Ekpe, Bassey. "The Intelligence Assets of the United Nations: Sources, Methods, and Implications." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 377-400.
"[A]mple evidence shows that the UN already has well-established information and analysis systems." Yet, there is "a lack of criteria and clear definitions of an appropriate intelligence system for the organization."
Ekpe, Bassey. The United Nations and the Rationale for Collective Intelligence. Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2009.
For Peake, Studies 55.1 (Mar. 2011), it is a given that "the UN requires information and intelligence to perform its peacekeeping missions." However, "the UN's acquisition of intelligence is complicated by national secrecy issues. Whether the complex considerations described by Ekpe are a necessary prerequisite for dealing with these issues is unclear."
El-Ad, Avri, with James Creech, III. Decline of Honor. Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1976.
Pforzheimer notes that "the failure and exposure of the [Lavon] operation created government crises in Israel for some years." According to Constantinides, El-Ad certainly "has [the] credentials to speak on the case," but his "partisan and emotional involvement" make deferral of judgment wise.
Elcock, Ward. "CSIS Statement on Counter-Terrorism." CASIS Intelligence Newsletter 33 (Fall 1998): 9-16.
Statement by the CSIS Director to the Senate Special Committee on Security and Intelligence, House of Commons, 24 June 1998. Elcock states that "[w]ith perhaps the singular exception of the United States, there are more international terrorist groups active [in Canada] than in any other country of the world." (Emphasis in original)
Elder, Gregory. "Intelligence in War: It Can Be Decisive." Studies in Intelligence 50, no. 2 (2006): 13-25. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol50no2/html_files/Intelligence_War_2.htm]
This article explores "the role of tactical and operational intelligence in dictating force employment schemes and as a decisive element in five strategically significant battles -- the First Battle of Bull Run (1861), Tannenberg (1914), Midway (1942), Inchon (1950), and the Israeli air strike initiating the Six-Day War in 1967." The author argues that "it was neither technology nor material superiority that won the day, but accurate, timely, actionable intelligence, combined with leaders willing to treat intelligence as a primary factor in deciding outcomes."
Elder, Robert E. The Information Machine: The USIA and American Foreign Policy. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968.
Eldredge, Wentworth [MAJ/USAF (Ret.)]. "Biggest Hoax of the War: Operation FORTITUDE -- The Allied Deception Plan that Fooled the Germans about Normandy." Air Power History 37 (Fall 1990): 15-22. [Seymour]
Eldridge, Justin L.C. "The Blarney Stone and the Rhine: 23rd Headquarters, Special Troops and the Rhine River Crossing, March 1945." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 3 (Jul. 1992): 211-241.
The 23rd Headquarters, Special Troops, were organized in 1944 to conduct tactical deception operations in support of the Allied advance across Europe. Its efforts were largely "a series of unrelated and ineffective deception operations that contributed little to the supported combat operations." With regard to the Rhine crossing in March 1945, the author concludes that German military intelligence was in such disarray by this time that the extensive deception efforts of the 23rd were not even noticed by the Germans.
Eldridge, Justin L.C.
1. "Defense on the Rhine." Military Intelligence 21, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1995): 38-44, 52.
With regard to the Allied Rhine crossings in March 1945, "German intelligence fell far short of success and significantly hindered German efforts to halt Montgomery's assault.... German intelligence during the Rhine River crossing failed at the operational level of war."
2. "Delusions of Grandeur: Ethnocentrism and Wehrmacht Intelligence Analysis." Military Intelligence 18, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1992): 20-25.
3. "German Human Intelligence and the Conduct of 'Operation CITADEL.'" Military Intelligence 15, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar. 1989): 23-25.
Eldridge, Justin L.C. "The Myth of Army Tactical Deception." Military Review 70, no. 8 (Aug. 1990): 67-78.
The author is less than complimentary of the Army's ability to make use of deception techniques.
Electronic Privacy Information Center. Cryptography and Liberty 1999: An International Survey of Encryption Policy. Washington, DC: 1999.
From the "Executive Summary": The U.S. government "continues to lead efforts for encryption controls around the world." It has exerted economic and diplomatic pressure on other countries in an attempt to force them into adopting restrictive policies. The U.S. position may be explained, in part, by the dominant role that national intelligence and federal law enforcement agencies hold in the development of encryption policy."
"Electronic Warfare." In Jane's Military Communications, 1995-96, ed. John Williamson, 607-847. Alexandria, VA: Jane's Information Group, 1995.
el-Gamasy, Mohamed Abdel Ghani. The October War: Memories of Field Marshal Gamasy of Egypt. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1993.
Elgood, Giles. "More Spies Accused in Growing UK Cold War Scandal." Reuters, 18 Sep. 1999.
In addition to the BBC's accusation that Hull University lecturer Robin Pearson spied for the East German Stasi from 1977, "[t]wo more academics -- Vic Allen, a retired sociology professor, and Gwyneth Edwards, a former German studies lecturer -- were named by three British Sunday newspapers" as having spied for the Stasi.
Elias-Sanborn, Barbara, ed. The Central Intelligence Agency's 9/11 File: Top Secret CIA Documents on Osama bin Laden Declassified. National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 381. Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 19 Jun. 2012. [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB381/]
The National Security Archive on 19 June 2012 posted "over 100 recently released CIA documents relating to September 11, Osama bin Laden, and U.S. counterterrorism operations." The documents, obtained by the Archive "under the Freedom of Information Act, are referred to in footnotes to the 9/11 Commission Report. The collection includes rarely released CIA emails, raw intelligence cables, analytical summaries, high-level briefing materials, and comprehensive counterterrorism reports."
Eliot, Frank."Moon Bounce Elint." Studies in Intelligence 11, no. 2 (Spring 1967): 59-65. [Richelson, Wizards (2002)]
Elkins, Dan [LCDR/USNR].
1. "The Critical Role of the Resource Manager in the US Intelligence Community." Defense Intelligence Journal 1, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 205-221.
See "Follow-Up Article: Intelligence Resource Management," Defense Intelligence Journal 2, no. 1 (Spring 1993), 93-95.
2. Financial Management of Intelligence Resources: A Primer. Washington, DC: Defense Intelligence College, 1992.
3. An Intelligence Resource Manager's Guide. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, Defense Intelligence Agency, 1997.
Return to E Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents