Emerson, Steven.
Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan
Era. New York: Putnam's, 1988.
Emerson, Steven.
Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan
Era. New York: Putnam's, 1988.
For Valcourt, IJI&C 2.3, the "book's promise and actual content do not match up adequately.... While purportedly telling about covert operations, the book instead details much of the corruption that has plagued the special forces.... Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) ... was, and still is, one of the Pentagon's most highly classified organizations."
To Lowenthal, the book is "[u]seful in highlighting the difficulties inherent in command and control of such operations, but weaker in assessing their propriety and utility."
Bar-Joseph, I&NS 4.3, finds that Emerson's description of the activities of the Army's Special Operations Division since its establishment in 1981 "is rich in detail." While his account "is fluent and colorful," the author seems to take his sources -- many of them the "secret warriors" themselves -- "at face value, giving them more credit than they deserve and foregoing even the simplest criticism of small operational details which contradict common sense."
[MI/SpecOps]
Emerson, Steven.
"Where Have All the Spies Gone?" New York Times Magazine,
12 Aug. 1990, 16-21, 28-30.
[GenPostCW/90s/Gen]
Emerson,
Thomas I.
1. "Control of Government Intelligence Agencies: The American Experience." Political Quarterly 53, no. 3 (Jul. 1982): 273-291.
2. "Controlling the Spies." Center Magazine, Jan.-Feb. 1979, 69-74. [Petersen]
[Oversight]
Emerson, Tony. "The CIA Lands a Big Fish." Newsweek, 8 Sep. 1997, 54.
North Korea's Ambassador to Egypt, who defected to the United States at the end of August together with his Paris-based brother, had been working for the CIA for some time prior to his defection. See also Anthony Spaeth, "Another One Slips Away," Time, 8 Sep. 1997.
[CIA/90s/97; OtherCountries/NKorea][c]
Enahoro, Peter.
"Did the CIA Kill Lumumba?" Africa, Oct. 1975, 11-13. [Petersen]
[CA/Africa]
Enever, Ted.
Britain's Best Secret: Ultra's Base at Bletchley Park. Stroud, UK: Alan Sutton, 1994. Dover, NH: Alan Sutton, 1994. 2d ed. Dover, NH: Alan Sutton, 1995.
Kruh, Cryptologia 20.1, sees this as "a fascinating 'tour'" of the Bletchley Park complex. The author provides "an account of the activities in each building, machines and equipment, and many of the people who worked there."
According to Nautical Brass Bibliography, this book presents "[h]istory, physical description and tour of Bletchley Park as it is today. [There are m]inimal references to codebreaking, per se."
[UK/WWII/Ultra]
Engelberg, Stephen. "30 Years of Spying for China Is Charged." New York Times, 27 Nov. 1985, B8.
[SpyCases/U.S./Other/Chin]
Engelberg, Stephen. "Webster Dismisses or Disciplines." New York Times, 18 Dec. 1987. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to administration officials on 17 December 1987, DCI William H. Webster "has dismissed two field operatives and disciplined three senior officials for improper actions during the Iran-contra affair.... Webster acted after receiving a report from Russell Bruemmer, the lawyer he named as special counsel to examine the role of agency officials in the sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of some profits to the contras." Although Webster's statement did not name the two dismissed officials, administration officials said they "were Joe Fernandez, the former station chief in Costa Rica, and the chief of base in Honduras, whose identity has not been publicly disclosed."
Administration officials said that the "senior officials disciplined ... were Alan Fiers, chief of the Central America Task Force, who was reprimanded; Duane C. Clarridge, head of the C.I.A.'s counter-terrorism unit, who was stripped of that job, reprimanded and urged to take early retirement; and Charles Allen, a national intelligence officer, who was reprimanded. A reprimand means the employee cannot be promoted or given a bonus for two years." The text of Bruemmer's report "is classified and was not released."
[CIA/80s/Gen, Components/DO, & DCIs/Webster]
Engelberg, Stephen. "Webster Names Ex-Agent to Top C.I.A. Post." New York Times, 9 Dec. 1987. [http://www.nytimes.com]
DCI William H. Webster on 8 December 1987 named Richard F. Stolz to head the CIA's Directorate of Operations. Stolz "retired from the agency in 1981 as chief of the division that handles operations in the Soviet Union," after DCI William J. Casey named Max Hugel, a businessman, to head operations. Stolz replaces Clair E. George.
[CIA/Components/DO]
Engle,
Anita. The Nili Spies. London: Hogarth, 1959. Jerusalem: Phoenix Publications, 1989. Intro., Peter Calvocoressi. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
According to Constantinides, the Nili intelligence organization operated in Palestine in 1917. It was organized by Zionists Aaron and Sarah Aaronson, and provided assistance to the British with the hope of support for Jewish aspirations after the war. The organization's work is not the focus of this sympathetic book. There is more to be done in assessing Nili's contributions.
Commenting on the reprint of this book, Tauber, I&NS 7.3, says that there is too little emphasis on the group's intelligence activities, either what the group collected or how the information benefited the British. However, the main faults of the book are a general lack of footnotes and the fact that it is based on Nili documents without reference to British or Ottoman sources.
[Israel/Historical; WWI/UK]
Englemann,
Larry. Tears Before Rain: An Oral History of the Last Days of the Fall of South Vietnam. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. [Petersen]
[Vietnam]
English, R. "A Counterintelligence and Counterterrorism Case: CISPES and the FBI." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989).
[FBI/DomSec/CISPES]
E.N.I. "CIA
Wants Option of Recruiting Clergy." Christian Century, 11-18
Sep. 1996, 844.
Report on comments by Rodney Page of the National Council of Churches and DCI John Deutch's response at 17 July 1996 session of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Page argued for an absolute ban on the use of clergy by the CIA.
[CIA/Relations]
Ennis, Jerry D.
1. "Anatoli Golitsyn: Long-time CIA Agent?" Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 26-45.
The answer to the author's question is, "no." It appears that James Angleton's suggestion otherwise was typically Angleton muddying the waters.
2. "What Did Angleton Say About Golitsyn?" Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 905-909.
The author revisits the conclusions in his earlier article about what Angleton said about Golitsin and why he said it. He argues that Angleton's point was that Golitsin had decided to defect long before he did, and had been gathering information to pass along when he did defect.
[CIA/60s/Gen; CIA/Angleton/Related]
Ennis, Michael
E. [BGEN/USMC]
1. "The Future of Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 1-2.
The Intelligence Community "should focus more of its effort on ... 'operationalizing' intelligence -- that is, making it more usable, understandable, and accessible to its consumers, the operators and planners.... [T]he first step in operationalizing intelligence needs to be a physical integration of intelligence personnel within critical warfighting functions.... The second step ... is to build intelligence products with the end user (the operator/planner) in mind.... The last step ... is for the commanders to take a more active role in intelligence."
2. "The Future of Intelligence." Marine Corps Gazette, Oct. 1999, 46-47.
An earlier version of the above.
[GenPostCW/90s/Gen; GenPostCW/00s/Gen; MI/Marines]
Ensign, Eric S. [LT/USN] Intelligence in the Rum War at Sea, 1920-1933. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2001.
Hanyok, I&NS 17.2, notes that Ensign covers "many interesting aspects of the Coast Guard's intelligence effort" in this "well-written history." However, "[d]espite the details, he does not organize them into a coherent whole.... [T]he book never effectively demonstrates how intelligence actually affected the overall efforts to control maritime liquor smuggling."
For Anderson, Intelligencer 13.1, this "interesting little study" should have avoided the "use of some current military bureaucratic jargon" such as "force multiplier" and "dominant battlespace knowledge."
Heitmann, JIH 2.2, notes that "[t]he U.S. Coast Guard waged an unrelenting campaign to detect, monitor, apprehend, and support the prosecution of those who smuggled alcohol on the high seas and navigable waterways of the United States." The Coast Guard used intelligence "to bridge the capabilities gap between well-organized smugglers and under-resourced law enforcement.... [Ensign's] study ... brings to light the massive, all-source intelligence effort that provided the backbone of Coast Guard operations in the 'Rum War at Sea.'"
[MI/CG]
Ensor,
David. "Biggest U.S. Spy Agency Choking on Too Much Information."
CNN, 25 Nov. 1999. [http://www.cnn.com]
The National Security Agency "is in crisis, overwhelmed by too many targets, too much information and the challenges created by increasingly sophisticated technologies."
[NSA]
Ensor, David, Jonathan Karl, and Steve Turnham. "CIA Under Fire in Iraqi Intelligence Flap." CNN, 11 Jul. 2003. [http://www.cnn.com]
In a written statement on 11 July 2003, SSCI Chairman Sen. Pat Roberts (R-KS) criticized the CIA's "'extremely sloppy handling' of some prewar intelligence on Iraq and accused the agency of leaking information that reflected badly on President Bush."
[GenPostCW/00s/03/IraqiUranium]
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