases/US/Bomb/Rosenbergs]

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