Eoyang, Carson. "Models of Espionage." In Citizen Espionage: Studies in Trust and Betrayal, eds. Theodore S. Sarbin, Ralph M. Carney, and Carson Eoyang, 69-91. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.
Ephron, Dan. "Jailed For 23 Years, An Old Spy Asks For a Fresh Start." Newsweek, 12 Jan. 2009. [http://www.newsweek.com]
Jonathan Jay Pollard's lawyers and the Justice Department have told Newsweek that Pollard "would like President Bush to commute his sentence to time served -- the first time Pollard has submitted such a request.... Much of the U.S. intelligence community remains against a commutation."
Ephron, Henry D. "An American Cryptanalyst in Australia." Cryptologia 9, no. 4 (Oct. 1985): 337-340.
The author worked at the Ascot Park, Brisbane, intercept site during World War II.
Eppler, John. Operation Condor: Rommel's Spy. London: Macdonald & Jane's, 1977.
Constantinides notes that this Abwehr operation in Egypt was wrapped up by the British in 1942. Eppler participated in the operation. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War (1978), reveals that the mission was compromised from the start by Ultra intelligence.
Epstein, Edward J.
Epstein, Rafael, and Dylan Welch. "Secret Squadron: SAS Elite Operate at Large as Spies in Africa." Brisbane Times, 13 Mar. 2012. [http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au]
"A secret squadron of Australian SAS soldiers has been operating at large in Africa, performing work normally done by spies.... The deployment of the SAS's 4 Squadron ... has put the special forces unit at the outer reaches of Australian and international law.... [T]roopers from the squadron have mounted dozens of secret operations over the past year in African nations including Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Kenya.... It is believed the missions have involved gathering intelligence on terrorism and scoping rescue strategies for Australian civilians trapped by kidnapping or civil war."
Epstein, Samuel, and Beryl Williams. The Real Book About Spies. Garden City, NY: Garden City Books, 1953.
Wilcox: "General popular account of spies and spying."
Epstein, Stephen M., R.S. Cronin, and J.G. Pulley. "JTF (Joint Task Force) Haiti: A United Nations Foreign Internal Defense Mission." Special Warfare 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1994): 2-9. [Gibish]
Erard, Michael. "Translation in the Age of Terror." Intelligencer 14, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2005): 61-65.
This article discusses the potential of the National Virtual Translation Center, created in 2001 by the Patriot Act but not funded until 2003. The focus is on developing tools to assist translators in their work. The author writes with a host of caveats, such as, "if...," "hopes to...," and "could...."
Erckenbrack, Adrian A., and Aaron Scholer. "The DOD Role in Homeland Security." Joint Forces Quarterly 35 (Summer 2003): 34-41.
Erickson, Andrew S. "Eyes in the Sky." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 136, no. 4 (Apr. 2010): 36-41.
The author reviews PRC surveillance satellite capabilities in considerable detail. His conclusion is: "With 15 new satellites launched in 2008 alone and an ambitious program to produce more space-based surveillance technology, China is increasing its ability to monitor its near seas with deadly precision."
Ericson, Paul G. "The Need for Ethical Norms." Studies in Intelligence 36, no. 5 (1992): 15-18.
"We take great pride in our Agency's specialness.... This pride is well placed." But it "has its dark side, which has its costs. One of the foremost has been our seemingly sustained reluctance to formalize the ethical minimums which should govern our business and to pass these findings on to those who join the Agency."
Erikson, Kai. "Of Accidental Judgment and Casual Slaughters." The Nation, 3 Aug. 1985, 80-85.
Eriksson, Pär. "Intelligence in Peacekeeping Operations." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 1-18.
The author, drawing on the Swedish peacekeeping experience, focuses on operational/tactical level intelligence. He notes that the "UN's systems for intelligence management are weak in that the organization actually relies on being supplied with intelligence collected by the great powers." Eriksson argues that in the most dangerous situations, "the peacekeeping organizations should assume the right to carry out intelligence operations by almost any suitable method," in the interest of guaranteeing the security of the forces it has placed at risk.
Eringer, Robert. RUSE: Undercover with FBI Counterintelligence. Dulles, VA: Potomac, 2008.
According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), this work concerns the author's activities with the FBI to lure Edward Lee Howard back to the United States, where he could be arrested for espionage. In terms of documentation, it "falls squarely in the 'trust me' category" and "struggles to attain mediocrity."
Erlanger, Steven. "C.I.A. Official Quits Nonproliferation Post." New York Times, 21 Oct. 1997, A8 (N).
Gordon C. Oehler, director of the CIA's Nonproliferation Center, has taken early retirement. He said that "he was tired of being a target for criticism in a stressful job." Oehler insisted that he was not being forced to retire. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Top CIA Proliferation Aide, Facing Budget Cuts, Quits," Washington Post, 22 Oct. 1997, A19.
Erlanger, Steven. "Israeli Found Spy's Data Irresistible." New York Times, 3 Mar. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Rafi Eitan, Jonathan Pollard's Israeli intelligence handler, has told the newspaper Yediot Aharonot that "Pollard provided such good information that he could not face stopping the operation even though it was aimed at Israel's closest ally, the United States." Eitan said that Pollard "never exposed American agents in the Soviet Union or elsewhere."
Erlanger, Steven. "Israelis Fault Intelligence Agencies on Bombings by Hamas Cell." New York Times, 2 Sep. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 1 September 2004, "Israeli intelligence agencies came under careful criticism ... for their failure to crack the Hamas cell in Hebron that carried out the twin suicide bombings in Beersheba" on 31 August 2004.
Erlanger, Steven. "U.S. Negotiating with Germany to Avoid C.I.A. Man's Expulsion." New York Times, 12 Mar. 1997, A5 (N).
The fate of the CIA officer reported by Der Spiegel to have been expelled from Germany has not yet been decided. U.S. and German officials continue to negotiate over the broader issues that seem to be at the heart of this current division between the two allies: the role of American intelligence in Germany in the aftermath of the Cold War and intelligence sharing. For previous report, see Alan Cowell, "Bonn Said to Expel U.S. Envoy Accused of Economic Spying," New York Times, 10 Mar. 1997, A6 (N).
Ermarth, Fritz. "The Role of Analysis." Periscope 13, no. 4 (1988): 7-11.
Former Chairman, National Intelligence Council (NIC).
Ermarth, Fritz W. "Seeing Russia Plain: The Russian Crisis and American Intelligence." The National Interest, Spring 1999, 5-14.
Sorting out the political and economic situation in today's Russia "is a mighty challenge for analysis, policymaking and investment.... Russian crime and corruption are deeply embedded in the failure of Russia to advance toward real democracy and capitalism since 1991, as cause, consequence, and symbol of Russian realities.... They are pervasive in government, politics, business, and security affairs; even foreign relations are affected." In the last years of the Soviet regime, "intelligence, business, politics and crime blurred indistinguishably into each other....
"American intelligence analysts and policymakers should have known about the Russian crime and corruption problem as a threat to reform and as a challenge to our grasp of Russian realities. Indeed, a fine analysis was done by the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research in April 1992. But subsequently, neither American intelligence analysis nor American policymakers adequately appreciated the crime and corruption problem.... The recipients evidently did not want to hear" about the corruption of high Russian figures.
"Intelligence analysis brought its own vulnerabilities to the table, first, in the form of a post-Cold War agenda that has become ever more operational (i.e., supportive of daily business) rather than focusing on understanding the big picture; and second, a management code that prizes above all serving -- which can easily degenerate into pleasing -- the customer. Our policymakers did not much want, and our intelligence analysts had little incentive to provide, a big-picture, long-term assessment of Russian realities....
"In the end, these failings did not, I believe, have a direct impact on U.S. policy. Rather, they represented some participation by U.S. intelligence analysis in a general pattern of overlooking the darker sides of Russian realities."
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